Much has been written over the last two years about how President Trump’s approach to global security weakens the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO is America’s most important alliance, a collective security pact fashioned at the beginning of the Cold War to counter Russian threats against Western Europe.

President Trump is said to doubt the value of continued participation in NATO, even though his national security strategy has returned Russia to its past status as a top security concern of U.S. military planners. But much of the reporting about Trump’s views fails to explain why he is so ambivalent about the alliance.

The reason, as he himself has put it, is that some of America’s overseas partners have “taken advantage” of the U.S. on both trade and military relations. The president has made it clear that he thinks Germany is one of the top offenders in that regard.

Germany is the linchpin of NATO, a country that because of its history, location and economic strength is central to the integrity of the Atlantic alliance. But the president has good reason to wonder whether Berlin cares as much about collective security as Washington does. Here are five examples of why the White House is right to wonder.

German defense minister Ursula von der Leyen has argued strenuously for increasing military outlays, but plans call for reaching only 1.5% of GDP in 2024. She is the only minister who has remained in the German government since Angela Merkel first became chancellor in 2005.WIKIPEDIA.

Not bearing the burden. At $4 trillion, Germany’s economy is a fifth the size of America’s. But Germany’s military budget isn’t a fifth of America’s military spending. It isn’t even a tenth. In recent years Berlin has spent 1.1% of its GDP on defense compared with over 3% for the U.S. Under prodding from Trump, the Germans have agreed to raise their defense budget by several billion dollars this year, to 1.3% of GDP. But NATO members have supposedly committed to reaching 2% by 2024, and the German government says it isn’t likely to get above 1.5% in that year—even though chancellor Angela Merkel agrees this raises doubts about “Germany’s credibility.”

Not ready for a war. Berlin says it can’t sensibly spend much more than it already plans for military forces. But German media have repeatedly documented the depressed state of readiness in those forces. For instance, Der Spiegel reported last year that only four of Germany’s 128 Eurofighter Typhoons were ready for combat. The country is supposed to maintain 82 fighters in a high state of readiness to meet alliance commitments Other reports have noted that only one of the country’s submarines can deploy on short notice; that most of Germany’s tanks are in a low state of readiness; and that barely a quarter of its nuclear-capable Tornado tactical aircraft are operational. Obviously, Berlin isn’t expecting a war anytime soon.

Turning to Russia for energy. Germany obtains about 40% of the natural gas it consumes from Russia. A Baltic pipeline called Nord Stream 2 will double the potential for Russian imports. NATO and European Union countries alike have objected to building the new pipeline, but Berlin has been adamant about proceeding even though there are other sources for Germany’s energy needs. Washington’s complaints that greater dependence on Russian gas will strengthen Moscow’s hand in a future east-west confrontation have gone unheeded. As the respected British publication The Economist observed in a February 16 editorial, “The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is a Russian trap and Germany has fallen into it.”

Turning to China for technology. Germany missed the boat on high-speed internet, so now it is trying to catch up. But despite warnings from Washington and other allied capitals, Berlin is signaling it will allow China’s state-influenced Huawei to play a major part in building out the country’s 5G mobile network. Chinese telecom companies are required by law to assist the state in pursuit of security objectives, and U.S. intelligence has long feared that Huawei equipment might be used to compromise Western security—for example by collecting sensitive information. By embracing Huawei, Berlin is legitimizing use of the suspect company’s technology in other European countries, potentially a big blow to alliance security.

Putting politics above capability. Given Germany’s low level of military spending, you might think the defense ministry works hard to spend every euro wisely. Well, guess again. Two months ago, Berlin inexplicably decided to exclude America’s F-35 fighter from the competition to replace aging Tornado fighter bombers—even though it is the most capable aircraft for continuing Tornado’s “dual-key” nuclear mission, and even though many of Germany’s allies have elected to replace their own Cold War fighters with F-35. The hinted reason is that picking an American plane might undermine Franco-German plans to field a new fighter in the 2040s. But kicking F-35 out of the competition will undermine NATO’s deterrent posture and interoperability so much that war is more likely to occur before the envisioned future plane ever flies.

So President Trump has good reason to question whether Washington should continue counting on NATO to secure America’s overseas interests. The alliance’s most important European member often seems to be missing in action. It is not hard to understand why Germans are uncomfortable with military spending, but how many of them grasp that Washington is postured to put America’s survival at risk in support of their freedom in a future war? Much of America’s military planning and expenditure revolves around being able to defend German borders in an east-west conflict. If Berlin doesn’t start showing more concern for the risks its policies present to U.S. combatants and noncombatants in a future conflict, it is inevitable that President Trump’s criticisms will win a growing audience on this side of the ocean.

