German foreign policy - Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association

The next German government’s foreign policy

Council on Geostrategy — Fri, 12 Nov 2021 10:04:21 +0000

When it comes to foreign policy in Germany, the differences between the mainstream political parties are few and the level of public interest low. Foreign policy barely featured as an issue in the recent federal election campaign or in the televised debates between the three leading candidates for the chancellorship. It will not be a showstopper in the negotiations to form the next government, either.

Those negotiations have just started. A three-party coalition will be required and the two smaller parties, the Greens and the Free Democrats (FDP), have begun by talking together bilaterally before engaging with the Social Democrats (SDP), who are now the largest party in the Bundestag. It is not a certainty that a coalition of these three parties will be formed and the FDP, in particular, will want to keep open the possibility of an agreement with the Christian Democrats instead. But initially at any rate the momentum is clearly with the so-called ‘traffic light’ option.

It will be an unusual coalition: partly because it will, for the first time, involve three parties, but also because the party providing the chancellor will represent only around one-quarter of the vote and the two other parties jointly about the same. If the two smaller parties are able to combine together, as they are currently trying to do, their influence will be significantly stronger.

This will have consequences for the new coalition’s position on some foreign policy issues. Both the Greens and the FDP take human rights more seriously than the mercantilist SPD and will wish the next government to be more robust in its criticism of Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). They will not, in either case, go as far as to demand trade boycotts or sanctions, but they will expect Germany to speak up more on the Uyghurs’ plight and perhaps put pressure on German companies with investments in Xinjiang to do more to combat forced labour.

They will however face a dilemma over Nordstream II, the new pipeline bringing Russian gas across the Baltic to Germany, which is about to start operating. Both parties expressed opposition to it during the election campaign albeit without specifying what exactly they would do once it was built. The SPD will be reluctant to see it mothballed, so the chances are that it will go ahead as planned.

But it will not be just Russia and the PRC whose domestic policies will cause difficulties with the new German government. Turkey’s too will come under increased scrutiny, as will those of some of the European Union’s (EU) Central and Eastern European members, notably Hungary and Poland. An SPD/Green/FDP German government will not be shy of linking EU countries’ adherence to the rule of law with the disbursement of EU funds.

There will also be tensions in the field of defence. The FDP is in favour of increasing defence expenditure, while the SDP and the Greens are not. Germany is in theory committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) target of spending 2% of national income on defence. NATO estimates that Germany will spend 1.53% in 2021; the last government planned to gradually increase this figure. It seems improbable that an SPD/Green/FDP coalition would actually hit 2% – flat-lining at around 1.5% seems more likely.

More difficult though will be the decision on whether to maintain United States (US) nuclear weapons on German soil; and whether to equip the Tornado replacement aircraft with the capability for delivering free-fall nuclear bombs. Nuclear burden-sharing has been a key element in NATO’s deterrent strategy and if Germany were, as the Greens and some in the SPD want, to try to opt-out of direct involvement in it, this would put additional strain on the transatlantic alliance.

What will not change under any new German government will be a purported enthusiasm for more European defence. There will be frequent calls for a European army, for a European ‘defence union’ and for European ‘strategic autonomy’. But, as in the past, there is unlikely to be much clarity over what these terms mean or what concrete policies would be required to achieve them. This is an area where there has long been a marked contrast between what German politicians say about the EU and how they actually behave within it.

Another issue to be resolved in the coalition negotiations will be who gets what job. For the last 50 years, the German Foreign Minister has been a member of the minority party in a coalition government (there has not been a Christian Democrat one since 1966); for much of this time, the Foreign Minister was also the Vice-Chancellor. But it is not now a priority for either the Greens or the FDP. The latter want above all the Finance Ministry and a veto right over economic policy. The former want the Environment and Transport ministries.

Annalena Baerbock, the Greens’ candidate for the chancellorship, is widely tipped for the Foreign Ministry. But it is her co-party leader Robert Habeck, who is expected to be Environment Minister and Vice-Chancellor. The only former Green Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, was a notable success in the role and was personally responsible for getting his party to endorse Germany’s participation in NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Whether Baerbock would have the same clout is unclear.

