Friction between Tehran and Ankara in Iraq is rooted in balance-of-power considerations and their quest for greater influence.

Over the past several weeks, Iraq has become a major point of friction between Iran and Turkey. On February 27, Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Iraj Masjedi criticized Turkey’s military intervention in Iraq, calling on Ankara to withdraw its troops from Iraq. “We do not accept at all, be it Turkey or any other country, to intervene in Iraq militarily or advance or have a military presence in Iraq,” Masjedi said in an interview with Kurdish outlet Rudaw. He further emphasized that “the security of Iraq should be maintained by Iraqis.” Turkey’s envoy to Iraq Fatih Yıldız hit back on Twitter, saying that his Iranian counterpart “would be the last person to lecture Turkey about respecting borders of Iraq.” Following the quarrel, Tehran and Ankara summoned each other’s ambassadors to formally express their grievances.

The diplomatic row came amid an increased Turkish military presence in northern Iraq with the pretext of fighting against Kurdish militants belonging to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The group is a designated terrorist organization in Turkey and several other countries. On February 10, Ankara conducted a military operation in the Gara Mountains of Iraq’s Duhok province to free a number of Turkish hostages held by the PKK. After the operation failed to achieve the designated goal and thirteen hostages were killed, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened that Turkey would expand its anti-PKK campaign to Sinjar, a strategic region located on Iraq’s border with Syria.

Following Erdogan’s threat to invade Sinjar, Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) of Iraq deployed thousands of troops in three brigades to Sinjar to counter what they perceive as Ankara’s intention to occupy parts of their country. The move was widely seen by Turkish media as the PMF coming to the PKK’s rescue and an indication of Iran’s support for the Kurdish militants. As such, one might argue that divergent Iranian and Turkish approaches toward the Kurdish militants in Iraq are the main factor behind the recent tensions. However, such an argument would ignore the fact that as recently as June 2020, Tehran and Ankara launched simultaneous air and artillery strikes against Kurdish insurgents in northern Iraq, sparking speculations that they have coordinated their military moves in the Arab country. What has changed in less than a year that has prompted contention between the two sides over—apparently—the same issue?

In the big picture, friction between Tehran and Ankara in Iraq is rooted in balance-of-power considerations and their quest for greater influence. Over the past couple of years, Iranian leaders have been under the impression that their influence in Iraq is declining and an anti-Iranian atmosphere is dominating the Arab country. Widespread public protests in Iraq in late 2019 against Iran’s role was the first major sign of this downward spiral and the assassination of Iran’s Quds Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani dealt the most severe blow to Tehran’s influence.

To exacerbate the problems even further, in May 2020, Iran-backed Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi was replaced with Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, a more independent Iraqi politician who is trying to maintain a balanced relationship with Iran and Iraq’s other neighbors, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey. By then, Ankara had already reached an agreement with Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil to purge the PKK in Sinjar. Iran’s exclusion from the trilateral agreement made it suspicious of Turkey’s plans for Iraq. Tehran is especially worried that Ankara might use its anti-Kurdish campaign to establish a long-term military presence in Sinjar, as it previously did in northern Syria and Iraq’s Dohuk province. Considering Iraq and Syria are the main constituents of its “strategic depth,” Iran has a zero-sum approach to these countries. This means that Tehran is basically unwilling to share its perceived sphere of strategic influence with rivals unless they could build on rapidly changing power equations to impose themselves on the ground, like the case of the U.S. military presence in Iraq or the Turkish occupation of northern Syria.

Yet this is not the whole story. Turkey is also Iran’s main economic competitor in the Iraqi market. In 2019, Turkey exported $10.2 billion worth of goods to Iraq, slightly surpassing Iran’s $9.6 billion export over the same period. Turkish companies have also invested about $25 billion in nine hundred construction and infrastructural projects – including energy, water, and petrochemical industries—in various Iraqi cities. There’s also growing competition between Tehran and Ankara in Iraq’s electricity industry, which used to be dominated by Iranian companies. Besides, Turkey considers its geographical location at the juncture of Eastern Europe and West Asia as a unique geo-economic advantage, increasingly seeking to monopolize transit routes in the neighboring areas. In this vein, through expanding economic ties with Iraq, Turkey wants to block Iran’s potential energy transit to Europe via Iraq and Syria, become the main hub for energy exports to Europe, and open a southward corridor to Jordan and Saudi Arabia to transit Turkish and European goods to the Arab markets of the Persian Gulf.

