China’s growing naval power is “explosive” and a cause for concern, said German Chief of Navy, Vice Adm. Kay-Achim Schonbach, who urged Beijing to follow the international rules-based order.

Schonbach said China is increasing the size of its navy by the equivalent of the entire French navy every four years.

“I can understand the political leaders in China … now say ‘We want to have a big navy. We want a blue-water navy’ — of course, also to make power,” Schonbach told CNBC’s Martin Soong on “Squawk Box Asia” on Wednesday. A blue-water navy is one that can operate globally in open oceans and is not limited to near-shore functions.

“The question is if they fit into the international rules-based order,” he said.

Schonbach made his comments as the German frigate Bayern is docked in Singapore. The Bayern arrived Monday as part of a six-month deployment to Asia-Pacific. It is sailing through the South China Sea, marking the first deployment of a German warship to the Indo-Pacific in almost 20 years.

China’s growing naval might has become a source of increasing concern for the United States as well as democracies in Europe and Asia.

According to a recent report on Chinese military power, the U.S. Department of Defense said China is the world’s biggest ship-producing nation and is nearly self-sufficient in those endeavors. It also expects China’s second domestically built aircraft carrier to enter service by 2024 and projects the country to maintain between 65 and 70 submarines by the mid-2020s.

South China Sea
Washington is concerned about Beijing’s moves in the South China Sea, as are countries that bound it including Vietnam and the Philippines. The South China Sea is massive, about 1.4 million square miles (3.5 million square kilometers), and contains some of the world’s most critical shipping lanes.

China claims most of the South China Sea as its own territory though other countries and an international ruling from the Hague have rejected those claims.

During a visit to the Indo-Pacific region last week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken called on China to cease its “aggressive actions” in the region.

“Nowhere is the rules-based maritime order under greater threat than in the South China Sea,” Blinken said in July. “The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to coerce and intimidate Southeast Asian coastal states, threatening freedom of navigation in this critical global throughway.”

Germany’s deployment of the Bayern comes after the country issued policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific region last year, which noted that European and Indo-Pacific economies “are closely connected through global supply chains.” Berlin also said in its announcement that if there are conflicts in the region that “adversely affect security and stability there, this has repercussions for Germany, too.”

Schonbach said the deployment is “like a teaser” and signals German commitment to step up engagement in Asia, including through expanding its security and defense cooperation with regional partners.

“We’re here for the first time after 19 years to check the battlefield,” he said. “Last year, the government of Germany promulgated the guidelines for the Indo-Pacific. This is now the first step. The next step, probably, I hope that we can come on a regular basis — two or three years.”

Source: https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/22/germanys-vice-adm-kay-achim-schonbach-on-chinas-naval-buildup.html

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TAIPEI, Sept 1 (Reuters) – China’s armed forces can “paralyze” Taiwan’s defenses and are able to fully monitor its deployments, the island’s defense ministry said, offering a stark assessment of the rising threat posed by its giant neighbour.

Beijing is stepping up military activities around the island, which it views as Chinese territory. It has never renounced the use of force to bring democratic Taiwan under its control.

In its annual report to parliament on China’s military, a copy of which was reviewed by Reuters, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry presented a far graver view than it did last year, when the report said China still lacked the capability to launch a full assault on Taiwan.

This year’s report said that China can launch what it termed “soft and hard electronic attacks”, including blocking communications across the western part of the first island chain, the string of islands that run from the Japanese archipelago, through Taiwan and down to the Philippines.

China “can combine with its internet army to launch wired and wireless attacks against the global internet, which would initially paralyze our air defenses, command of the sea and counter-attack system abilities, presenting a huge threat to us”.

China has also improved its reconnaissance abilities using Beidou, China’s answer to the U.S.-owned GPS navigation system, the ministry added.

This means Beijing can monitor movements around Taiwan, helped by China’s regular use of its own spy planes, drones and intelligence gathering ships, it said.

China’s Defense Ministry did not respond to a request for comment.

Although Taiwan’s report noted, like last year, that China still lacked transport abilities and logistical support for a large-scale invasion, the Chinese military is working to boost those abilities.

With precision missile attacks that can hit anywhere on the island, China is also capable of “paralyzing” Taiwan military command centers and combat capacity of its naval and air forces, it said.

