As the Syrian government is now in full control of most parts of the war-torn country, the role of Iran, as a main ally of President Bashar al-Assad, appears to be undergoing significant change.

On Aug. 1, the Russian president’s special envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, said Iranian forces, together with their allied Shiite groups, had pulled back from southwestern Syria to a distance of 85 kilometers (53 miles) from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. “The Iranians withdrew and the Shiite formations are not there,” said Lavrentiev, underlining that the heavy weapons in the hands of those forces have also been withdrawn beyond the same distance.

Indeed, the move came against the backdrop of frequent calls by Israeli officials for Iran’s complete withdrawal from Syria, claiming that Iran’s presence poses a direct threat against the security and interests of Israel. As such, Lavrentiev’s remarks could lead us to the question of whether the recent development is indicating Iran’s imminent exit from other parts of Syria as well, or whether it’s just a tactical move aimed at readjusting Iran’s Syrian strategy with regard to the rapidly changing equations on the military and political fronts.

Reviewing the wider scene of recent developments regarding the Syrian crisis, it could be said that Iran’s withdrawal from southern Syria has been caused by two sets of military and political factors. First of all, the news about Iran’s withdrawal from the south came just one day after the successful end of the Syrian army’s six-week military campaign to recapture the southwestern region bordering the Golan Heights. Almost three weeks earlier, on July 12, the army had managed to retake the main rebel stronghold in that area, Daraa, known as the “birthplace of the revolt” against Assad in 2011.

As such, it could be said that in the current situation, the southern areas are not a priority anymore for the Syrian army and its allies in military terms and the next phases of massive military operations in Syria are expected to include areas in the northern and eastern parts of the country that are still under the control of armed groups. In a recent interview, Lavrentiev directly pointed to this issue, saying three areas in Syria have yet to be targeted by Syrian army operations. He said, “Those areas include Idlib [in the northwest], al-Rakban camp in al-Tanf area [in the east], as well as the areas under Kurdish control close to the Iraq-Syria border.”

Pro-Iran forces started to evacuate the southern areas when the mission there was accomplished and their presence was no longer vital in determining the military equations on the ground. In a broader framework, it could be said that the pullback was even necessary in order for the Syrian government to consolidate its positions in the south. In other words, as the presence of Iran and its allied forces in the southern parts of Syria has always been used by the Israelis as a reason to conduct strikes against various positions inside Syria, the continuation of the Iranian presence there would mean that the Israeli strikes would continue as well, forcing Assad to deal with a persistent headache that would tie his hands in planning further military moves elsewhere in the country.

Meanwhile, on the political front, it seems that an important factor that has caused Iran to limit the scope of its active military presence in Syria is Russia’s changing diplomatic role regarding the Syrian crisis. On the one hand, while Russia appears determined to continue playing a balancing role between Iranian and Israeli interests in Syria, it seems that the Russians have shifted toward using a more coercive approach in this regard. On July 30, Russia’s ambassador to Tel Aviv, Anatoly Viktorov, adopted a controversial stance on the issue, saying that while “Russia cannot compel Iranian forces to quit Syria,” it could “equally do nothing to prevent Israeli military strikes against Iranian forces.” The remarks clearly meant that Moscow is unable to prevent an open confrontation between Iran and Israel in Syria unless Tehran and Tel Aviv come to a middle ground concerning their activities in the country. Limiting the scope of Iran’s activities in exchange for the halt of Israeli strikes seems to be that middle ground agreed to by both sides in order to prevent a devastating escalation.