As such, although the two non-Arab regional powers have historically tried to define their interests and zones of influence in the Arab world in a way to avoid friction and direct rivalry, when it comes to Syria and Iraq, their long-term interests are basically in conflict with each other. Meanwhile, following the rise of anti-Iran sentiments in Iraq and Soleimani’s assassination, Turkish leaders might have concluded that the time is ripe for rolling back Iranian influence and restoring what they perceive as Turkey’s historical role in Iraq. That said, Turkey does not appear to be seeking confrontation with Iran in Iraq but rather is looking to exploit the country’s current power vacuum to strengthen its strategic leverage over its southern neighbors in the long run.

Ankara’s unwillingness to confront Tehran in or over Iraq notwithstanding, the current trajectory involves the risk of an unwanted clash. If Syria is any example, unrelenting Iranian and Turkish approaches toward their actual or perceived zones of influence could easily lead to an escalation, should one of the parties decide to challenge the other’s interests. In February 2020, Iran and Turkey were on the verge of a direct confrontation in Idlib, after the Iran-backed militias were for the first time deployed to the northwestern Syrian province to participate in the fight against Turkish-backed rebels. If a potential Turkish campaign in Sinjar results in a confrontation between Turkey and Iran-backed PMF groups, it’s hard to assume that Iran will sit idly by and let the Turks go ahead as they want. As such, although Tehran shares Ankara’s concerns over Kurdish insurgency in northern Iraq, its fears over the long-term implications of an extended Turkish military campaign has put the two sides at odds over the situation in Sinjar.

Vali Golmohammadi, Ph.D., is an assistant professor of International Relations at Tarbiat Modares University in Tehran and a former visiting scholar at Bilkent University in Ankara. He is also a senior fellow at the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies (CMESS). On Twitter: @VGolmohammadi

Hamidreza Azizi, Ph.D., is an Alexander von Humboldt fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. He was an assistant professor of regional studies at Shahid Beheshti University (2016-2020) and a guest lecturer at the department of regional studies at the University of Tehran (2016-2018). On Twitter: @HamidRezaAz

Image: Reuters.

Source: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/are-iran-and-turkey-collision-course-iraq-179902

[Disclaimer]

The post Are Iran and Turkey on a Collision Course in Iraq? first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

The post Christians in northeast Syria fear Turkish invasion first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

This is an opportunity for Israel and Turkey to recognize a new alignment of interests.

As the brutal eight-year Syrian Civil War winds down, uncertainty over what the future holds for the country is prompting new alliances while testing established ties. Both Israel and Turkey border Syria and have a strategic interest in the postwar settlement that emerges there. While there has been no shortage of disagreements between Israel and Turkey over the past decade, both share a desire to see stability across their Syrian borders. However, each holds a different set of priorities informed by distinct geopolitical and national security exigencies. How this plays out may have far-reaching consequences for stability in post-war Syria and should be of close interest to the United States—a long time strategic ally of both Israel and Turkey.

Through key military cooperation agreements, Israel and Turkey were historically allied since the 1990s in pursuit of a shared goal: to deter the Syrian regime from hostile actions against them by creating a bulwark on its southwest and northern borders. Israel’s limited direct participation in the Syrian Civil War focused on thwarting the Islamic State (or ISIS) threat and the Hezbollah-Iranian presence near its frontier with the Golan and Lebanon. Turkey has been intertwined with the theatre of war at a greater cost. The Turkish Armed Forces conducted two major cross-border ground operations into northern Syria within the span of two years: Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch. Turkey controls Syrian territory in Afrin and its surrounding areas, and has amassed troops along the 566-mile border. Turkey received over 3.6 million Syrian war refugees since 2011, placing a burden on its already overstretched economy and sparking irreversible demographic changes. Israel received none, although it has been concerned that the refuge issue is destabilizing the regime in Jordan. Despite diverging wartime experiences, both Turkey and Israel share overlapping concerns about future stability in Syria.