Chinese spies in Taiwan could launch a “decapitation strike” to destroy political and economic infrastructure, it added.

With the deployment of mid- and long-range missiles and more exercises involving its aircraft carriers, China is trying to position itself to delay “foreign military intervention” in an attack on Taiwan, the ministry said.

President Tsai Ing-wen has made bolstering Taiwan’s own defenses a priority, building up its domestic defense industry and buying more equipment from the United States, the island’s most important arms supplier and international backer.

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Pedestrians in Tokyo (AP Photo)

TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — Nearly 90 percent of Japanese and over 70 percent of South Koreans view China’s expanding military influence in the region as a threat, according to the results of a poll conducted jointly in the two countries last month.

The poll, carried out in Japan by the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper and in South Korea by Hankook Ilbo, surveyed adults on the state of Japan-Seoul relations and ongoing points of contention between the two countries. Respondents were also asked to assess their country’s relationship with China, North Korea, and the U.S.

Asked about their country’s relationship with China, 61 percent of Japanese and 48 percent of South Koreans said it’s “rather bad,” with 17 percent of Japanese and 10 percent of Koreans describing it as “very bad.”

Nevertheless, only a minority in either country wish to scale back their economic relationship with China, their shared largest export partner. On this point, 48 percent of Japanese and 33 percent of Koreans said to “leave it as is,” while 23 and 42 percent of Japanese and Koreans, respectively, said economic ties with China should be strengthened.

When asked whether China’s growing military pressure on nations in the East and South China seas poses a threat to their country, 88 percent of Japanese and 72 percent of Koreans responded that they believe it does.

A smaller majority also said their government should be “in tune” with the U.S. as Washington increases pressure on Beijing over security, diplomatic, and human rights disputes. On this question, 59 percent of Japanese and 64 percent of Koreans are in agreement.

A large majority in Japan (81 percent) and South Korea (80 percent) called Xi Jinping (習近平) “unreliable,” suggesting the Chinese leader is viewed as only slightly more reliable than North Korea’s Kim Jong-un.

However, the poll also found that approximately the same number of Japanese and South Koreans view each others’ presidents with as much suspicion as they do Chairman Xi. In addition, over 80 percent on either side believe their country’s relationship with the other is either “rather bad” or very “bad.”

Poll respondents were also asked about the historical issues driving the diplomatic schism between the two nations, including Korean “comfort women” being forced into prostitution by the Empire of Japan during World War II. A majority of Japanese (59 percent) and Koreans (79 percent) do not think it’s necessary to “go further on the issue of historical awareness” to mend the relationship and expressed pessimism that it would improve in the future, with 73 percent of Japanese and 58 percent of Koreans forecasting “no change.”

The poll was conducted by landline and used the random digit dialing (RDD) survey method to reach landline and mobile phones. It collected responses from 1,063 Japanese over the age of 18 from May 21-23 and 1,000 South Korean adults on May 21 and 22.

Source: https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4218535

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The Chinese have been heavily investing in amphibious capabilities.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: The best way to prevent such a violent and shameful disgrace is to press Taipei into negotiations on forming a confederation with Beijing now. It was actually not so long ago that Taipei and Beijing leaders were chatting amiably at the first-ever Taiwan-China summit. “One country, two systems” may indeed be a kind of “ugly duckling” at this point, at least in the Western press, but that only remains true until the cataclysmic alternative is thoroughly understood.

A number of events and trends are coming together now to drive Taiwan and with it the whole Asia-Pacific region, to the edge of disaster. These include the recent election for Taiwan’s leadership, the unrest in Hong Kong, China’s increasing military might, and the downward spiral of contemporary U.S.-China relations. For sure, Taiwan has been at or near the center of U.S-China relations for the last seventy years, so at one level, there is nothing particularly new here.

