US Navy photo

“For the first time, we’re not chasing anyone,” Russian strongman Vladimir Putin declared in a section of his 2020 State of the Nation address focused on Russia’s military. “We’re not catching up with anyone. On the contrary, other states will have to create weapons that Russia already has.”

On this issue, it appears Putin is not bluffing.

Provocative foe

A recent analysis by the Economist magazine illustrates the dramatic advances and investments Russia has made in its military in recent years.

“Russian military expenditure approximately doubled between 2005 and 2018,” according to the report. Russia now spends about 4 percent of GDP on its military.

On the strength of that spending binge, Russia has added 600 new warplanes, 840 helicopters, 2,300 drones, and some truly eyebrow-raising (and nightmare-causing) weapons systems: a hypersonic missile that can fly 27 times the speed of sound, a nuclear-tipped high-speed underwater drone designed to target and render coastal areas uninhabitable, a nuclear-powered cruise missile designed to loiter in the atmosphere – and evade satellite and radar detection – for months at a time.

In addition, tens of thousands of Russian troops have seen combat in Ukraine and Syria in recent years, thus honing and hardening a good portion of the Russian military. More than 2,000 Russian troops are occupying eastern Ukraine, down from a high of 15,000; some 31,000 Russian troops have deployed to Ukraine’s Crimean region; and 63,000 Russian troops have cycled through Syria, where the Russian military has conducted long-range sea-borne missile strikes, carried out precision (and not-so-precision) airstrikes, tested air defenses against drone swarms, and deployed its own combat drones.

Russia’s air force has revived the Cold War-era practice of hounding U.S. warships and testing U.S. air defenses in Alaska and the North Pacific. Russia’s navy has captured Ukrainian warships in international waters, effectively annexed the Sea of Azov, gained a strategic foothold in the Mediterranean (courtesy of Syria), slipped warships into the English Channel for provocative sail-throughs, returned to the North Atlantic in force, flouted America’s exclusive economic zone off Alaska, bullied American fishing vessels out of the area and conducted large-scale operations along the edge of Alaskan waters.

The Russian navy’s actions prompted Lt. Gen. David Krumm, commander of Alaskan Command and the 11th Air Force, to conclude, “What we have to do now is be prepared to fight here and defend here.”

Moscow has not limited its military displays to land, sea, and sky. In April and July of this year, Moscow conducted provocative tests of anti-satellite systems (ASAT). The April test is believed to be Russia’s ninth demo of a “direct ascent” ASAT in recent years. (Direct-ascent ASATs are ground-based or air-launched missiles.) The July test saw Russia fire an object from a satellite built to deploy ASATs.

During a similar test in 2017, Russia deployed a satellite that “launched a high-speed projectile into space,” as Space Force chief Gen. John Raymond recently revealed.

As a Canadian general at NORAD puts it, “This adversary – this competitor, Russia – has advanced on all fronts.”

Weak points

Putin, like history’s other revisionist autocrats, has tried to justify his buildup and behavior by contriving external causes. His twin bogeymen are U.S. missile defense and NATO expansion.

Regarding the missile defenses America began deploying in 2004, the system was then and remains today focused on limited threats posed by Iran and North Korea. Due to both the positioning of the system’s elements and the number of Russian missiles, Russia’s massive arsenal would easily overwhelm America’s rudimentary missile defenses. Putin knows this. Moreover, it pays to recall that when Washington notified Moscow of plans to withdraw from the ABM Treaty to defend against rogue missile threats, Putin said the decision “does not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.” The U.S. system hasn’t changed, but Putin’s opinion has.

Regarding NATO expansion, the Brookings Institution’s Steven Pifer details how Mikhail Gorbachev “made clear there was no promise regarding broader enlargement” of the alliance as the Cold War thawed. Gorbachev himself concedes, “The topic of NATO expansion was not discussed at all.” Moreover, the historical record shows that in the years before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, NATO avoided activity in Eastern Europe. NATO didn’t even begin drawing up contingency plans for defending Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (which joined the alliance in 2004) until after Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008.

Putin’s military buildup and outright aggression occurred as NATO members slashed military spending and “hugged the bear,” in the words of former NATO commander Gen. Philip Breedlove.