And what of the next German government’s attitude to the United Kingdom (UK)? Initially at any rate it will probably be benign neglect. Interest in Britain in Germany is declining and the commercial relationship is fading: by the end of the year, Britain will not, according to some forecasts, any longer be among Germany’s top ten trading partners. Olaf Scholz as Chancellor is unlikely to find Boris Johnson a congenial partner: their political styles are diametrically opposed and his priorities will be to establish relationships with Emmanuel Macron and Joe Biden. The German government will also be suspicious of any attempt by the UK to use bilateral contacts to bypass the EU.

At the working level however cooperation will continue, including in defence. The British Army retains a small residual presence in Germany in the form of a joint river crossing unit. The German Navy might in due course be tempted by the idea of participating in a British carrier strike group deployment, as the Netherlands is currently doing. But the performance of the British economy will be the key factor in determining the nature of the future UK-German relationship. Fuel shortages and empty supermarket shelves currently dominate German perceptions of Britain. But if the British economic recovery continues and the UK finds a successful role for itself outside the EU, then Germany, for all its regrets about Brexit, will treat Britain as a serious partner.

Sir Paul Lever was Her Majesty’s Ambassador to Germany (1997-2003) and Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee (1994-1996). His most recent book is Berlin Rules: Europe and the German Way (I.B. Tauris, 2017).

Source: https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/britains-world/more-of-the-same-the-next-german-governments-foreign-policy/

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Germany rejects calls for troops to return to Afghanistan

Reuters — Tue, 10 Aug 2021 06:34:27 +0000

German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer speaks during the last session of the lower house of parliament Bundestag before federal elections, in Berlin, Germany, June 23, 2021. REUTERS/Michele Tantussi/File Photo

Germany’s Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer meets with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, U.S., June 30, 2021. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst/File Photo

BERLIN, Aug 9 (Reuters) – Germany’s defence minister rejected on Monday calls for its soldiers to return to Afghanistan after Taliban insurgents took Kunduz city where German troops were deployed for a decade.

Germany had the second largest military contingent in Afghanistan after the United States, losing more troops in combat in Kunduz than anywhere else since World War Two.

The Taliban overran three provincial capitals including Kunduz at the weekend as it pressed an offensive since foreign troops began a withdrawal. read more

“The reports from Kunduz and from all over Afghanistan are bitter and hurt a lot,” Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said on Twitter.

“Are society and parliament prepared to send the armed forces into a war and remain there with lots of troops for at least a generation? If we are not, then the joint withdrawal with the partners remains the right decision.”

Some within her own conservative party want German troops to participate in an intervention against the Taliban, but Kramp-Karrenbauer said defeating them would require a long and hard campaign.

Since the United States announced plans in April to pull out troops by Sept. 11, and the transatlantic alliance NATO followed suit, violence has escalated as the Taliban seize territory.

Kramp-Karrenbauer blamed former U.S. President Donald Trump for undermining the Afghanistan operation, even though it is his successor Joe Biden implementing the withdrawal policy.

“Trump’s unfortunate deal with the Taliban was the beginning of the end,” she said of an agreement Trump struck with the Islamist militants in 2020 for U.S. troops to leave.

Reporting by Sabine Siebold; Editing by Andrew Cawthorne

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/germany-rejects-calls-troops-return-afghanistan-2021-08-09/

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Time to Define European Autonomy

Robin Niblett — Tue, 30 Mar 2021 09:49:23 +0000

No matter who succeeds Angela Merkel in the chancellery, Germany will need to focus on building stronger European strategic autonomy in order to be a strong and valued partner to the United States—and to other liberal democracies around the world.

Angela Merkel’s foreign policy did not stretch Germany. It inspired and disappointed its allies in equal measure. She was tough on her most indebted eurozone partners during the financial crisis of 2010–12, as most German voters demanded, but Germany backstopped a massive increase in the ECB’s financial commitment to those countries, as most outsiders recommended. She championed the plan for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States but did not try to force it through overgrowing popular hostility in the European Union. She stood up to Russian President Vladimir Putin after his annexation of Crimea and orchestrated the EU sanctions that continue to affect the Russian economy, but she supports the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

She spoke out boldly against former US President Donald Trump’s values-free America First philosophy when he took office but avoided a rupture in the transatlantic alliance. She has championed the Paris Agreement and the green focus of the NextGenerationEU recovery fund, but Germany’s transition away from high-carbon electricity generation remains slow. One of her boldest moves—opening Germany’s borders in 2015 to someone million migrants fleeing Syria and other conflicts—was forced on her by circumstance, and she then balanced it by negotiating a tawdry deal with Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to staunch the flow.