Yet, before U.S. leaders dismiss this warning into a heap of other global calamities, they should briefly peruse the words below from an unsigned Chinese editorial in the December 25, 2019 edition of Global Times: “The United States as a whole must understand that although Taiwan is the easiest place to provoke Mainland China, it is also the place where the U.S. is most at risk. It is precisely that China has the most real cards against the U.S. provocation in the Taiwan Strait region, and China has the strongest will and capability to defend the core interests of the country [美方作为整体必须了解，台湾虽是最容易挑衅、刺激中国大陆的地方，但也是对美方来说风险最大的地方。中国在台海地区反制美方挑衅的实牌恰恰也是最多的，而且中国在这里捍卫国家核心利益的意志和能力都是最强的].” The editorial continues, “This is not a joke. Mainland China has so far exercised restraint in the Taiwan Strait region and has not meddled in some of America’s vulnerabilities across the world [这可不是开玩笑的，中国大陆迄今在台海地区很克制，在国际上也没有在美国的一些脆弱点找麻烦].” It concludes, “We hope the U.S. Congress is not acting as a prelude to a future U.S.-China crisis. To be honest, we don’t think that the U.S. is ready for a Sino-U.S. crisis related to Taiwan, and we don’t think the DPP authorities are ready for it [希望美国国会不是在弹中美一场未来危机的前奏。实话说，我们不认为美方对迎接一场与台湾相关的中美危机做好了准备].” Merry Christmas? Not so much. Fighting words or a brash bluff?

As one who reads Mainland Chinese defense publications on a daily basis, my impression is that “T-Day” is not very far off. Over the last few years, I have demonstrated that China’s missile forces are wholly adequate to give the PLA both air and naval superiority for the requisite period of weeks. I will not rehearse here the many reasons why Western analyses tend to be overly optimistic concerning the military balance in the western Pacific more generally. But rather than discussing capabilities again, let’s briefly put a focus on the crucial matter of strategy. That is generally a taboo subject in Chinese defense discourse, but hints occasionally bubble to the surface. One such discussion appeared in the September 2019 edition of Military Digest [军事文摘] that provides a careful analysis in Mandarin of the vital precursors to the Normandy victory in WWII: both the disaster at Dieppe, as well as the lessons learned from amphibious operations during the arduous Italian Campaign.

For readers unfamiliar with Dieppe battle, this short, bloody engagement featured an amphibious “probe” by British and Canadian forces of German coastal defenses along the French coast of the English Channel during mid-August 1942. This Chinese analysis rightly characterizes the raid as a “complete defeat,” but extracts numerous lessons, as indeed the Allied commanders did too. First, it is assessed that “the forces were inadequate to risk such a decision [实力不足冒险决策].” The Allies in this engagement suffered from a paucity of warships, transports, tanks, artillery, and even infantry numbers were less than their German adversaries. Trying to fight their way ashore straight into the teeth of Germany’s “massive air force shield” was bound to prove disastrous for Allied troops, according to this Chinese analysis, as Dieppe proved to be both “the wrong time and the wrong place” for an attack. A second lesson articulated in the Chinese article is, indeed, that “intelligence was poor causing operational blindness [情报不力盲目行动].” The account reports the Allied forces were surprised by unexpected defenses, such as a two-meter sea wall, minefields, and also German forces that were not anticipated to be in the area. Even the weather forecasts are reported in this Chinese rendering to have been inadequately detailed.

Lacking both air and sea control in these circumstances, the Allies making the raid on Dieppe were relying heavily on the element of surprise. Apparently, there was neither an extensive pounding by bombers from the air, nor even any kind of preparatory barrage from warships offshore. This Chinese account relates how “the element of surprise was lost immediately … [and] the Allied amphibious forces came under the full firepower of the German military.” Thus, a third lesson the Chinese take from Dieppe is that “inadequate fire preparation will entail major personnel casualties [火力不备人员伤亡].” Finally, the Chinese analysis examines the command arrangements for the Dieppe battle and finds them wanting. It is reported that there was no overall commander and each of the services went in their own direction. An airborne parachute drop was scrubbed due to weather at the last minute and the participating ships were very poorly coordinated, such that the amphibious forces were, more or less, left to simply try to save themselves with the resultant terrible losses. Thus, the fourth lesson for Chinese strategists from Dieppe was “the need to harmonize so that each service is not fighting on its own [协同不周各自为战].”

Fortunately, as related in this Chinese analysis, the Allies got some substantial additional practice before Normandy. In the invasion of Sicily, for example, it is related that the Americans and British corrected almost all the mistakes from Dieppe. British intelligence, according to this Chinese rendering, succeeded in making fake plans and spreading rumors that the Allies intended to attack Greece instead of Sicily. Mobility was used to achieve surprise, air and naval superiority proved decisive, and due diligence on logistics also paid dividends for the Allies. Still, this Chinese analysis criticizes Allied operations in the Italian campaign for being excessively timid [步步为营] and also in failing to make better use of airborne and amphibious capabilities.

