Nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, thousands of artillery pieces, and millions of fanatical troops are the core of the North Korean threat. But Kim Jong Un has another ace up his sleeve: potent special-operations forces.

Not much is known about this force, but recent revelations by a senior North Korean spy who defected offer some insight into how Pyongyang’s commandos train and fight.

The Korean People’s Army (KPA) is one of the largest in the world, with an active-duty force of about 1.3 million. Pyongyang also has more than 200,000 special operators organized in standard formations, such as brigades, regiments, battalions, and in even smaller, more specialized outfits.

The typical special-operations unit has between 3,000 and 5,000 commandos and falls under the different branches of the North Korean military and under Pyongyang’s intelligence service, the Reconnaissance General Bureau.

North Korean special-operations units can be divided by specialty.

Reconnaissance units specialize in collecting intelligence and passing it back to headquarters. Airborne units can infiltrate by air and seize and hold targets like airfields or bridges. Maritime units can infiltrate from submarines or ships and conduct littoral raids. Commando units can conduct direct-action operations, such as raids.

North Korean troops may appear very well equipped during parades in Pyongyang, but those weapons and gear aren’t necessarily distributed to the rest of the force. Because of their special mission, North Korean special-operations units receive the best equipment and training.

In a recent report, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) said “North Korean SOF are highly trained and well-equipped in comparison to other units, and, if successfully infiltrated into the South, would be capable of disruptive attacks in the rear area.”

That gear is rudimentary compared to other countries’ special-operations units, but even with technological or logistical shortcomings compared to US and South Korean special-operations units, North Korean commandos are a dedicated and dangerous foe.

According to the US military, KPA doctrine and tactics for ground operations have largely remained the same since the Korean War in the 1950s. Special-operations forces play an important part in KPA’s war-fighting doctrine, which seeks to attack an enemy target simultaneously from numerous angles.

North Korean special-operations doctrine emphasizes speed and surprise. Pyongyang’s special-operations forces have two strategic missions: to infiltrate South Korea and conduct unconventional warfare and sabotage on the US and South Korean rear lines and to defend North Korea against US or South Korean special-operations units.

If a major war broke out, the North Korean play would be to swiftly cross the Demilitarized Zone and flood South Korea with troops, attempting a repeat of the early stages of the Korean War, when communist forces almost drove South Korean and UN troops into the sea.

In such a scenario, North Korean heavy infantry or mechanized units would strike at South Korean and US forces’ frontlines. North Korean special-operations forces, organized in commando or light infantry units, would conduct unconventional warfare to the rear or on the flanks, attacking supply lines, command-and-control centers, and other strategic facilities.

By design, North Korea’s commandos are aggressive and would prefer to be on the offensive, which is in line with special-operations doctrine around the around.

They “would be a fierce enemy” if a war broke out, a former Green Beret who served in South Korea told Insider.

The Kim regime has cultivated a cult of personality around its leaders, with public pledges of loyalty by troops and military elites.

“We have the technological advantage and our planes and missiles can bomb them back to the Stone Age, but they will be fighting for their ‘god,’” the former Green Beret said. “Since birth, they have been brought up in this cultish environment where the supreme leader is their ‘god.’ They are fanatical and tough. Korean winters are no joke, and these guys have been trained to survive and operate in such environments. They would fight to the last man.”

Pyongyang might also use conventional military operations to distract US and South Korean forces and allow its special-operations units to infiltrate the South successfully.

In 2010, 46 sailors were killed when a South Korean vessel was sunk in a suspected North Korean submarine attack. A few months later, North Korean artillery shelled a South Korean island near the two countries’ maritime boundary, killing four people.

In a recent interview with the BBC, Kim Kuk-song, a senior North Korean intelligence officer who defected to South Korea, described how Kim Jong Un uses North Korea’s military and intelligence resources for personal enrichment or revenge against real or perceived enemies. North Korean special-operations forces may also facilitate such “gang-style” operations.

In the event of a war with South Korea, North Korean commandos would also likely attempt a strike against South Korea’s leaders and command-and-control centers, seeking to decapitate South Korean leadership and sow confusion in the initial hours of the conflict.

It wouldn’t be the first time North Korean commandos have tried something like that. On January 31, 1969, a North Korean special-operations assault force infiltrated into South Korea with the goal of assassinating South Korean President Park Chung-hee.

The commando team moved fast and aggressively and managed to reach Park’s residence in Seoul, even though they were spotted by some farmers along the way. That’s when everything unraveled, however, as the North Koreans didn’t know the code word to enter the residence and got into a running firefight with South Korean troops.