On the other hand, after the July 16 summit between the presidents of Russia and the United States in Helsinki, in which possible cooperation between the two sides in Syria was discussed, among other issues, Moscow has increased its diplomatic pressures on Washington to limit its military role in the Arab country. On Aug. 3, Col. Gen. Sergei Rudskoyof the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces called on the United States to close down its military base in al-Tanf, saying the base has become a center for harboring Islamic State (IS) terrorists. As Washington has openly declared that its main goal in Syria currently is to counter Iran’s growing influence, limiting Iran’s presence in the country could be Russia’s selling point to compel the Americans to limit their own presence. As the US military presence in Syria is perceived by both Tehran and Moscow as a threat to their longer-term interests, it’s hard to believe the notion that Iran has been reluctant to provide Russia with an additional diplomatic asset to deal with this common challenge.

Finally, it seems that Iran itself is in a process of redefining its role in Syria, which has mostly been derived from the impression that the end of the war is close and now is a time to focus on safeguarding Iran’s interests through political and diplomatic measures. In this vein, Iran is shifting its strategy from playing an active military role toward more actively participating in the diplomatic frameworks regarding Syria. Hosting the upcoming summitof Astana partners, which is due to be held in Tehran in September, could be interpreted as a sign to this end. Iran’s active participation in the establishment of Syria’s Constitutional Committee, which is tasked with developing a new constitution for the country, is another sign of Iran’s changing approach.

All in all, it could be said that the recent withdrawal of Iranian and pro-Iran forces from southern Syria has more to do with Iran updating its Syria strategy and adapting it to be in line with the new political and military developments, rather than a decision to leave Syria due to Russian or Israeli pressures.

Hamidreza Azizi is an assistant professor of regional studies at Shahid Beheshti University and a member of the scientific board at the Iran and Eurasia Studies Institute (IRAS) in Tehran. On Twitter: @HamidRezaAz

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Source: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/08/iran-syria-golan-heights-russia-israel-shiite-groups-us.html

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In an astounding series of statements, Russia has made it clear that it expects all foreign forces to withdraw from Syria. Alexander Lavrentiev, President Putin’s envoy to Syria, specified on May 18, 2018, that all “foreign forces” meant those forces belonging to Iran, Turkey, the United States, and Hizbullah.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov added this week that only Syrian troops should have a presence on the country’s southern border, close to Jordan and Israel. Previously, Russia had been a party to the establishment of a “de-escalation zone” in southwestern Syria along with the United States and Jordan. Now, Russian policy was becoming more ambitious.  Lavrov added that a pullback of all non-Syrian forces from the de-escalation zone had to be fast.

The regime in Tehran got the message and issued a sharp rebuke of its Russian ally. The Iranians did not see their deployment in Syria as temporary. Five years ago, a leading religious figure associated with the Revolutionary Guards declared that Syria was the 35th province of Iran. Besides such ideological statements, on a practical level, Syria hosts the logistical network for Iranian resupply of its most critical Middle Eastern proxy force, Hizbullah, which has acquired significance beyond the struggle for Lebanon.

Over the years, Hizbullah has become involved in military operations in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and elsewhere. Without Syria, Iran’s ability to project power and influence in an assortment of Middle Eastern conflicts would be far more constrained. Syria has become pivotal for Tehran’s quest for a land corridor linking Iran’s western border to the Mediterranean. The fact that Iran was operating ten military bases in Syria made its presence appear to be anything but temporary.

Already in February 2018, the first public signs of discord between Russia and Iran became visible. At the Valdai Conference in Moscow, attended by both Lavrov and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (and by this author), the Russian Foreign Minister articulated his strong differences with the Iranians over their pronouncements regarding Israel: “We have stated many times that we won’t accept the statements that Israel, as a Zionist state, should be destroyed and wiped off the map. I believe this is an absolutely wrong way to advance one’s own interests.”

Iran was hardly a perfect partner for Russia. True, some Russian specialists argued that Moscow’s problems with Islamic militancy emanated from the jihadists of SunniIslam, but not from Shiite Islam, which had been dominant in Iran since the 16th century. But that was a superficial assessment. Iran was also backing Palestinian Sunni militants like Islamic Jihad and Hamas. This May, Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, told a pro-Hizbullah television channel that he had regular contacts with Tehran.