Understanding this history in some detail enables a keener appreciation of the grand achievements of D-day, for sure. This Chinese historical analysis closes with a summary of those elements of success for Operation Overlord. These included, of course, “absolute superiority [绝对优势]” in the air that knocked down 600 German aircraft in the months prior to the invasion at Normandy. With a comment that might have special resonance for the Taiwan scenario, this Chinese rendering claims that during the three days after D-day, not a single German submarine entered the English Channel to challenge the invasion force. The famous intelligence ruse or a skillful “mingling of truth and false [真真假假]” made by General Dwight Eisenhower is also related in decent detail – down to the fact that Allied bombers and intelligence flights made a 2:1 ratio in favor of sorties to targets that were distant from Normandy in order to keep the Germans confused. Finally, the Chinese analysis relates that the Normandy invasion represented the triumph of logistics [后勤支撑], including 370,000 dedicated logistics personnel that delivered over five millions tons of equipment and supplies for the invasion.

With respect to Taiwan, one can safely assume both a massive PLA superiority in firepower and very close attention to the complex logistics problem. Thus, the only remaining challenge for Beijing is to create a proper ruse – admittedly somewhat difficult in the age of satellite reconnaissance. Yet, this is also not all too hard to imagine. Would Xi Jinping simply call his friend Vladimir Putin to ask for a decent-sized diversion in the Baltics? It should not be forgotten that Mao Zedong’s victorious military campaign against India in 1962 was accomplished with lightning efficiency under the “cover” of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The actual PLA assault on the “beautiful island” would come from both the sea and the air, of course, developing from multiple vectors simultaneously, allowing for the exploitation of the most promising fronts, and likely prompting rapid, total collapse.

Probably, the “dirty deed” would be accomplished within just a week or maybe two (for mopping up). As with Putin’s annexation of Crimea back in 2014, the U.S. might well be better off if the whole episode was “fervently condemned,” but then quickly written off as a total loss. To be sure, some new “Taiwan sanctions” could be added to the Hong Kong and Uighur list already approved by Congress. Yes, this would be another grand humiliation for American power, but at least the planet would be spared from a third and final world war.

The best way to prevent such a violent and shameful disgrace is to press Taipei into negotiations on forming a confederation with Beijing now. It was actually not so long ago that Taipei and Beijing leaders were chatting amiably at the first-ever Taiwan-China summit. “One country, two systems” may indeed be a kind of “ugly duckling” at this point, at least in the Western press, but that only remains true until the cataclysmic alternative is thoroughly understood.

In November 2019, a leading Mainland expert regarding Taiwan, Wang Zaixi, gave a keynote speech at Peking University. He decried the new tendencies in Taiwan toward ‘step-by-step de-sinification’ [一步一步推动’去中国化’]” and the Taiwan-related manifestations of the new policy of “hard containment [强硬遏制]” undertaken by the Trump Administration. He warned ominously that “time is running out [时间已经不多了]” and that cross-Strait relations now confront “huge risks [巨大风险].” Are American diplomats, strategists, and scholars wise enough to help avert this altogether preventable tragedy?

Lyle J. Goldstein is Research Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the United States Naval War College in Newport, RI. In addition to Chinese, he also speaks Russian and he is also an affiliate of the new Russia Maritime Studies Institute (RMSI) at Naval War College. You can reach him at goldstel@usnwc.edu. The opinions in his columns are entirely his own and do not reflect the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other agency of the U.S. government.

Source: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/war-china-showing-its-commitment-invading-taiwan-sea-179454

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The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force increasingly resembles the former Imperial Japanese Navy, but in a smaller size.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: One type of warship the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force won’t operate is a battleship, and there are no plans for a 21st-century version of the Yamato super battleship.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force increasingly resembles the former Imperial Japanese Navy, but in a smaller size. It has a fleet of some 154 ships and operates 346 aircraft. In 2000 it has also been the world’s fourth-largest navy by tonnage, and likely will only increase in size.

In December 2018, Tokyo approved a plan to modify its two Izumo-class helicopter carriers to embark the Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II jet fighter. The modifications would enable Japan to operate flattops with fixed-wing aircraft for the first time since World War II. The Japanese government also announced as part of its record-setting defense budget it would purchase additional F-35 aircraft.