In the end, only one North Korean commando managed to get back into North Korea, with the rest captured or killed.

The threat of infiltration and of other attacks by North Korean commandos remains. North Korea may exaggerate its military capabilities regularly, but its special-operations forces are no joke.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate.

Source: https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/north-korea-has-big-plans-for-its-special-operations-forces-biggest-on-earth/

The post North Korea Has Big Plans For Its Special-Operations Forces (Biggest On Earth) first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

Approval ratings are exceptionally important for South Korean presidents to maintain authority within their own ruling party and delay the almost inevitable arrival of lame-duck status, which leaves them politically paralyzed. But the most important factor determining a president’s popularity is economic performance.

Many South Koreans list Cold War dictator Park Chung-hee as their favorite president because national GDP nearly quadrupled during his reign from 1961 to 1979. Rapid economic development, proudly referred to as the ‘Miracle on the Han River’, served to legitimize Park’s dictatorship despite grave constitutional violations. As long as the economy is booming, most other failures and transgressions are readily forgiven by the South Korean people.

Roh Moo-hyun is remembered as South Korea’s most democratic president — a clear contrast to Park Chung-hee. Although he went to great lengths to dispel an authoritarian legacy and instill democratic values, Roh’s approval rating dropped from 60 to 20 per cent in his first year and never fully recovered.

Some have concluded that this drop was intimately tied to the public’s economic anxiety. President Roh’s failure to stabilize property prices and reduce economic polarization made his support base, and consequently his party, turn their backs on him. Let down by Roh’s failed economic policies, the public elected the conservative candidate Lee Myung-bak — one of South Korea’s most famous entrepreneurs.

A poorly performing economy could also become a serious obstacle for Moon Jae-in. Shortly before Moon’s inauguration, more than 85 per cent of the South Korean population felt that North Korea’s nuclear weapons constituted a major threat. More than 60 per cent answered ‘yes’ when asked whether or not ‘the South Korean government should agree to American military actions against the North’.

But even amid such keen security anxieties, the public still saw economic recovery as the most urgent issue facing President Moon. National security was third on the list after job creation. From his experience in the Roh administration, Moon is well aware of the importance of economic success.

That is not to say that Moon’s North Korea policy is not important. After a decade of intense inter-Korean animosity, the pendulum has swung back towards support for engagement. Most South Koreans expressed fervent support for Moon’s North Korea policy of engagement over pressure. Moon’s strong and consistent message of ‘no war on the Korean Peninsula’ has eased concerns even amid heightened US–China tensions. He has also managed to hold three inter-Korean summits and helped bring about the first US–North Korea summit.

Although Moon’s achievements with North Korea temporarily increased his approval rating, they are unlikely to be enough in the long run. His remarkable 74 per cent support rating after the April 2018 summit with Kim Jong-un quickly dropped to 52 per cent, before rallying again after his visit to Pyongyang in September.

The plunge between April and September was due to public dissatisfaction with Moon’s handling of the country’s economic problems. 2018 has seen economic growth slow, economic polarization worsen and capital investment decline. This sluggishness has allowed the opposition conservative party, eager to redeem itself, to define Moon’s income-led growth principle as a complete disaster.

Moon’s popularity has fallen with his advocate groups, especially those in their 20s and small business owners, after negotiations on raising the minimum wage next year. Small- and medium-sized enterprises — which are already struggling with expensive rents, commissions and franchise fees — regard this decision as an extra burden. This has slowed job creation and threatens the livelihoods of younger generations. The 54 trillion won (over US $47 billion) that the Moon administration has spent on job creation has not succeeded in lowering the unemployment rate, which is the highest since the Asian financial crisis in 1997.

The opposition will, no doubt, use the slumping economy against Moon. They will argue that conciliatory engagement with North Korea will be little more than an economic hand-out. Previous liberal administrations were accused of the same during the so-called Sunshine Policy era of 1998–2008. If the opposition can successfully establish a correlation between Moon’s North Korea policy and the worsening economic situation, this will complicate Moon’s engagement strategy immensely.

If history is anything to go by, Moon’s successful North Korea policy will not be enough to offset public frustrations with a sluggish economy. His dipping approval rating should worry supporters of a more conciliatory North Korea policy as it heralds the coming of Moon’s lame-duck period. If that happens, it is far from certain that opportunistic politicians in his own party will continue to support him. In other words, unless Moon manages to dispel his reputation as weak on the economy, the positive developments we have seen between the two Koreas under his presidency may come to an abrupt end.