First, a key shared goal is curbing the maneuverability space of armed non-state actors and militia groups. Indeed, in a Facebook post in March 2013, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained that one motivation behind his apology to Turkey’s President Recep Erdogan over the Mavi Marmara incident was the situation in Syria: “Syria is disintegrating, and the huge advanced weapons stockpiles are beginning to fall into the hands of different forces…it is important that Turkey and Israel can communicate with each other.”

According to Gallia Lindenstrauss, a senior research fellow at the Israel-based Institute for National Security Studies, while Syria has not developed into an area for cooperation between Turkey and Israel, neither has it become an area of competition between the two states. This is due mainly to diverging immediate priorities: Israel is focused on conflict triggers in southern Syria while Turkey is interested in the future of northern Syria.

Turkey views the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region in northeastern Syria as an existential threat and seeks guarantees of the territorial integrity of the Syrian state. Turkey seeks to halt the territorial gains made by the American-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, which is dominated by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Syrian militia linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an insurgent group the United States and Turkey list as a terrorist organization.

Israel’s support for the independence referendum held in Iraqi Kurdistan on September 30, 2017 put it at odds with Turkey. According to a Turkish foreign-policy expert that I spoke with, Ankara understands the Israeli approach to be “smaller is better” when it comes to its neighbors, meaning that the fragmentation of Syria into statelets or autonomous territories would serve Israel’s national security over a unified and stronger Syrian state.

Turkey’s fears may be exaggerated. Israel’s own experience with cross-border terror attacks means it can fully understand the challenges facing Turkey in Syria. Lindenstrauss adds that given the United States decision to withdraw from Syria, it is unlikely that Israel will take a strong position on the issue of Kurdish autonomy there.

Israel’s priority is dismantling the threat of Hezbollah on its northern border, making it paramount that steps are taken to oust Iranian forces and Shia militias out of Syria. With the winding down of the Syrian conflict, the fear is that eyes will invariably turn back to the group’s stated enemy of Israel. Moreover, as its engagement within Syria diminishes, Hezbollah will likely augment its position in Lebanon.

A related second goal is that Turkey and Israel both wish to limit Iran’s influence in Syria. Israel’s recent raids in Syria, including a September 2018 strike on ammunition depots in western Syria, were a clear signal of Israel’s intention to maintain its military dominance in the region, ignoring fears of backlash from Russia. After an attack on an Iranian arms depot near Damascus International Airport in January, Netanyahu announced that Israeli forces had attacked “Iranian and Hezbollah targets hundreds of times.”

Although Turkey is part of a coalition that supports Iran, it is weary of protracted Iranian influence over Syria, as well as its hegemonic aspirations over the wider region. Turkey has sought to place itself as a check on Iranian expansionism but has encountered setbacks after failing to oust the Assad regime.

The Israeli leadership perceives itself to have few allies in its bid to counter the entrenchment of Iranian-Hezbollah power in Syria. But this is an area where Turkey and Israel share a common interest. According to Nimrod Goren, the head of Mitvim (The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies), “Israelis tend to overestimate Turkey’s relations with Iran, and Turks tend to overestimate Israel’s relations with the Kurds in northern Syria.” Overcoming misperceptions and building mutual trust—however difficult that may seem in the short-term—will benefit both states as the security architecture of Syria takes shape.

Third, both states support a process of political transition to a postwar settlement. Applying a common pragmatic lens, both Israel and Turkey recognize that Bashar al-Assad has reconsolidated regime authority in territories lost to opposition forces in most of the country and that there are no alternatives to his leadership.