With an eventual plan to be equipped with 105 F-35As and 42 F-35Bs, Japan would become the largest operator of the fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft outside of the United States.

One type of warship the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force won’t operate is a battleship, and there are no plans for a 21st-century version of the Yamato super battleship.

However, according to a recent report from TheDrive, citing Japanese media, Tokyo is now considering the feasibility of procuring two “super-destroyers.” Such warships – much like the modified flattops – would seem to be in contradiction of Japan’s 1947 Constitution, which renounced war but is also seen to suggest that Japan’s military forces are maintained for the purpose of self-defense.

In this case, however, the super-destroyers would serve as a replacement to the pair of planned land-based Aegis Ashore systems. Work on those was suspended due to technical issues, costs, and domestic criticism. The destroyers would be focused on missile defense – primarily from North Korea – and would be equipped with a version of the Aegis combat system that is equipped with Lockheed Martin’s AN/SPY-7 Long Range Discrimination Radar. That platform was originally intended for the shore-based Aegis system.

Nikkei Asia reported that the funding for the system modifications of the AN/SPY-7 will be allocated in Japan’s fiscal 2021 budget.

While the Defense Ministry has been expected to approve the vessels, based on an interim report that is due later this month from a private-sector technical study, officials have also considered the option of a special-purpose warship that could be dedicated to intercepting missiles. However, despite the fact that such a vessel would cost less, it could be far more vulnerable to submarine and air attacks.

The other consideration is that even as North Korean missiles are seen as the primary threat, Japan has other priorities that include patrolling the East China Sea due to increased Chinese aggression, and new Aegis-equipped destroyers could be a practical addition to the fleet due to their maneuverability and defenses.

One issue outstanding could be that of personnel. Tokyo opted for the Aegis Ashore system to address the lack of personnel, but now the Maritime SDF may need to be further expanded with the addition of such warships.

Yet to come into focus is whether Tokyo would opt to build a new warship or a derivative of vessels currently in the fleet. TheDrive cited a report from Tokyo’s Kyodo News agency, which suggested that the government was considering a vessel with a standard displacement of around 8,000 tons – which would be larger than the current Maya-class’s displacement of 8,200 tons.

The Maya-class is a modified version of the Atago-class, and the lead vessel Maya was commissioned on March 19, 2020, with a second vessel, Haguro, set to enter service in March of next year. These vessels were also designed to enhance Japan’s ballistic missile defense capabilities, but now it seems that Tokyo is thinking even bigger.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. This article first appeared last year and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Source: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/thanks-north-korea-and-china-japan%E2%80%99s-navy-has-reason-grow-178644

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Several soldiers were injured when hundreds of Chinese and Indian troops reportedly exchanged blows along Nakula border in the northeastern Indian state of Sikkim on Saturday.

“Four Indian soldiers and seven Chinese troops suffered injuries during the confrontation that involved around 150 soldiers,” said one Indian on condition of anonymity.

The aggressive confrontation between the troops happened near the Naku La sector, a pass at a height of more than 5,000 meters.

Sources in the Indian government said: “Temporary and short duration face-offs between border guarding troops do occur as boundaries are not resolved.

“Aggressive behavior by the two sides resulted in minor injuries to troops.

“The two sides disengaged after dialogue and interaction at local level.”

India and China share a border that is almost 4000km long, which has many unresolved boundary issues.

This is not the first time Indian and Chinese soldiers have exchanged blows along the border.

In August 2017, Indian and Chinese soldiers threw stones at each other and also exchanged blows near Pangong Lake in Ladakh, close to the de facto border between the two countries.

The incident took place after Indian soldiers patrolling the area did not heed to objection to their presence in the area by Chinese troops.

After the scuffle, both sides called for reinforcements. However, the face-off ended following delegation-level talks between the two sides.

The clash near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) aggravated bilateral tensions as it happened at a time when the two neighbors when their soldiers began confronting each other at the Doklam plateau where India, China, and Bhutan meet.

India had sent its troops to stop China building a road in the remote, uninhabited territory, which is claimed by both China and Bhutan.

Beijing said India had no role to play in the area, and ordered its troops to withdraw unilaterally or face the prospect of an escalation.