Indeed, Putin’s Russia grew more aggressive even as NATO grew less concerned about deterrence. It pays to recall that before Ukraine, the alliance had carved out a special Russian place within NATO headquarters, downgraded defense spending, and pulled back or shelved deterrent military assets. For instance, the Navy’s North Atlantic-focused 2nd Fleet was deactivated in 2011. The Army’s Germany-based V Corps was deactivated in 2012. Washington withdrew every American main battle tank from Europe in 2013 – the first time since 1944 Europe had been left unprotected by U.S. heavy armor. That same year, Britain announced it would close its garrison in Germany, pulling thousands of combat troops out of Europe. And Germany busily beat its swords into plowshares. In the 1980s, West Germany deployed 2,125 tanks; by 2014, Germany had fewer than 300.

All the while, Putin was taking aim at weak points in Europe and NATO. He waged a crippling cyberwar against NATO member Estonia, invaded and dismembered NATO aspirants Georgia and Ukraine, violated the INF Treaty; reactivated the 1st Guards Tank Army (a 500-tank force based in western Russia), mused about using nuclear weapons to somehow de-escalate military conflict, threatened nuclear war against NATO members Poland and Norway, armed Taliban forces waging war against NATO personnel operating under U.N. mandate, and unleashed his intelligence agencies to conduct strategic-influence operations targeting political institutions in the United States and 26 allied countries.

NATO response

The good news, as the Russian bear flexes its muscles and sharpens its claws, is that NATO is responding.

Before Putin’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, only three NATO members met the alliance-wide goal of investing 2 percent of GDP in defense. But after Ukraine, NATO shifted back to deterrence: 2019 marked five consecutive years of increased defense spending in Europe and Canada, NATO’s European members have added 109,000 troops to their ranks since 2015, NATO’s European and Canadian members have added $100 billion in fresh defense spending, and by 2024, two-thirds of the alliance will meet NATO’s 2-percent standard.

On the strength of these defense investments, NATO has tripled the size of its rapid-response force. NATO members have committed to deploy 30 troop battalions, 30 squadrons of aircraft, and 30 warships to any European crisis zone within 30 days of a go order. NATO members are deploying air units to the Baltics to protect and monitor alliance airspace. Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia are establishing a Regional Special Operations Command to coordinate, train and jointly deploy commando units capable of defending against Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics, which rely on troops scrubbed of insignia to slip into foreign territory to sow confusion and direct fifth-column elements. Germany, Britain, and Canada are spearheading NATO’s frontline Baltic battlegroups to deter Putin from mounting a Ukraine-style invasion.

Indeed, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a seminal moment for the alliance. After Ukraine, the Obama administration quadrupled funding for the defense of NATO’s easternmost members. The Trump administration tripled Obama administration funding levels for what’s known as the European Deterrence Initiative; reactivated the Navy’s 2nd Fleet; re-established the Army’s V Corps; authorized construction of and/or upgrades to bases in Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Latvia, and Estonia; returned U.S. assets to Cold War-era ports in France and Greece; approved the largest shipment of Air Force ordnance into Europe since the late 1990s; brought two new members into the NATO fold (Montenegro and North Macedonia), and strengthened NATO’s presence on the territory of its most vulnerable members.

In addition to the aforementioned Baltic battlegroups, the United States is well on its way to permanently basing some 5,500 troops in Poland. As Air Force Magazine details, the plan calls for squadrons of Air Force drones, a new Air Force “loading and unloading airbase” adjacent to Wrocław-Strachowice airport, an Army forward division command, a joint combat training center, a combat aviation brigade headquarters, a combat logistics support battalion, special-operations support facilities, and an armored brigade combat team headquarters.

Wise counsel

To be sure, today’s Russian military lacks the heft and reach of the Red Army. But Putin’s weapons and actions have gotten NATO’s attention — and re-reminded the alliance of the importance of deterrence and readiness.

Deterrence works. Deploying sufficient military strength where it’s needed to discourage an adversary from attacking, signaling a readiness to use military force in response to attack, making clear that the costs of aggression will be higher than any potential benefits of aggression – this is what deterrence looked like during the Cold War. And this is what American presidents counseled throughout the Cold War.

Pointing to “stepped-up training and production programs,” President Harry Truman praised NATO as “an integrated international force whose object is to maintain peace through strength.”

“Our arms must be mighty,” President Dwight Eisenhower explained, “so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk its own destruction.”

President John Kennedy vowed to “strengthen our military power to the point where no aggressor will dare attack.”