Obstacles to Realigning Cooperation

Despite complex shared interests on the future of Syria, as well as cooperation on natural resources, investment and trade, a number of factors at the regional and domestic levels complicate short-term realignment between Israel and Turkey.

The current situation is highly dependent on what Russia has in store for the beleaguered country of Syria. Despite public rhetoric to the contrary, Turkey maintains an uneasy relationship with its Arab neighbors and long-standing rivalries create a historic check on Turkey’s influence. Turkey has tilted toward Russia in recent years in a bid to re-calibrate its foreign-policy isolation that spiked due to its policy missteps during the Arab Spring. To regain strategic relevance over the future of its Syrian neighbor, Turkey continues to edge toward Moscow, a relationship that has tested its longstanding status as a NATO member.

In parallel to Israel’s enhanced relationship with the United States under the Trump administration, it has also cultivated ties with Russia in a bid to check Iranian influence. Putin has significant ties with Russian expatriates and investors within Israel and Israel’s continuing favor toward the Russian Church has warmed bilateral ties. Russia has assured Israel that it will work to deter Iran or Hezbollah from opening a new front with Israel. However, the extent of Russia’s influence over the Assad regime is not straightforward, making any promises to Turkey and Israel far from given.

At the same time, Israel’s relations with the Arab Gulf states has improved considerably in the recent period, and a reduction in anti-Israel rhetoric has signaled a turning point. Israel maintains strong trading relations with many states despite a lack of formal diplomatic relations. Part of this new web of relations is Egypt, which has increasingly been vying to reinsert itself as a regional player. By acting as an interlocutor with Hamas, Egypt has effectively removed a key claim Turkey held as a candidate for peace broker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With Egypt in the picture, Israel has learned it can rely less on Turkey as a middleman to influence the Hamas leadership in Gaza.

Complicating matter further, obstacles to closer ties are ubiquitous at the domestic level in both states. Turkey is under increasing pressure to find ways to correct its economic downturn and recent municipal elections have underlined the divide within opinion across the country. The current AKP administration, preoccupied with domestic stability, may well be tempted to distract its disgruntled heartland through posturing against Israel. At the same time, Israel is riddled with the problems of an increasing unilateral approach to policy making buoyed by the Trump administration, which has degraded Israel’s dovish factions. It is too soon to tell whether the current post-election period in both states will relieve some of the public pressure and encourage cooperation on shared strategic interests.

A further cause of uncertainty is how regional states will react to the looming announcement of the “deal of the century” to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, conjured up by chief negotiator and President Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner. Turkey will find it more difficult to work with Israel if the plan spells the end of the two-state solution.

Turkey and Israel have cooperated in the past when mutual interests superseded short-term differences. At the moment, sufficient reasons for closer relations do not appear to exist. A Turkey expert who use to work in Tel Aviv said recently, “Only God knows” what the future holds for Turkey and Israel relations.

However, according to Goren, a scenario where Israel and Turkey launch a channel of policy and strategic dialogue regarding Syria will deliver benefits for both sides that are currently “missing out due to their bilateral crisis.” The ending of the Syrian war will provide a timely opportunity for Israel and Turkey to recognize a new alignment of interests. The United States can play a productive role to bring the two states closer together to facilitate stability in Syria, particularly against growing Iranian influence. It is clear that the most likely outcome is that despite vitriolic rhetoric to the contrary, increasing normalization and cooperation between two powers at security, political and economic levels will become a necessary theme over the next period.

Burcu Ozcelik is a Leverhulme Early Career Research Fellow at the University of Cambridge. Dr. Ozcelik’s research interests involve the contemporary politics of the Middle East, focusing on Turkey, Iraq, Syria and transnational Kurdish politics. Her work has appeared in Foreign Affairs, RUSI, Government and Opposition, Sada Middle East Analysis (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Lebanon’s Daily Star, Syria Forward, the Cairo Review of Global Affairs and the Journal of the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies.