Source: https://www.itv.com/news/2020-05-10/chinese-and-indian-troops-exchange-blows-along-sikkim-border-leaving-several-soldiers-injured/

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In this decade, the United States Navy may be displaced as the most formidable maritime presence in the Pacific Ocean. China is determined to challenge America’s ability to project military power forward into the Western Pacific. It seeks to undermine the U.S. capability of standing with its allies and deterring China from using military force to coerce small nations into making concessions on their sovereignty and the enforcement of binding treaty commitments. Denying Beijing’s quest to become the region’s dominant land and sea power will require more than traditional naval strength. A comprehensive strategy that understands the unfolding fourth industrial revolution and the Chinese government’s problematic activities will be necessary to deny China’s bid for maritime primacy.

China’s emerging blue-water navy, backed by comprehensive national and maritime power, is “tipping the balance in the Pacific.” In the span of 35 years, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been transformed from a coastal defense force into a serious peer competitor for the U.S. Navy and its allies in the Western Pacific. The balance of naval power is particularly favorable to China in its near seas where shore-based missiles and aircraft can support the PLAN fleet. Together, China’s shore-based weapon systems and its fleet of small combatants are likely now sufficient to defend China’s near seas, which frees up the PLA Navy’s growing inventory of large vessels for power projection.

While the U.S. still fields more large combatants than the PLAN, the pace of China’s large combatant shipbuilding is accelerating. China is continuing to expand and modernize its shipyards so that they can build more large combatants simultaneously. Meanwhile, China is converting existing facilities for making small combatants into facilities to produce large warships. Retired Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt predicts that by 2035 China’s major surface fleet could add as many as 140 new large combatants and approach numerical parity with the U.S. Navy. If that occurs, China would not only pose a threat within a radius of its shore-based assets but anywhere its fleet sails.

Without an effective counterweight, China may well come to militarily dominate the majority of the maritime Indo-Pacific in the near future. While Beijing already enjoys a global maritime reach, the sharpest impact of its ascending naval power affects potential contingencies involving Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, and disputes in the South China Sea. The PLAN and its auxiliary forces intend to keep this trend going in the decade ahead, making the 2020s a “Decade of Concern.”

The PLAN’s surface ship prowess is improving in both quantity and quality. During the decade beginning in December 2008, the PLAN deployed 100 ships in 31 naval task forces to the Gulf of Aden, thereby using a nominally counterpiracy mission to build a truly blue-water navy capability. In December 2019, the PLA Navy commissioned its first indigenously produced aircraft carrier, the Type 001A Shandong, with a 70,000-ton displacement and a short take-off but arrested recovery (STOBAR) system similar to that of its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, a 1985 Soviet platform later purchased, overhauled, and eventually commissioned by the PLAN in 2012. Another four aircraft carriers are planned, and these may include nuclear-powered engines and a catapult assisted take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) system.

For now, however, China’s aircraft carriers convey greater prestige than combat power, and the PLAN surface fleet remains focused on a growing number of modern destroyers, frigates, and corvettes. These surface ships include the new Type 055 large destroyer armed with 112 vertical launch system cells. China’s destroyers have fewer VLS cells than their U.S. counterparts. Still, when operating within range of short-based missile defense systems, they can dedicate a larger percentage of their missile inventory to attack rather than self-defense. As experts like Bryan Clark have noted, the missiles on China’s combatants can also out-range U.S. missiles, meaning PLAN vessels can target U.S. Navy ships before they can return fire. So far, China has launched six Type 055 destroyers and 24 Type 052D destroyers, dubbed the “Chinese Aegis.” The pace of shipbuilding surpasses that of any other navy today. For instance, in December 2019 alone, China launched two Type 056A missile corvettes, two Type 052D guided-missile destroyers, and one Type 055 guided-missile destroyer, as well as having commissioned into service the Shandong aircraft carrier.

More worrisome for a potential Taiwan or East or the South China Sea scenario, however, is the expansion of China’s amphibious force. Last year, the PLAN began construction on its first big-deck amphibious assault ship, the Type 075 landing helicopter dock (LHD). Adding the rough equivalent of the USS Wasp to other Chinese capabilities, including some 37 large amphibious landing ships and 22 medium landing ships, it appears that the PLAN is replicating the combined U.S. Marine and Navy amphibious task forces—Marine Expedition Unit/Amphibious Ready Group (MEU/ARG) – that currently deploy throughout the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere. The combined air-sea-ground capability represented by the 31^st MEU based in Japan, for instance, conducts joint training with partners, delivers timely humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and otherwise signals U.S. interests and influence. China appears to be on the cusp of replicating this amphibious capability and with it an ability to conduct the same range of influence operations, exercises and training, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), and HA/DR missions. Moreover, China’s quantitative advantage in ships, backed by a massive shipbuilding industry and para-naval forces, conveys a message throughout the Indo-Pacific that Beijing is becoming more capable of coercing regional neighbors into abiding by China’s rules and claims.