Avoiding Risks

In many ways, Merkel’s foreign policy record encapsulates the outside view of Germany as an international actor. It is a powerful country that lies at the intersection of many of the world’s most significant fault lines—geographically and thematically. It has the means to tilt the balance of European foreign policy in its preferred direction, but it often avoids the burdens and risks that such overt leadership would entail.

In which direction might German foreign policy turn after Merkel’s departure? Will it continue to reflect her deft balancing act, keeping Germany safe, but pushing difficult decisions into the future? Will it become more inward-looking, especially in a post-COVID-19 context, if German voters demand a clearer prioritization of their national interests? Or will it build on the many positive aspects of Merkel’s legacy and strengthen German support for a more collective and, potentially, powerful European voice?

Choices Are Limited

The future course of German foreign policy does not lie in its own hands. The changing international context will have a strong bearing on the choices future governments will make.

There is no more important bellwether for future German foreign policy than the policies of its principal global ally, the United States. Even an internationalist Biden administration is unlikely to recover America’s role as global leader, despite President Joe Biden’s proclamation that his foreign policy will “place the United States back at the head of the table.” The US faces huge internal challenges, and many of its allies remain wary of America’s longer-term reliability. As EU Council President Charles Michel put it on January 20, 2021, the same day as Biden’s inauguration, “the EU chooses its course and does not wait for permission to take its own decisions.”

Nevertheless, the United States will remain the most powerful, well-resourced democracy in the world, and the indispensable guarantor of Germany’s and Europe’s security. With President Putin planning to extend his presidency into the 2030s, Russia will remain a “spoiler” country across Europe and the world. Without US support, the threats it poses to the security of individual European states could become more pronounced. In this context, Washington will continue to demand that Europeans share a greater burden of Euro-Atlantic security, and Europeans, Germany included, will have to meet the challenge.

Absent some 1930s style financial collapse, China will become ever more powerful, especially across Asia Pacific, Africa, and parts of Latin America. Germany and Europe will be unable to counter-balance China’s growing influence alone, including the spread of its authoritarian security structures and opaque political and economic approach to governance. They will need to coordinate closely with the US and other like-minded countries and put flesh on the bones of some sort of European Indo-Pacific strategy. Failure to do so would have negative impacts on European economic interests in the region and on rules-based multilateralism.

An Unstable Environment

Europe’s southern and Mediterranean neighborhood will not stabilize any time soon. Governments in North Africa and the populous Gulf and Arab states will struggle to deliver hope and opportunity to their growing young populations, given the entrenched failings of domestic governance. Turkey’s future is uncertain, as hopes for democratic renewal could be overwhelmed by the populist lure of neo-Ottoman rule. These nearby challenges will pale into insignificance if Africa’s fast-expanding populations fail to enjoy economic opportunity and continue to be ravaged by violence and the effects of accelerating climate change. Future German governments would do well to sustain Merkel’s investment in Africa’s future, which may prove to be one of her most important European legacies.

The EU itself faces multiple internal challenges: a significant minority of voters are increasingly skeptical of the process of European integration; economic divisions between and within European countries are being deepened by the COVID-19 crisis. And a sometimes defensive, sometimes belligerent UK is cutting at the economic strings that inevitably bind it to its EU neighbors—disrupting EU politics and business. The bulk of Germany’s foreign policy attention will be spent managing relations with its European neighbors and EU institutions, irrespective of the major challenges beyond.

The “How,” Not the “What”

The focal areas of Germany’s future foreign policy are fore-ordained; they will not be “new,” whoever enters the Chancellery later this year. What will matter will be the “how,” not the “what” of German foreign policy. Some of the “how” will be tactical—how much more German and EU money to deploy on stabilization efforts in the Sahel? How quickly to raise defense spending toward agreed NATO targets? Which Chinese investments to welcome and which to block? Whether to leave Nord Stream 2 “dormant” if it is completed. Each tactical decision will signal how seriously Germany takes the new international context and its support for a unified European response.