Image: Reuters

Source: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/syrian-civil-war-changing-turkish-israeli-relationship-61327

The post The Syrian Civil War is Changing the Turkish-Israeli Relationship first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan speaks during the United Solidarity and Brotherhood rally in Gaziantep, Turkey, August 28, 2016.Umit Bektas, Reuters

The post Opinion For Turkey, All Kurds Are Terrorists first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

Turkey’s president has strongly rejected US calls for his country to protect Kurdish fighters in Syria.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said such statements made by US National Security Adviser John Bolton at the weekend were “unacceptable”.

Mr Bolton was in Ankara to seek guarantees that a Kurdish militia battling the Islamic State group would be safe after US troops pulled out.

Turkey regards the People’s Protection Units (YPG) as a terrorist group.

Mr Erdogan told MPs from his governing Justice and Development Party on Tuesday that he could not “accept and swallow” Mr Bolton’s message.

The Americans did not know who the various Kurdish groups were, he said, adding: “If the US evaluates them as ‘Kurdish brothers’ then they are in a serious delusion.”

He considers the YPG an extension of the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has fought for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey for three decades. The YPG denies any direct organisational links to the PKK.

• War-weary Syrians in Manbij wait to learn fate
• Trump rewrites US-Syria policy
• After the caliphate: Has IS been defeated?

US officials were informed that Mr Erdogan was unable to meet Mr Bolton because of a local election campaign and a speech to parliament.

A senior US official said that Mr Bolton had subsequently complained to an aide of Mr Erdogan that the Turkish president’s recent opinion piece in the New York Times was “wrong and offensive”.

In the piece, Mr Erdogan wrote that US-backed forces had “relied heavily on air strikes that were carried out with little or no regard for civilian casualties” and that Turkey was “the only country with the power and commitment” to stabilize Syria.

Why is the US withdrawing from Syria?

In 2014, militants overran 100,000 sq km (39,000 sq miles) of Syria and neighboring Iraq, and imposed their brutal rule on almost 8 million people. Now, they control only 1% of the territory they once had.

However, the defeat of IS is far from final. A US defense department report estimated in August that there might be as many as 14,000 jihadists left in Syria and 17,000 in Iraq.

President Donald Trump consequently shocked allies and faced strong criticism at home last month when he ordered US forces to immediately begin withdrawing from the approximately 30% of Syria controlled by the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) alliance.

Over the weekend, Mr Bolton laid out several conditions for the withdrawal, which suggested that the four-month schedule agreed by Mr Trump could slip.

He told reporters in Israel that it would be done in a way that guaranteed IS “is defeated and is not able to revive itself”, and that the US would “take care of those who have fought with us against [IS] and other terrorist groups”.

Erdogan’s blunt message

Analysis by Selin Girit, BBC News, Istanbul

US-Turkish talks in Ankara over the withdrawal of US troops from Syria were expected to be tense after Mr Bolton’s comments about the YPG. But no-one really contemplated that President Erdogan would speak in such blunt terms.

Mr Erdogan said it was impossible to swallow Mr Bolton’s comments suggesting that Turkey should agree to protect YPG forces as a pre-condition to the withdrawal.

He said Turkey would do whatever it takes to kill terrorists, adding that an operation in the Kurdish-controlled area in northern Syria would take place soon.

Ankara sees the YPG as a national security threat. But Washington wants to reassure the Kurds over the Turkish threat, so they don’t feel obliged to cosy up to Russia.

How did Mr Bolton’s talks in Ankara go?

He met Mr Erdogan’s aide, Ibrahim Kalin, to discuss how the US withdrawal could take place.

Later, Mr Kalin told a news conference that he had asked Mr Bolton about the heavy weapons and facilities that the US had handed over to the YPG.

“We should not allow the withdrawal process to open new opportunity fields for terror organisations,” he said.

Mr Kalin also said that Turkey would not seek permission from anyone to carry out military operations in Syria, amid reports that it is preparing to attack the SDF-controlled town of Manbij.

What is the US presence in Syria?

Some 2,000 US military personnel are reported to be deployed in Syria.

