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THE END OF THE AGE OF OIL
By David Goodstein
Published by CalTech News, California Institute of Technology
Vol. 38, No.2, 2004
This article is adapted from a talk that Caltech vice provost and
professor of physics and applied physics David Goodstein presented at an
April 29 program of the Institute support group, the Caltech Associates.
Goodstein’s new book, Out of Gas: The End of the Age of Oil, was
published in February by W. W. Norton.
In the 1950s, it was not Saudi Arabia but the United States that was the
world’s greatest producer of oil. Much of our military and industrial
might grew out of our giant oil industry, and most people in the oil
business thought that this bonanza would go on forever. But there was
one gentleman who knew better. He was an oil exploration geologist named
Marion King Hubbert.
In about 1950, Hubbert realized that the trajectory of oil discovery in
the continental United States was going to be a classic bell-shaped
curve, for the decades from 1910 to 1970, in billions of barrels per
year (see figure 1, below). He also saw that there would be a second
bell-shaped curve that would represent production, or consumption, or
extraction. The oil industry likes to call it “production,” but the
industry doesn’t really produce any oil at all. It does, however,
reflect the rate at which we use the oil up. Perhaps you could call it
supply.

Hubbert realized that using what he knew in 1950 about the history of
discoveries, along with what was already known about consumption, and a
little mathematics, he should be able to predict that second bell-shaped
curve. And so he did (see figure 2, below). The red, bell-shaped curve
is the kind of curve he predicted. The black points are the actual
historical data, and the uppermost point represents what has come to be
known as Hubbert’s Peak. Obviously, he was doing something right.
The situation worldwide is a little less well-determined. A third
graphic provided by the energy conglomerate BP, shows what the world’s
known crude oil reserves are (see figure 3, left-hand graph, below). The
amount that we have now is a trillion barrels of oil. So people in the
industry might say, we have a trillion barrels just sitting there
waiting to be pumped out of the ground; we’re using it up at a rate of
about 25 billion barrels a year, and so we have 40 more years to
go—there’s nothing to worry about. But as Hubbert has shown us, that’s
the wrong way of looking at it .

Before we leave that curve, though, I want to point out that a sudden
jump of 300–400 billion barrels of oil in OPEC (the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries) reserves occurs in the late 1980s (see
figure 3, left-hand graph, above). But there were no significant
discoveries of oil in OPEC countries during that period. What happened
instead is that OPEC changed its quota for how much each country could
pump on the basis of what it claimed in reserves, and politicians
discovered 400 billion barrels of oil without ever drilling a hole in
the ground! This helps us to understand how undependable these numbers
are for worldwide proven oil reserves.
As you can see, the curve that traces the historic record of oil
discovery peaks around 1960. In other words, Hubbert’s peak for oil
discovery came and went 40 years ago.
The curve for oil usage, as you can see, is a rising curve and will
become a bell-shaped curve eventually. Note that for the last quarter
century, we’ve been using oil faster than we have been discovering it.
World reserves should have decreased during that time by about 200
billion barrels. Instead, as we’ve seen, they’ve increased by 400
billion barrels. In any case, it should be possible, given this much
information, to make a prediction similar to the one that Hubbert made
for the continental United States for worldwide oil production.
One such estimate was published in 1998 in Scientific American. It
predicts that we will have a worldwide maximum in oil production just
about now—around the middle of the decade 2000–2010. What will happen
when we reach that peak we don’t really know. But we had a foretaste in
1973 and ’79 when the OPEC countries took advantage of the supply
shortage in the United States and shut down the valve a bit. What
happened, as you may recall, is that we had instant panic and despair
for the future of our way of life, and mile-long lines at gas stations.
We don’t know what’s going to happen at the next peak, but we do know
that those past peaks were artificial and temporary. The next one will
not be artificial and it will not be temporary.
However, we have to use caution in evaluating these types of
predictions. One crucial quantity that goes into making such an estimate
is knowing how much oil Mother Nature originally made for us—that is,
how much oil was in the ground before we ever started pumping it. The
Scientific American estimate used 1.8 trillion barrels of oil as the
baseline number. Today it looks like 2.1–2.2 trillion barrels might be
more accurate. That number—the total amount of oil that ever
existed—tends to increase with time for a variety of reasons.