Noting that “none of the four wars in my lifetime came about because we were too strong,” President Ronald Reagan steered Cold War 1.0 to a peaceful end by promoting “peace through strength.”

To ensure Cold War 2.0 follows a similar trajectory, NATO’s leaders need to keep that wise counsel in mind, keep their armies ready and keep an eye on Putin.

Source: https://www.legion.org/landingzone/251355/bear-not-bluffing

The post The bear is not bluffing first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

US forces in Europe are getting smarter and more flexible. But they still lack firepower.

That’s one problem that U.S. Air Force general Tod Wolters, the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa, described in a wide-ranging interview that Air Force magazine published in April 2019.

U.S. president Donald Trump has nominated Wolters to head U.S. European Command, taking over from U.S. Army general Mike Scaparrotti.

Wolters said EUCOM’s mobility and intelligence operations have improved. He mentioned improvements to air bases in the Baltic states as well as the new base in Poland for Air Force MQ-9 drones.

But the 67,000-strong EUCOM still lacks the forces to precisely strike an attacking Russian force deep behind the front line. “You always want to shoot faster, you always want to shoot more accurately, and you always want to shoot longer,” Wolters said.

Air Forces Europe oversees just three fighter wings. One in the United Kingdom flying F-15Cs and F-15Es and one each with F-16s in Italy and Germany.

The three wings combined possess fewer than 200 fighters, none of them stealthy. F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters and bombers including B-2 stealth bombers frequently deploy to Europe on a temporary basis as part of the $7-billion-a-year European Deterrence Initiative, Washington’s response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine.

“You want to be able to put more targets at risk across the potential battle space, wherever that battle space may be,” Wolters said.

“With the current posture, we’re probably not as fast or as deep as any commander would prefer, and to be more effective you would like to be able, for example, to deliver fires from all domains. Not just from the air, but from the maritime, from [Special Operations Forces], from space, from cyber and certainly from land.

As we look into the future about the potential of each one of those domains possessing the capability to deliver fires, we want to make sure that from an alignment perspective, and a deconfliction perspective and a coordination perspective, the effect that we want to get in the battle space is exactly the one that we will get as a result of meshing all of those domains together … on a potential target.

If you do that … you create tremendous challenges with a potential foe, because they have to defend, not just against what may come at [them] from the air, but also what may come at [them] from the land and from the maritime.”

Wolters said he and his fellow commanders must “ensure that we have fine-tuned the effect that both of us can deliver for a given problem set and a potential battle space location, to make sure that we’ve got the right fire at the right time coming from the right domain.”

But as a result of deep cuts that began in 2013, EUCOM lacks forces in the air, on the ground and on the sea. A U.S. Army regiment with 300 Stryker wheeled vehicles is the only mechanized American force permanently in Europe. The Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade also is based in Europe.

The Army also temporarily deploys one armored brigade at a time to the continent. A typical armored brigade has around 90 M-1 tanks and 130 M-2 fighting vehicles plus around 18 M-109 self-propelled howitzers.

Scaparrotti previously complained that EUCOM doesn’t have enough warships. In March 2019 he told a Senate committee he wanted two more destroyers to supplement the four that the U.S. Navy already stations in Rota, Spain.

The general said he also wants a “better pace” of carriers and amphibious ships deploying to European waters, according to USNI News reporter John Grady. The extra ships would help deter “an evolving and modernizing Russian fleet,” Scaparrotti said.

The Navy is struggling to expand from 289 major warships to 355 in order to meet growing demand from regional commanders. The Air Force likewise has proposed to grow from 311 front-line squadrons to 386. Both efforts currently lack the necessary funding.

The California think-tank RAND in 2016 war-gamed a Russian invasion of the Baltics. In RAND’s scenario, the Russian forces quickly overrun lightly-armed NATO forces. The Western alliance quickly deploys helicopters and air-mobile troops to confront the Russian advance. But NATO tanks are too slow to arrive.

“What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to more-frequent and more-effective attacks from air- and land-based fires and subject them to spoiling counterattacks,” RAND explained.

Wolters said he and other commanders in Europe struggle to coordinate the forces that they do have in order to hit an enemy force fast enough and hard enough to defeat it. “Those are areas … none of us are satisfied with at this time.”

David Axe serves as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels  War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad.

Source: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/dont-tell-russia-us-forces-europe-lack-firepower-53597

The post Don’t Tell Russia: U.S. Forces in Europe Lack Firepower first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.