Ground troops first arrived in autumn 2015 when then-President Barack Obama sent in a small number of special forces to train and advise YPG fighters.

The US did this after several attempts at training and arming Syrian Arab rebel groups to battle IS militants descended into chaos.

Over the intervening years the number of US troops in Syria has increased, and a network of bases and airfields has been established in an arc across the north-eastern part of the country.

Source: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46792329

The post Syria conflict: Turkey says US plea on Kurds ‘unacceptable’ first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

Source: https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/190874-181213-us-warns-turkey-any-unilateral-military-action-in-syria-worrying-and-unacceptable

The post US warns Turkey any unilateral military action in Syria ‘worrying and unacceptable’ first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

Iraqi President Barham Salih did not propose mediation between the Kurdish PKK group and the Syrian regime, the country’s presidency spokesperson, Luqman Al-Fili, announced yesterday.

The London-based Asharq Al-Awsat recently reported that Salih “adopted a scenario to fill the gap left by the United States’ decision to withdraw its forces from Syria.”

The agency claimed that Salih’s proposal suggested that the PKK leaders would meet with the Syrian government officials in the capital Damascus to discuss restoring relations between the two parties. It explained that the PKK leaders would arrive there through the Iraqi-Iranian border and then through the northern Iraqi city of Sulaymaniyah.

According to the agency’s report, the agreement would include “the return of the [Syrian] army and border guards to all Syrian border points with Turkey and Iraq, in addition to waving the official Syrian flag and returning the sovereignty elements in the eastern Euphrates.”

The Saudi-funded newspaper pointed to a “possible resumption of coordination between the PKK and Syria for joint action against Turkey.” It noted that there has been communication between the Kurdish PYD and the Syrian army in the country’s Al-Hasakah and Aleppo governorates.

“This information is inaccurate, and we reiterate that the President of the Republic [Iraq] has previously stressed the need to support the efforts of a peaceful solution to end the vicious cycle of violence in neighbouring Syria,” Al-Fili said.

He added that the Iraqi approach in Syria was based on “respect for its independent decision and an end to interference in its internal affairs,” adding that the “president [Salih] believes that achieving peace in Syria requires coordination and support from the neighbouring countries and the international community.”

Salih, Al-Fili reiterated, has always sought to strengthen relations with all Iraq’s neighbours, including Turkey. “We always follow the policy of not interfering in other countries’ internal affairs.”

Source: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20181224-iraq-denies-attempts-to-restore-pkk-syria-relations/

The post Iraq denies attempts to restore PKK-Syria relations first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan renewed threats to target Kurdish fighters Monday as he sent more troops to the border with Syria ahead of an imminent US withdrawal.

Turkey was in Syria “to return the freedom of our Arab brothers and sisters, to return the freedom of our Kurdish brothers and sisters”, he said during a speech in Ankara.

“Just as we did not leave our Syrian Arabs to Daesh (IS), we will not leave Syrian Kurds to the cruelty of the PKK,” he said during a speech in Ankara.

A Turkish military convoy arrived overnight on Monday at the border with Syria, with local media reporting that some vehicles had entered Syria.

In a telephone conversation Sunday between Trump and Erdogan, which both sides described as “productive”, they agreed to avoid a power vacuum in Syria after the US withdrawal.

The US leader tweeted that Erdogan had told him Ankara would “eradicate” the last IS elements.

Turkey has said any offensive targeting the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia and the Islamic State (IS) group will be launched in the coming months.

Ankara views the YPG as a “terrorist offshoot” of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has waged an insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984.

Unlike several other allies of the United States, Turkey has praised US President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw 2,000 his ground forces from Syria.

Trump stunned the US political establishment and allies last week with his decision, days after Erdogan had warned that Ankara would soon launch an offensive in northern Syria.

Critics of Trump’s decision fear that thousands of Islamic State (IS) group extremist members are still thought to be in Syria, despite Trump’s claim of having defeated IS.