But there is a bigger “how” question that will define the character of Germany’s future foreign policy: it concerns where Germany stands on the question of how to build European “strategic autonomy” and “sovereignty” to deal with the new strategic context. Germany’s political influence, financial means, and market power will be central to deciding how this plays out.

Understandable Ambivalence

There has been an understandable ambivalence toward European strategic autonomy under Merkel—born of the suspicion that it might leave Europe in a strategic limbo between America and China and weaken the transatlantic alliance which remains so central to German and European security.

This ambivalence is well-placed. France’s President Emmanuel Macron’s view that Europeans, “cannot accept to live in a bipolar world made up of the US and China” presents Germany and Europe with a false choice. Because there will not be a bipolar world. China does not have the allies to build its own pole, and America’s allies—in Europe as in Asia—would not follow the US to such a destination if the Biden administration were to try to make it a reality.

Moreover, there is no third-way option for Europe. The citizens and polities that together comprise Europe—EU members and non-EU alike—are intrinsically part of the world’s liberal democratic camp, notwithstanding some recent, marginal back-sliding. The growing global assertiveness of China and Russia creates a congruence of interests among the liberal democracies across the Atlantic, and with other US allies—Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia, among others—that is systemic, not temporal.

A Strong and Valued Partner

This is reflected in the way that France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other European countries are developing Indo-Pacific strategies that will complement the heightened US focus on the region. It also applies to those policy areas which are most symbolic of European strategic autonomy—over data governance and trade, for example. In both areas, there is more that unites German, European, and US approaches than divides them, given the potential spread of Chinese state surveillance into global data governance and the economic threats posed by state-dominated economic systems.

This all means that the EU cannot be truly sovereign or autonomous, even if it were to overcome the perennial difficulties of trying to exercise collective action among 27 member states with very different external priorities and cultures. Europe’s strategic autonomy is conditional on the existence of a strong and sizeable community of other states, indispensably including the US, that share its commitment to liberal democratic systems of governance.

So, Germany’s future foreign policy needs to focus on building European strategic autonomy not for its own sake, but to enable Europe to be a strong and valued partner to the US and to other liberal democracies around the world which share the same core commitments to open societies, respect for individual and minority rights, the rule of law, and separation of powers. Germany’s indispensable new role should be to help the EU commit to inclusive forms of autonomy built around these principles.

Robin Niblett is director and chief executive of Chatham House in London.

Source: https://ip-quarterly.com/en/time-define-european-autonomy

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Time to Define European Autonomy

Robin Niblett — Tue, 30 Mar 2021 09:38:30 +0000

Avoiding Risks

Choices Are Limited

The future course of German foreign policy does not lie in its own hands. The changing international context will have a strong bearing on the choices future governments will make.

An Unstable Environment

The “How,” Not the “What”

Understandable Ambivalence

A Strong and Valued Partner

Robin Niblett is director and chief executive of Chatham House in London.

Source: https://ip-quarterly.com/en/time-define-european-autonomy

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A senior Merkel ally says China is an ‘ever more powerful snake’ that Germany will take the fight to

Adam Payne — Thu, 06 Aug 2020 05:02:38 +0000

German Chancellor Angela Merkel speaks during a news conference after coalition meetings over stimulus measures to reboot post-coronavirus economy, at the Chancellery in Berlin, Germany June 3, 2020.

John Macdougall/Pool via REUTERS

Germany will take the fight to China as an EU leader, a senior ally of Angela Merkel has said.
Germany took on the European Council’s rotating presidency last month.
Michael Roth, a senior foreign minister in Merkel’s government, said Berlin would prioritize standing up to Beijing, writing: ‘One thing is clear: We urgently need more European action in our dealings with China.’
Roth said China was an ‘apparently ever more powerful snake’ that must be met head-on by the EU.
There is growing tension between China and the West over its treatment of Uighurs and Hong Kong.
Visit Business Insider’s homepage for more stories.

A senior member of Angela Merkel’s government has warned China that a European Union fronted by Germany will go toe-to-toe with Beijing, stating “there will be no ‘business as usual’ as far as the EU is concerned.”

Germany took on the European Council’s rotating presidency last month and has warned Beijing that it will not be afraid to “lock horns” over issues like its treatment of Hong Kong and Uighurs in the Chinese province of Xinjiang.