I have business ties of one sort or another to companies on all sides of the German fighter competition.

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Source: https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2019/03/04/germanys-policy-choices-are-hastening-the-decline-of-nato/#456d7444bba3

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The post Germany’s Policy Choices Are Hastening The Decline Of NATO first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

Military treaties for a joint European army were signed just a few years after the end of the Second World War. A defense cooperation pact laid out the details, from acquiring new uniforms to implementing a clear command structure. France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg would supply the European Army with soldiers. A European commissioner’s office made up of nine representatives would send the troops to the front line, but officials would be monitored by a European assembly of MEPs from participating states.

Read more: Can PESCO provide a new European identity?

The lower level military units would operate on a purely national level, while officers from several participating states would be expected to serve as leaders. The military project — probably the most ambitious in Europe’s post-war history — cleared numerous hurdles, only to be stopped by opposition in France’s parliament in 1954.

PESCO

After the end of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954, plans for a European army were put on the back burner for decades, until recent events revived the idea. US President Donald Trump’s lack of interest in Europe, the increased threat posed by Russia and the UK’s looming withdrawal from the EU have given the military project new impetus.

The first major step was late last year, when 25 EU member states agreed to the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on the integration of national militaries into an EU force. This cooperation strives for joint armaments projects and a closer cooperation between the armed forces themselves. Going by the wishes of EU defense ministers, PESCO could set the groundwork for a European military. At the same time, the willingness to cooperate is on the rise at the bilateral level.

Franco-German Brigade

Founded in 1989, the Franco-German Brigade is the only bi-national military organization in the world. Its roughly 6,000 soldiers are stationed in four locations in Germany and three in France. Jägerbataillon 291 (291st Light Infantry Battalion) in Alsace is the only combat unit of Germany’s military, the Bundeswehr, permanently stationed outside the country. Soldiers of both nations serve together, but only in the supply and support company and on command levels — all other units are divided by nation.

Launched in 1989, the Franco-German Brigade is considered an early example of European defense integration

German/Netherlands Corps

In 1995, only a few years after the Franco-German Brigade was founded, Germany and the Netherlands established the German/Netherlands Corps, which commands a Dutch and German division of just over 40,000 soldiers.

At the beginning, only leadership positions were filled by soldiers from both countries, but now Germany and the Netherlands are linking the units of both armed forces further down the chain of command. Germany’s Panzerbataillon 414 (414th Tank Battalion) was attached to the Dutch 43rd Mechanized Brigade in 2016. The German battalion also includes a Dutch company of 100 soldiers who are trained to work with German tanks.

This is the first time that German and Dutch units have integrated forces from the company to the divisional level, similar to the kind of integration envisioned by ECG planners in 1950s. German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen called it a “prime example of how to build a European defense union.”

The German/Netherlands Corps is just one example of military integration between the two countries

The cooperation took a further step forward at the start of 2014, when the 11th Airmobile Brigade of the Netherlands was attached to the Division Schnelle Kräfte (German Rapid Forces Division), giving Dutch and German rapid and light infrantry the chance to work side by side.

Combining resources

The motivation for increased military integration extends beyond strengthening political ties. EU countries want to save costs and share access to military capabilities other states may lack.

This year marks the beginning of the integration of the entire German Seebataillon (Naval Forces Protection Battalion) — consisting of some 800 troops — into the Dutch Navy, as agreed in 2016. The Dutch support ship HNLMS Karel Doorman, which is used for amphibious operations, is part of this cooperation. The Dutch Navy had been running the vessel with a reduced crew due to budget constraints, and Germany provided a partner to help operate it.

Regardless of the motivations, EU countries are increasingly recognizing the need to accelerate closer military cooperation within the bloc. This not only applies to smaller nations like the Netherlands, but also to EU heavyweights like France and Germany.

France relied on help from its military partners during the 2013 operation in Mali

During France’s Mali intervention in 2013, military leaders in Paris were shocked to discover that the country lacked the resources to run such extensive combat operations on its own for long periods of time. French military partners had to help with transport and reconnaissance missions shortly after the operation was launched.

Meanwhile Germany is noticing just how much the cost-cutting measures of recent decades have restricted the operational capability of its armed forces. Last year it was reported that Germany’s navy had no submarines at the ready, because they were either undergoing maintenance or had been dry docked, forcing crews to train on shore. The country’s military, the third-largest in the EU, is not expected to have an operational submarine at its disposal again until mid-2018 at the earliest.

Source: https://www.dw.com/en/changing-europe-revives-interest-in-an-eu-military/a-42555374

The post Changing Europe revives interest in an EU military first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.