– Convoy enters Syria –

A Turkish military convoy with howitzers, artillery batteries and several units of the armed forces, was deployed to the border district of Elbeyli in Kilis province, state news agency Anadolu reported on Monday.

Parts of the convoy had entered Syria, the private IHA news agency reported, which said the reinforcements would take place “gradually”.

The deployment began over the weekend with around 100 vehicles, Hurriyet daily said, and crossed into the Al-Bab region, headed towards Jarabulus and YPG-held Manbij.

Jarabulus and Al-Bab were areas captured from IS during Ankara’s first military operation in August 2016 which lasted until March 2017.

Military reinforcements had also been sent to the Akcakale border town and Ceylanpinar district, both in the southeastern Sanliurfa province.

Turkey conducted a second offensive with Syrian rebels against the YPG in its northwestern enclave of Afrin in January this year.

Turkish officials have previously said Ankara has no territorial ambitions in Syria.

– Warming Turkey-US relations –

In a tweet on Sunday, Trump said he discussed a “slow & highly coordinated pullout” of troops from Syria with Erdogan, even as some allies expressed they dismay.

French President Emmanuel Macron said he “deeply regretted” the US decision.

Trump’s move has also sparked turmoil within the administration. First Defence Secretary Jim Mattis resigned, then Brett McGurk, the special envoy to the anti-IS coalition, stepped down.

American support for the YPG, under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) alliance, has long been a source of tension between NATO allies the US and Turkey.

But relations between the Turkish and American leaders appear to have improved substantially since a crisis in the summer over the detention of a US pastor, since released.

Last week, the US approved the sale of $3.5 billion in missiles to Turkey, after American outrage over Ankara’s major arms purchase from Russia.

But there are still strains over the US refusal to extradite Fethullah Gulen, the Pennsylvania-based Muslim preacher who Turkey says ordered the 2016 failed coup.

Source: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-6527307/More-Turkish-troops-Syria-border-ahead-US-pullout.html

The post More Turkish troops to Syria border ahead of US pullout first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

ARTICLE SUMMARY

The US-Turkish deal on Manbij sparks a Damascus opening to Syrian Kurds; Iran scolds Turkey on PKK operations in Syria; the HDP faces violence and an “uneven” playing field in elections; Iran is caught in the middle between Russia and Saudi Arabia.

The post Turkey’s Kurdish policies provoke backlash everywhere first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

The Turkish military launched a ground incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan in March, seizing control of villages and territory previously controlled by the PKK, a group that been fighting the Turkish state for decades.

Statements by Turkish government officials suggest the incursion may develop into an attempt to take control of the Qandil mountains, which have served as the PKK’s main base for decades. However, any such aims will be difficult to achieve without the co-operation of Iran, whose northern border with Iraq the mountain range straddles.

According to Duran, the Iranians have, thus far, shown little inclination to co-operate with Turkey over the operation for two main reasons.

First, Iran is wary of the long-term consequences substantial Turkish military operations against the PKK’s main bases will have for its growing influence in Iraq, which has expanded steadily as US influence over Iraq has waned.

Iran also feels, wrote Duran, that co-operation with Turkey over the PKK in Iraq is not required to achieve its wider goals in the region. This is despite Turkey having refrained from openly supporting the block formed by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United Arab Emirates that aims to curb growing Iranian regional influence and having worked closely with Iran as partners in the Astana process that aims to bring the Syrian conflict to an end.

Iran may soon come to regret its uncooperative stance regarding Turkey’s military operations in Iraq, says Duran, as strained relations between the United States and Turkey are improving following a recent agreement between the two countries over the status of the disputed Syrian city of Manbic.

Such improvements in US-Turkish relations, he implies, may result in Ankara becoming more receptive to US overtures that aim to convince Turkey to play a more active role in limiting Iranian ambition. Iran, in turn, will have cause to regret its “swollen ambitions”.

Source: https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-iran/iran-will-regret-lack-co-operation-turkey-over-northern-iraq

The post Iran will regret lack of co-operation with Turkey over northern Iraq first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.