Writing in Spiegel on Sunday, Michael Roth, the state secretary for Europe in Germany’s foreign affairs ministry, described China as an “ever more powerful snake” that must be met head-on by a more confident EU.

“We must not be afraid to lock horns when it comes to difficult issues such as human rights, security, and technology. This, too, is about our own sovereignty at the end of the day,” Roth wrote.

“China will certainly not build one single coal-fired power station less if we remain silent when we have differences of opinion.”

Roth issued the warning amid growing tension between Beijing and governments in the West.

The senior German minister said that while the EU and China are “interconnected” economies and must work together to be successful, China is a “systemic rival” to Europe that is “increasingly going on the offensive.”

“The leadership of the authoritarian, one-party state passes up no opportunity to drive a wedge between the EU member states and weaken them. We are locked in a tough competition of values stemming from very different concepts of society,” he said.

Roth said Germany’s priority would be to encourage the EU to “act more confidently” towards China than it has done before.

“We will not bring our influence to bear in Beijing if we are not united and if we do not stand up for our values and interests with the combined strength of the EU.”

He said: “What can the EU do to ensure it does not find itself paralyzed like the proverbial rabbit when faced with an apparently ever more powerful snake?”

“One thing is clear: We urgently need more European action in our dealings with China.

“A consistent ‘Team Europe policy’ is long overdue.

“This is a priority of Germany’s presidency of the Council of the European Union, during which we bear particular responsibility. The EU must act more confidently vis-à-vis China and speak with one voice.”

Getty

Roth warned that Beijing’s imposition of a draconian new security law on Hong Kong and its suppression of Uighurs in the Chinese province of Xinjiang showed “how uncompromisingly it is prepared to assert its claim to power.”

“China is therefore not afraid to violate central principles of the rules-based international order before the eyes of the world,” he said.

Germany on Friday followed the UK, Australia, and Canada by suspending its extradition agreement with Hong Kong.

Roth added that the EU must aim to become less economically dependent on China.

The bloc should increase efforts to look to firms in Europe for technology like 5g, he said, describing the row over whether Chinese firm Huawei should be allowed to develop 5g in Western countries as a “litmus test” for the EU.

“Nothing less than the security of our citizens is at stake here,” he said.

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Source: https://www.businessinsider.com/senior-merkel-ally-michael-roth-says-germany-and-the-eu-must-get-tougher-with-china-2020-8

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Germany Calls for De-escalation of ‘Explosive’ Iran-US Tensions

NewsMax — Tue, 11 Jun 2019 20:12:18 +0000

Confrontation between Washington and Tehran is now “explosive” and could lead to military escalation, Germany’s foreign minister said on Monday, becoming the most senior Western official to visit Iran since a war of words erupted last month.

Iran accused the United States of waging economic war by reimposing and extending sanctions. Nevertheless, it reassured Germany’s Heiko Maas that it still wants to work with European powers to salvage a deal to curb its nuclear program in return for lifting sanctions, which Washington abandoned a year ago.

European countries have found themselves caught in the middle as the United States and Iran have taken increasingly aggressive postures in recent weeks.

Washington sharply tightened sanctions from the start of May, ordering all countries and companies to halt all imports of Iranian oil or be banished from the global financial system.

It has since also began discussing military confrontation, dispatching extra troops to the region to counter what it describes as Iranian threats.

Iran, for its part, has threatened to increase its enrichment of uranium in response, unless European powers find a way to shield it from the impact of American sanctions.

“The situation in the region here is highly explosive and extremely serious,” Maas told a news conference alongside Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. “A dangerous escalation of existing tensions can also lead to a military escalation.”

The U.N. nuclear watchdog says Iran is still abiding by the nuclear deal despite the U.S. withdrawal. But experts say that if it carries out its threat to increase its output of enriched uranium, it could eventually violate it.

“We had frank and serious talks with Maas,” said Zarif, one of the nuclear deal’s architects. “Tehran will cooperate with EU signatories of the deal to save it,” he said of the deal.

Zarif blamed the United States for the escalation.

“Reducing tension is only possible through stopping the economic war by America,” he said. “Those who wage such wars cannot expect to remain safe.”

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GESTURES FAIL SO FAR

Washington’s European allies opposed its decision last year to abandon the nuclear deal. They have promised to help Iran find other ways to trade, though with no success so far. All major European companies that had announced plans to invest in Iran have since called them off for fear of U.S. punishment.