First, new technology and new discoveries have exactly the same
effect—they both make more oil available. Secondly, as oil becomes
scarcer and the price goes up, more oil becomes available at the
increased price, because you can invest more capital into pulling it out
of the ground. And finally, these estimates depend to some extent on
those proven reserve numbers and, as we’ve already seen, those numbers
are not very reliable. Nevertheless, the central idea of the Hubbert
Curve is certainly correct: the supply of any natural resource
invariably rises from zero to a maximum point, and then it falls
forever. Oil will behave in the same way.
In 1997, Kenneth Deffeyes, a former Shell Oil geologist who’s now an
emeritus professor of geosciences at Princeton, published a book he
entitled Hubbert’s Peak—The Impending World Oil Shortage. In it,
Deffeyes said he knew that Hubbert had been right and that the peak for
domestic production had been reached when he saw this sentence in 1971
in the San Francisco Chronicle: “The Texas Railroad Commission announced
a 100% allowable for next month.”
To demystify that sentence, the Texas Railroad Commission was the
quaintly named cartel that controlled the U.S. oil industry by making
strategic use of the excess capacity for pumping in Texas. When the
commission said, “100% allowable for next month,” it meant that there
was no longer any excess capacity. They were pumping flat-out, and
therefore Hubbert’s Peak had been reached.
Ever since reading this, I’ve thought that the signal that the worldwide
peak had been reached would be when we found out that Saudi Arabian
production had peaked. For the last few decades, the Saudis have been
using excess pumping capacity to manipulate the world oil market in
exactly the same way the Texans once did.
Well, on February 24 of this year, a story appeared on the front page of
the New York Times entitled “Forecast of Rising Oil Demand Challenges
Tired Saudi Fields.” Among other things, the article said that Saudi
Arabia’s oil fields are in decline, prompting industry and government
officials to raise serious questions about whether the kingdom will be
able to satisfy the world’s thirst for oil in the coming years.
This is a New York Times story, so it’s very long, as many Times stories
are, and it’s written in a style in which each successive paragraph is
contradicted by the next paragraph. This is called “balanced reporting.”
Sure enough, much farther down in the article, we find these words:
“Some economists are optimistic that if oil prices rise high enough,
advanced recovery techniques will be applied, averting supply problems.”
But here comes the contradiction in the next paragraph, “But, privately,
some Saudi oil officials are less sanguine.”
I don’t know whether we will look back years from now and say that this
was the beginning of the end of the age of oil. We’re much too close to
it to tell, and our figures are, overall, much too uncertain. But, to
those people who are aware of the Hubbert’s Peak predictions, as the
writer of this article apparently was not, this was a chilling report.
Economists tell us that there can never be a gap between supply and
demand because the process is regulated by price. That’s never been true
in the case of oil, because it has always been controlled by cartels,
first in Texas and later by OPEC. However, once the peak occurs, OPEC
will lose control of the situation, and the price mechanism will kick in
with a vengeance. But the supply can keep up with the price only if
there is something to supply.
I’m sometimes asked, what about replenishing our oil reserves through
deep-ocean exploration? I’m already factoring in close-to-shore oil
production, but the deep oceans are essentially unexplored and, it’s
true, we don’t know whether there’s any oil out there. Over the last
hundreds of millions of years, oil typically has been manufactured in
places that are rich in life, which deep oceans are not. But the
landmasses have moved around over geologic time, so there may be
deep-ocean oil reserves.
Even so, deep oceans are technically extremely difficult places to drill
for oil. That leaves us with only two remaining reservoirs—the South
China Sea, which currently has seven countries claiming mineral rights
to it; and Siberia, which has very bad access problems. And those
resources, of course, are finite also. So let’s see what else there is
to use, aside from oil.
The word “oil” covers more than just the conventional light crude that
we’ve been pumping up to now. It also covers heavy oil, oil sands, and
tar sands. Heavy oil is essentially what’s left behind in the field
after you pump the light crude away. And, of course, if you put more
money in—that’s the price mechanism—you can usually squeeze a little
more oil out of any field. But it’s both more costly and more
time-consuming to get that oil out. And the more you pump out, the
heavier it gets.
Natural gas could be a very good substitute for oil. Cars that are not
very different from those we drive today can run on compressed natural
gas, and it’s a particularly clean-burning fuel. But if we turn to
natural gas in a major way to replace diminishing supplies of oil, it
will only be a temporary solution. The Hubbert Peak for natural gas is
only a decade or so behind Hubbert’s Peak for oil.
