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Pivotal Pakistan
The world's most dangerous place
From The Economist print edition
Nothing else has worked: it is time for Pakistan to try democracy
THE war against Islamist extremism and the terrorism it spawns is being
fought on many fronts. But it may well be in Pakistan that it is won or
lost. It is not only that the country's lawless frontier lands provide a
refuge for al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, and that its jihad academies
train suicide-bombers with global reach. Pakistan is also itself the
world's second most populous Muslim nation, with a proud tradition of
tolerance and moderation, now under threat from the extremists on its
fringes. Until recently, the risk that Pakistan might be prey to Islamic
fundamentalism of the sort its Taliban protégés enforced in Afghanistan
until 2001 seemed laughable. It is still far-fetched. But after the
assassination of Benazir Bhutto, twice prime minister, nobody is
laughing. This, after all, is a country that now has the bomb Miss
Bhutto's father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, craved so passionately as prime
minister in the 1970s.
There are many other reasons why the murder of Miss Bhutto (and some 20
other people unlucky enough to be near her) makes Pakistan seem a
frightening place (see article). That terrorists could strike in
Rawalpindi, headquarters of the Pakistani army, despite having
advertised threats against Miss Bhutto, and despite the slaughter of
some 150 people in Karachi on the day she returned from exile last
October, suggests no one is safe. If, as many in Pakistan believe, the
security services were themselves complicit, that is perhaps even
scarier. It would make it even harder to deal with the country's many
other fissures: the sectarian divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims; the
ethnic tensions between Punjabis, Sindhis, Pushtuns and “mohajir”
immigrants from India; the insurgency in Baluchistan; and the spread of
the “Pakistani Taliban” out of the border tribal areas into the
heartlands.
In search of statesmen
Miss Bhutto's murder has left her Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the
country's biggest, at risk of disintegration. It is now in the hands of
her unpopular widower, Asif Ali Zardari, and her 19-year-old son,
Bilawal, who by rights should be punting and partying with his
classmates at Oxford, not risking his neck in politics. The election
whose campaign killed Miss Bhutto was due on January 8th, but the
Election Commission has delayed it by six weeks. The PPP will reap a big
sympathy vote. But bereft of Miss Bhutto, the party—and the country—look
desperately short of leaders of national stature. Other Bhutto
clan-members are already sniping at her successors.
The other big mainstream party, led by her rival Nawaz Sharif, another
two-time prime minister, is also in disarray. Both parties have been
weakened by their leaders' exiles, as well as by persecution at the
hands of President Pervez Musharraf's military dictatorship. In truth,
both Miss Bhutto and Mr Sharif were lousy prime ministers. But at least
they had some semblance of a popular mandate. The systematic
debilitation of their parties benefits the army, which has entrenched
itself in the economic as well as the political system. But it also
helps the Islamist parties—backed, as they are, by an army which has
sometimes found them more congenial partners than the more popular
mainstream parties. The unpopularity of the Musharraf regime, hostility
towards America, and resentment at a war in neighbouring Afghanistan
that many in Pakistan see as directed at both Islam and their ethnic-Pushtun
kin, have also helped the Islamists.
So, ironically, America's support for Mr Musharraf, justified as
necessary to combat extremism next door, has fostered extremism at home.
Similarly, in the 1980s America backed General Zia ul Haq, a dictator
and Islamic fundamentalist, as his intelligence services sponsored the
mujahideen who eventually toppled the Soviet-backed regime in
Afghanistan. In the process, they helped create what Miss Bhutto called
a “Frankenstein's monster”—of jihadist groups with sympathisers in the
army and intelligence services. The clubbable, whisky-quaffing,
poodle-cuddling Mr Musharraf is no fundamentalist. But the monster still
stalks his security forces.
Two straws to clutch
Yet Pakistan's plight is not yet hopeless. Two things could still help
arrest its slide into anarchy, improbable though both now seem. The
first is a credible investigation into Miss Bhutto's murder and the
security-service lapses (or connivance) that allowed it to happen. Mr
Musharraf's willingness to let a couple of British policemen help the
inquiry is unlikely to produce this. Every time a bomb goes off in
Pakistan, people believe that one of the country's own spooks lit the
fuse. Until there has been a convincing purge of the
military-intelligence apparatus, Pakistan will never know true
stability.
Second, there could be a fair election. This would expose the weakness
of the Islamist parties. In the last general election in 2002, they won
just one-tenth of the votes, despite outrageous rigging that favoured
them. Even if they fared somewhat better this time, they would still, in
the most populous provinces, Sindh and Punjab, be trounced by the
mainstream parties. An elected government with popular support would be
better placed to work with the moderate, secular, professional tendency
in the army to tackle extremism and bring Pakistan's poor the economic
development they need.
Sadly, there seems little hope that the security forces will abandon the
habit of a lifetime and allow truly fair elections. The delay in the
voting—opposed by both main opposition parties—has been seen as part of
its plan to rig the results. The violence that has scarred the country
since Miss Bhutto's assassination may intensify. The army may be tempted
to impose another state of emergency; or it may cling on to ensure that
the election produces the result it wants—a weak and pliable coalition
of the PPP and Mr Musharraf's loyalists.
For too long, Mr Musharraf has been allowed to pay lip-service to
democratic forms, while the United States has winked at his blatant
disdain for the substance. The justification has been the pre-eminent
importance of “stability” in the world's most dangerous place. It is
time to impress upon him and the generals still propping him up that
democracy is not the alternative to stability. It is Pakistan's only
hope.
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