The administration of President Donald Trump argues that the deal, reached under his predecessor Barack Obama, is not tough enough and Tehran can be forced to make more concessions with new sanctions. Europeans say this undermines the pragmatist faction in Iran’s leadership and strengthens hardliners.

Iran says the Europeans have not done enough to provide it with alternative ways to engage economically with the outside world. Maas acknowledged limits to how much help the European countries can provide.

“We want to fulfill our obligations,” Maas said during his joint news conference with Zarif. “We cannot work miracles, but we will try to avert a failure” of the nuclear deal.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Abbas Mousavi said: “So far, we have not seen practical and tangible steps from the Europeans to guarantee Iran’s interests.”

In an effort to protect at least some of Iran’s economy from U.S. sanctions, France, Britain and Germany have set up a special-purpose vehicle called Instex, designed to allow trade payments that would bypass sanctions. It has yet to be launched.

“This is an instrument of a new kind, so it’s not straightforward to operationalise it,” Maas told reporters. “But all the formal requirements are in place now, and so I’m assuming we’ll be ready to use it in the foreseeable future.”

Washington has denounced the European plans. Diplomats say the system is unlikely to have much impact on commercial trade with Iran but could be used for humanitarian transactions that are permitted under U.S. sanctions.

Washington says the nuclear deal should be expanded to cover other issues including Iran’s missile program and its regional policies. European countries share those concerns, although they argue that it would be harder to address them without the nuclear deal in place.

Iran strongly opposes any effort to expand negotiations to cover other issues. Mousavi said as much: “The EU is not in a position to question Iran’s issues beyond the nuclear deal.”

Source: https://www.newsmax.com/world/globaltalk/germany-iran-united-states/2019/06/10/id/919754/

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Solidarity with Israel central to German foreign policy, new FM says

Raphael Ahren — Sun, 25 Mar 2018 11:44:02 +0000

Ahead of maiden trip to the region, Heiko Maas reiterates commitment to Jewish state’s security, notes 70th anniversary of independence.

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas takes the oath of office after the new government was appointed after German Chancellor Angela Merkel was elected for a fourth term as chancellor in the German parliament Bundestag in Berlin, Germany, Wednesday, March 14, 2018. (AP Photo/Michael Sohn)

Solidarity with the Jewish state is a cornerstone of German foreign policy, Berlin’s new top diplomat said Sunday as he boarded a plane to Israel for his first visit.

“Responsibility for and solidarity with the Jewish and democratic State of Israel, standing up for its security and against anti-Semitism — that’s at the center of our foreign policy,” he said. “And it’s the compass that I followed on my way to politics.”

During his two-day trip to the region, Maas is scheduled to meet with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Reuven Rivlin. He will also visit the Yad Vashem Holocaust museum and meet with survivors. In Ramallah, he is set to meet with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

“Every trip to Israel is special, especially a few weeks before celebrating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the state,” Maas said. That momentous occasion is an important date in Germany, he added, “because the friendship that we enjoy today with Israel is thanks to the great men and women that made it grow. For us, it is a great gift.”

Maas, who became foreign minister earlier this month, affirmed German “continuity” regarding Middle East policy. “We want to strengthen our special connection to Israel in the future,” he said.

His talks with Netanyahu, however, may focus on some contentious issues, as Germany, along with other European states, is currently advocating for the maintenance of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, while Israel has been seeking to have the pact, in which Germany was a key partner, either significantly modified or abrogated altogether.

“Germany remains committed to the nuclear agreement with Iran in order to avoid an increasing arms race in the Middle East,” the German Foreign Ministry posted on its website on Sunday morning.

Another potential point of friction between Jerusalem and Berlin is the upcoming vote for a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council for 2019-2020.

The two countries are competing for the same slot, which dramatically decreases Israel’s chances to enter the prestigious council for the first time.

During his March 14 inauguration at the German Foreign Office headquarters in Berlin, Maas reiterated his personal commitment to Israelbut also made plain that Germany will not withdraw its candidacy for the Security Council.

“For me, German-Israeli history does not only entail a historic responsibility. For me personally, it is a deep motivation of my political activity,” he said.

Source: https://www.timesofisrael.com/solidarity-with-israel-central-to-german-foreign-policy-new-fm-says/

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