Oil was created when so-called source rock, full of organic inclusions,
sank deep within the earth. The inside of the earth is heated by natural
radioactivity, and the deeper you go, the hotter it gets. This source
rock sank just deep enough into the heated interior for the organic
matter to get cooked into oil. Rock that sank deeper got overcooked and
became natural gas. Rock that sank to a more shallow level became shale
oil, which is essentially unborn oil that can be made into a fuel by
strip-mining, crushing, and heating the rocks until you generate a
usable liquid. People who have invested many millions of dollars into
trying to exploit this resource have come to the conclusion that it will
probably always be energy-negative, meaning that you will always have to
put more energy into acquiring and processing it than you will ever get
out of it.
Methane hydrate is a solid that looks like ice, but that burns if you
ignite it. It consists of methane trapped in a sort of cage of water
molecules and it gets created when methane comes into contact with water
under very high pressure at very low temperatures close to the freezing
point of water. Nobody has any idea of where all it is, how much there
is, whether it can be mined, or how it could be used—all we know is that
this stuff exists.
Finally, there is coal. We are told that there is enough coal in the
ground for hundreds, maybe even thousands of years, at the present rate
of use. The fact that these estimates range over a factor of ten tells
you immediately that nobody has the foggiest notion of how much coal is
actually available. But even those projections might be considered
reliable, compared to the second part of that optimistic sentence: “at
the present rate of use”! We’ll get to that in a moment.
The largest coal deposits are in the United States, and China and Russia
have very large reserves as well. Coal can be liquefied and made into a
substitute for oil. That was done in Nazi Germany during World War II,
and in South Africa under apartheid. That alone should tell you that you
have to be fairly desperate to do it, but it can be done.
But, coal is a dirty, dirty fuel. It often comes with nasty impurities,
including mercury, arsenic, and sulfur. The mercury that accumulates in
the bodies of tuna or swordfish—and which has led to FDA warnings to
limit our consumption of these fish—originates in coal-fired power
plants in the United States. We use now about twice as much energy from
oil as we do from coal, so if you wanted to mine enough coal to replace
the missing oil, you’d have to mine it at a much higher rate, not only
to replace the oil, but also because the conversion process to oil is
extremely inefficient. You’d have to mine it at levels at least five
times beyond those we mine now—a coal-mining industry on an absolutely
unimaginable scale.
And even that doesn’t take into account the world’s increasing
population, or the fact that nations like China and India want to have a
higher standard of living, which means burning more energy. Finally, it
doesn’t take into account the Hubbert’s Peak effect, which is just as
valid for coal as it is for oil. Long before we have mined the last ton,
we will have started to deplete our ability to get the stuff out of the
ground. So, it’s a very good bet that the governing “rate of use” number
I mentioned earlier is not hundreds or thousands of years, and that no
more than one-tenth of that timeframe represents a realistic estimate.
What all this suggests is that if we accept the economists’ solution and
just let the marketplace do its thing as we make use of all the fossil
fuel we can, we’ll start running out of all fossil fuels by the end of
this century.
So, what does the future hold? Well, for one thing, there will be an oil
crisis very soon. Whether that means it has already begun or won’t
happen until later in this decade or sometime in the next decade, I
don’t know. In my view, the numbers are not dependable enough for us to
say. However, while the difference between those estimates may be very
important to us, it’s of no importance at all on the timescale of human
history. Either we, our children, or perhaps our grandchildren, are in
for some very, very bad times. If we turn to all the other fossil fuels
and burn them up as fast as we can, they will all probably start to run
out by the end of the 21st century. Assuming that our planet remains
habitable after such a vast consumption binge, we will have to invent a
way to live without fossil fuels. (See sidebar “Too Hot To Handle?”)
How about hydrogen? Both President Bush and California governor
Schwarzenegger have publicly embraced hydrogen as a solution to our fuel
problems. But there are only two commercially viable ways of making
hydrogen. One is to make it out of methane, which is a fossil fuel. The
other is to use fossil fuel to generate the electricity that you need to
electrolyze water and get hydrogen. The economics of doing that are such
that you end up using the equivalent of six gallons of gasoline to make
enough hydrogen to replace one gallon of gasoline. So this solution is
not a winner in the short run. In the long run, if the problem of
harnessing thermonuclear fusion can be solved and we have more power
than we know what to do with, you could use that form of energy to make
hydrogen for mobile fuel. I’ll get to that a little later.