Meanwhile, undersea capabilities remain a vital part of the PLA’s naval capabilities. The PLA is steadily modernizing its mostly non-nuclear-powered submarines and investing in unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) and seabed research and survey vehicles. One notable development has been the creation of “a deep-sea base for unmanned submarine science and defense operations in the South China Sea, a center that might become the first artificial intelligence colony on Earth.”

The PLAN remains focused on its near seas, a fact attested to by its relatively small inventory of replenishment ships. However, China is developing a replenishment system designed to be used on existing civilian ships. Moreover, given China’s shipbuilding capabilities, on top of building a base in Djibouti and constructing various ports that could in the future accommodate naval vessels, Beijing is not as hamstrung by logistical shortfalls as some might think.

China can backstop its naval presence with not only advanced land-based airpower but especially with its array of anti-ship and land-attack cruise and ballistic missiles. Two land-based, road-mobile anti-ship ballistic missiles pose a direct threat to U.S. Navy combatants. The DF-21D has a range of more than 1,000 miles and is the first ASBM designed to hit ships at sea. The DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile boasts a range of about 2,500 miles, and it can carry either a conventional or nuclear warhead. Both missiles can achieve much greater range if delivered by air on the PLA’s new H-6N bomber, which is also designed to carry supersonic cruise missiles and UAVs, among other weapons. As if to emphasize the psychological warfare element of Beijing’s total competition, these missiles are often referred to as the “carrier-killer” and “Guam express” weapons designed to push the U.S. military out beyond the second island chain. Meanwhile, China is reportedly developing hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) that would be much harder to intercept.

Beyond all of these capabilities, China augments its naval power in the Pacific by exploiting information across all dimensions of policy, including its advances into the new domains of cyberspace, outer space, and the electromagnetic spectrum. The PLA’s quest to master the new domains is being realized through massive investment and reorganization to include a Strategic Support Force that integrates “PLA space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities.”

Also worth noting is that China essentially has two additional navies, each of which is the largest of its kind in the world. The China Coast Guard (CCG) inventory includes at least 142 lightly armed oceangoing vessels. If added to the PLA Navy’s force of over 335 commissioned combat submarines and surface combatants, China’s maritime force numbers 477 combat vessels—more than twice the number of comparable U.S. Navy combat vessels and nearly four times the number of U.S. Navy combat vessels assigned to the Pacific Fleet. A vast People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) and an organized civilian fishing fleet also give the PLAN and CCG vessels a major para-naval auxiliary force. Together, these so-called “three navies” constitute a gray-, white-, and blue-hulled force with nothing comparable in the U.S. alliance network.

Leadership in an Era of Total Competition

A more powerful China flexing its muscle at sea and in new domains is casting longstanding U.S. regional leadership and commitment in a harsher light in East Asia and the Pacific. Despite formidable headwinds, the Chinese economy is still seen as the dominant driver of the regional economy. Nearly four of five Southeast Asians polled view China as the dominant economic power, and twice as many (52 vice 26 percent) see China rather than the United States as the dominant political and strategic power in the region.

Meanwhile, the United States has shown signs of retrenchment from Asia. The Trump administration’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy could well serve as a basis for rallying like-minded countries to stand up to unilateral changes to the status quo and threatening to settle disputes through military force. However, as with the efforts of the Obama administration before it, and the George W. Bush administration before that, a real pivot to Asia requires a sustained focus on the region, backed by an ability to find sufficient resources to preserve a favorable balance of power. As elites in Asia increasingly see China as supplanting U.S. power, the U.S. Navy faces a welter of challenges to maintain current readiness for increasingly contested environments while simultaneously investing in future capabilities.