Eun Hee Woo is an affiliated researcher at Freie Universität Berlin.

Approval ratings are exceptionally important for South Korean presidents to maintain authority within their own ruling party and delay the almost inevitable arrival of lame-duck status, which leaves them politically paralysed. But the most important factor determining a president’s popularity is economic performance.

Many South Koreans list Cold War dictator Park Chung-hee as their favourite president because national GDP nearly quadrupled during his reign from 1961 to 1979. Rapid economic development, proudly referred to as the ‘Miracle on the Han River’, served to legitimize Park’s dictatorship despite grave constitutional violations. As long as the economy is booming, most other failures and transgressions are readily forgiven by the South Korean people.

Roh Moo-hyun is remembered as South Korea’s most democratic president — a clear contrast to Park Chung-hee. Although he went to great lengths to dispel an authoritarian legacy and instill democratic values, Roh’s approval rating dropped from 60 to 20 per cent in his first year and never fully recovered.

Some have concluded that this drop was intimately tied to the public’s economic anxiety. President Roh’s failure to stabilize property prices and reduce economic polarization made his support base, and consequently his party, turn their backs on him. Let down by Roh’s failed economic policies, the public elected the conservative candidate Lee Myung-bak — one of South Korea’s most famous entrepreneurs.

A poorly performing economy could also become a serious obstacle for Moon Jae-in. Shortly before Moon’s inauguration, more than 85 per cent of the South Korean population felt that North Korea’s nuclear weapons constituted a major threat. More than 60 per cent answered ‘yes’ when asked whether or not ‘the South Korean government should agree to American military actions against the North’.

But even amid such keen security anxieties, the public still saw economic recovery as the most urgent issue facing President Moon. National security was third on the list after job creation. From his experience in the Roh administration, Moon is well aware of the importance of economic success.

That is not to say that Moon’s North Korea policy is not important. After a decade of intense inter-Korean animosity, the pendulum has swung back towards support for engagement. Most South Koreans expressed fervent support for Moon’s North Korea policy of engagement over pressure. Moon’s strong and consistent message of ‘no war on the Korean Peninsula’ has eased concerns even amid heightened US–China tensions. He has also managed to hold three inter-Korean summits and helped bring about the first US–North Korea summit.

Although Moon’s achievements with North Korea temporarily increased his approval rating, they are unlikely to be enough in the long run. His remarkable 74 per cent support rating after the April 2018 summit with Kim Jong-un quickly dropped to 52 per cent, before rallying again after his visit to Pyongyang in September.

The plunge between April and September was due to public dissatisfaction with Moon’s handling of the country’s economic problems. 2018 has seen economic growth slow, economic polarization worsen and capital investment decline. This sluggishness has allowed the opposition conservative party, eager to redeem itself, to define Moon’s income-led growth principle as a complete disaster.

Moon’s popularity has fallen with his advocate groups, especially those in their 20s and small business owners, after negotiations on raising the minimum wage next year. Small- and medium-sized enterprises — which are already struggling with expensive rents, commissions and franchise fees — regard this decision as an extra burden. This has slowed job creation and threatens the livelihoods of younger generations. The 54 trillion won (over US$47 billion) that the Moon administration has spent on job creation has not succeeded in lowering the unemployment rate, which is the highest since the Asian financial crisis in 1997.

The opposition will, no doubt, use the slumping economy against Moon. They will argue that conciliatory engagement with North Korea will be little more than an economic hand-out. Previous liberal administrations were accused of the same during the so-called Sunshine Policy era of 1998–2008. If the opposition can successfully establish a correlation between Moon’s North Korea policy and the worsening economic situation, this will complicate Moon’s engagement strategy immensely.

If history is anything to go by, Moon’s successful North Korea policy will not be enough to offset public frustrations with a sluggish economy. His dipping approval rating should worry supporters of a more conciliatory North Korea policy as it heralds the coming of Moon’s lame-duck period. If that happens, it is far from certain that opportunistic politicians in his own party will continue to support him. In other words, unless Moon manages to dispel his reputation as weak on the economy, the positive developments we have seen between the two Koreas under his presidency may come to an abrupt end.

Eun Hee Woo is an affiliated researcher at Freie Universität Berlin.

Source:  http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/11/27/moons-north-korea-policy-in-danger/

The post Moon’s North Korea policy in danger first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.