There is also wind power, which many now see as a viable energy
alternative. And it is, but only to a limited extent. In regions like
northern Europe, where fossil fuels are very expensive and the wind is
really strong, wind power will someday come to rival hydroelectric power
as a source of energy. But there are relatively few places on earth
where the wind blows strongly and steadily enough for it to be a
dependable energy source, and people don’t really like wind
farms—they’re ugly and they’re noisy. Wind power will always be a part
of the solution. But it’s not a magic bullet. It’s not going to save us.
In recent years, the debate over nuclear power has revived, with
proponents maintaining that we can find environmentally sound and
politically acceptable ways to deal with the waste and security hazards.
But even assuming that to be true, the potential is limited. To produce
enough nuclear power to equal the power we currently get from fossil
fuels, you would have to build 10,000 of the largest possible nuclear
power plants. That’s a huge, probably nonviable initiative, and at that
burn rate, our known reserves of uranium would last only for 10 or 20
years.
As things stand today, the only possible substitutes for our fossil-fuel
dependency are light from the sun and nuclear energy. Developing a way
of running a civilization like ours on those resources is an enormous
challenge. A great deal of it is social and political—we’re in the midst
of a presidential election, and have you heard either party say a word
about this extremely important subject? But there are also huge
technical problems to be solved. So, you might well ask, what can
Caltech do to help?
The ultimate solution to our energy problem would be to master the power
of controlled thermonuclear fusion, which we’ve been talking about doing
for more than half a century. The solution has been 25 years away for
the past 50 years, and it is still 25 years away. Beyond those sobering
statistics, there are at least five or six schemes for harnessing fusion
energy that I know of. One of them, called the spheromak, is studied
here at Caltech in an experimental program run by Professor of Applied
Physics Paul Bellan and his research group.
In the spheromak, electric currents flowing in a hot ionized
gas—otherwise known as a plasma-—interact with magnetic fields embedded
in the plasma. As these fields and currents push the plasma around, new
fields and currents are created. There’s a sort of self-organizing
interaction occurring. You can see in this sequence of snapshots below,
starting from the top, that the plasma is organizing itself into a jet
and then a kink develops in the jet. This is something that happens all
by itself, and it’s not something that happens only occasionally—the gas
always self-organizes like that. After the kink develops, it breaks away
from the body of the jet as a doughnut. If you can find a way to
maintain that doughnut and keep it going—that is to pump in enough
energy to keep it from decaying—the doughnut has the perfect geometry
required for containing a hot plasma undergoing thermonuclear fusion.
Fusion research at Caltech.
But attaining this objective is far off. The existing apparatus is much
too small to reach the hundred million degree temperatures needed to
generate power. The Bellan team is studying the fundamental physics of
the self-organizing process in the hope it can be used to create and
sustain the desired fusion plasma confinement geometry in a reliable,
controlled manner.
There’s another group at Caltech whose efforts are aimed largely at the
other alternative—solar energy. Their program is called Power the
Planet: Caltech Center for Sustainable Energy Research. Members include
applied physicist Harry Atwater, chemists Harry Gray, Nathan Lewis, and
Jonas Peters, and materials scientist Sossina Haile.
Furthermore, our former provost Steve Koonin recently stepped down from
the provostship and took a leave of absence from the Caltech physics
faculty to become chief scientist at BP. BP, formerly British Petroleum,
is one of the largest energy companies in the world, and so he now has
one of the most important energy positions in the world.
The fact that these and similar scientific and technical efforts are
under way at Caltech and elsewhere are encouraging, but they are not
enough. What we really need is leadership with the courage and vision to
talk to us as John F. Kennedy did in 1960, when he pledged to put a man
on the moon by the end of the decade. It’s the same kind of problem. We
understand the basic underlying scientific principles, but we have huge
technical problems to overcome.
If our leaders were to say to the scientific and technical community,
“We will give you the resources, and you—right now, even before it
becomes imperative—will find a way to kick the fossil-fuel habit,” I
think that it could be done. But we have to have the political
leadership to make it work.
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