As the United States struggles to maintain and adapt a legacy naval force, China is closing the qualitative gap in its major combat ships and aircraft. China is gaining sea denial and sea control through a formidable array of missiles that threaten America’s aircraft carrier strike groups and critical bases throughout the region. China is also leveraging the world’s best-armed coast guard and largest paramilitary force to achieve its expansive goals through gray-zone operations.

Importantly, the erosion of U.S. military and naval supremacy is also being accelerated by China’s successful political warfare strategy and America’s sluggish response. Beijing is waging a whole-of-society “total competition.” The techno-nationalist approach seeks to achieve economic preeminence on the back of emerging information-centric technologies like 5G, artificial intelligence, robotics, 3D manufacturing, and quantum computing. All these technologies have both civilian and military value.

While naval competition is vital, there is another competition worth considering. Political and irregular warfare is making a resurgence. Major and regional powers bent on revising the post-World War II global order, in whole or in part, are seeking to achieve their aims without triggering major conflict. Through shadow and covert warfare, as well as a variety of means designed to achieve success with little or no use of kinetic force, revisionist powers are eroding rules, coercing states, and weaponizing information.

In a new report, Total Competition: China’s Challenge in the South China Sea, Ryan Neuhard and I have attempted to outline Beijing’s variant of political warfare, especially as it applies to a critical regional flashpoint: the South China Sea. Understanding China’s total competition approach is essential to thinking about the naval balance in the Pacific. “Total competition” is in contrast to the concept of “total warfare,” and it is better than “political warfare” because all wars are political, and the main idea is an indirect approach of winning without fighting.  The CCP is interested more in what H. R. McMaster calls “cooption, coercion, and concealment,” than it is in “lethality” (to pick a term central to DoD strategy). Total competition comprises five dimensions: economic, legal, psychological, military (especially maritime), and informational. But information cuts across all the aspects of the strategy and all activities. The growing importance of big data, narrative, cyber warfare, A.I., quantum, and other issues explains why Beijing’s total competition is, at its core, a desire for information dominance.

Augmenting the U.S. Response

In short, the United States does not merely face a rising competitor for primacy in the Pacific; it does so at a time when it is also having difficulty finding strategic coherence and adequate resources. It does so at a time when it is crucial to place conventional military power in a broader context of political warfare in the digital age, or total competition. With that in mind, the United States should consider making several strategic priorities and adjustments.

First, the United States and its allies and partners must prepare for a range of contingencies. Beyond a possible North Korean missile attack, the principal concerns are a possible Taiwan invasion, and maritime coercion or naval conflict in the East or South China Seas. In short, more must be done to shore up deterrence by denial, counter maritime coercion, and prepare for a possible, short, sharp “informationized” clash.

Second, the United States needs to strengthen rather than weaken its alliance network, building out a broader and more capable constellation of security partners.

Third, the U.S. needs to reinforce and defend the rules-based order, rather than calling into question the basic multilateral framework of regional cooperation.

Fourth, the United States needs to push back on China’s total competition, adding military means that help to preserve deterrence by denial, but at a sustainable cost.

Fifth, in the context of the Pacific naval balance, the United States needs to garner more resources and spend it far more wisely to protect the desired balance of current and future capabilities. The administration’s latest proposed budget would cut shipbuilding but invest more in the competition over future information-based technologies and capabilities. A balance is needed.

Three crucial questions require further deliberation and research. For one thing, how can the United States and allies maintain deterrence, prevent it from slipping, or restore it? Presumably, conventional deterrence by denial capabilities and networked security with partners are essential, but policymakers should consider the full toolkit.

Next, how can the United States reassure allies and partners while bolstering deterrence against major power adversaries? For instance, the U.S. Navy has begun its first submarine patrol with low-yield nuclear weapons designed to preserve deterrence. Similarly, the interest in deploying mobile, long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles is also sincere, even though the process of trying to deploy them will create an inevitable political backlash from some quarters.

Finally, how can the United States and its allies and partners win the total competition with China, given that winning means avoiding major war while denying China or any single power exclusive control over the Western Pacific and maritime Asia? A winning approach requires the adoption of a similar total competition strategy, albeit one suited to democracies. It also requires a positive slate of activities to bolster the prevailing rules, institutions, and partnerships to preserve a sustainable Indo-Pacific order for all.

Source: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/make-no-mistake-china-really-does-want-dominate-pacific-129917

The post Make No Mistake, China Really Does Want to Dominate the Pacific first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.