Iran Supports both Shiites and Sunnis

Iran was also supporting other Sunni organizations like the Taliban and the Haqqani network in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It harbored senior leaders from al-Qaeda. Indeed, when the founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, sought a regional sanctuary after the fall of Afghanistan to the United States, he did not flee to Pakistan, but instead, he moved to Iran. There is no reason why Iran could not provide critical backing for Russia’s adversaries in the future.

But, that was not the perception in Moscow when Russia gave its initial backing for the Iranian intervention in Syria. In the spring of 2015, Moscow noted that the security situation in Central Asia was deteriorating, as internal threats to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan were increasing. On top of all this, the Islamic State (IS) was making its debut in Afghanistan. An IS victory in Syria would have implications for the security of the Muslim-populated areas of Russia itself.¹

It was in this context that Russia dramatically increased arms shipments to its allies in Syria. It also coordinated with Iran the deployment of thousands of Shiite fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan under the command of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). That also meant the construction of an expanded military infrastructure on Syrian soil for this Shiite foreign legion.

At the same time, Russia maintained and upgraded a naval base at the Syrian city of Tartus and an air facility at the Khmeimim Air Base near Latakia. Moscow also had access to other Syrian facilities as well.

Russia Achieved Its Main Goal and Changed Its Policy

What changed in Moscow? It appears that the Kremlin began to understand that Iran handicapped Russia’s ability to realize its interests in the Middle East. The Russians had secured many achievements with their Syrian policy since 2015. They had constructed a considerable military presence that included air and sea ports under their control in Syria. They had demonstrated across the Middle East that they were not prepared to sell out their client, President Bashar Assad, no matter how repugnant his military policies had become – including the repeated use of chemical weapons against his own civilian population. The Russians successfully converted their political reliability into a diplomatic asset, which the Arabs contrasted with the Obama administration’s poor treatment of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt at the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011. However, now Iran was putting Russia’s achievements at risk, through a policy of escalation with Israel.

The Russian security establishment appeared to understand from the start that Israel’s strategy in Syria was essentially defensive. For example, Israel wanted to prevent the delivery of weapons to Hizbullah that could alter the military balance in its favor. One feature of Russian military policy at a very early stage was the carte blanche Moscow appeared to give Israel to strike at these weapons deliveries and later at Iranian facilities across Syria.

According to one report, a Moscow think tank, closely identified with President Putin, published a commentary blaming Iran for the deteriorating situation between Iran and Israel in the Syrian theater. The Sunni Arab states, which Russia was courting, were also voicing their concerns with growing Iranian activism. Undoubtedly, the Russians noticed the complaints that came from Tajikistan this year that Iran was seeking to destabilize the country by funding militant Islamists.

Russian President Putin meets with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mohammed Khatami in 2015 (Kremlin)

Putin seemed to have growing reservations about Iran’s policy of exporting the Islamic revolution from the soil of Syria. Now, with IS fundamentally vanquished, Iranian military activity in Syria lost its primary justification. And if Moscow was considering to more closely coordinate its Middle Eastern policy with Washington in the future, it needed to adjust its approach to Iran.²

On May 22, 2018, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo listed aspects of Iranian activism which the United States was now demanding that Iran halt. It was not surprising to see in Pompeo’s list the demand that “Iran must withdraw all forces under Iranian command throughout the entirety [of] Syria.”

Russia is not cutting its ties with Iran. But it is clearly cutting back Iran’s freedom of action in Syria. The idea that Russia would back Iran’s use of Syria as a platform for operations against Israel or Jordan is not tenable. Still, Russia would remain the primary supplier of Bashar Assad’s army in Syria as well as his strategic partner. Unquestionably, Iran would need to reassess its Middle Eastern strategy after Moscow’s pronouncements calling for it to leave Syria and not continue to be perceived as the force that put at risk all that Russia had achieved as a result of the Syrian civil war.

Source: http://jcpa.org/russia-constrains-iran/

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