A rising chorus of analysts now describe China as a “peaking power”—one that might take greater risks to revise the international order before its strategic window of opportunity closes. They cite the country’s aging population, slowing economy, and hostile external environment as evidence that time is no longer on China’s side. The “fear of decline,” they argue, could lead China to act sooner rather than later to solidify its position in East Asia, with potentially catastrophic consequences.

While there is a compelling case to be made about the downward trajectory of China’s power, it is difficult to argue that Chinese leaders perceive themselves to be running short on time. In recent years, the actions and rhetoric of the Chinese government reveal little doubt about how it sees the future. Moreover, Beijing appears increasingly bearish on the long-term prospects of the United States, which Chinese President Xi Jinping has described as the “greatest threat to China’s development and security.”

Behind closed doors, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders may well express concerns about China’s mounting internal and external challenges. But the triumphant stories Chinese leaders tell the party bureaucracy and the general public play a central role in shaping not only the country’s worldview but also its actions.

U.S. policymakers and scholars should not dismiss Chinese optimism as mere propaganda, despite how far removed it may be from reality. Perceptions of Beijing’s relative power, in addition to raw material capabilities, will affect whether or not China resorts to war in the coming decade.

The CCP is aware of the myriad challenges Beijing faces, but it believes its top-down system is capable of handling today’s complex environment. The party trusts that it can marshal the resources necessary to eradicate poverty, redress inequality, and drive innovation, as well as respond to major global trends: deglobalization, climate change, technological disruption, and shifts in the international balance of power.

Since the outbreak of COVID-19, Beijing has grown more confident in its economic and political system. After an initial lapse, the party’s grassroots apparatus kicked into gear, and the CCP hailed its success in stamping out the virus just as it began spreading throughout much of the world. Sustained growth in 2020 further reinforced China’s confidence in its state-led development model. Despite recent headwinds in the energy and property sectors, Chinese economists continue to express faith that the country will not only escape the middle-income trap by 2035 but also become a fully developed nation by midcentury.

More recently, Chinese officials have doubled down on the unique aspects of their system, instituting a flurry of new regulations for the private sector. There is hope that these clampdowns will boost competitiveness by diverting resources away from “unproductive” sectors—such as real estate, e-commerce, and online gaming—toward the “real economy,” which Xi argues is based on manufacturing. The government has also instituted policies to ease financial burdens on working families in the hope of mitigating demographic pressures. In short, the CCP is confident, at least in public, that its top-down leadership can promote “common prosperity” and guide the country through unforeseen headwinds.

The party’s conviction derives, in part, from what China’s 14th Five-Year Plan describes as its “institutional superiority,” “administrative efficiency,” and “social stability.” Xi has lauded China’s “whole-process people’s democracy,” arguing that it promotes stability and good governance—key elements of comprehensive national power. The recently released 6th Plenum Communique, like Xi’s report at the 19th Party Congress, depicts China on an inevitable path to national rejuvenation under the CCP’s central leadership.

Of course, it’s difficult to distinguish genuine enthusiasm for the project from politically mandatory expressions of support—especially in an era when the already limited space for public discourse in China has radically shrunk. But from the party’s perspective, closing those discussions is also a necessary step forward.

Since coming to power, Xi has seen Western political influence as a risk, going so far as to warn against the infiltration of “universal values” such as constitutionalism, free speech, and a free press. In the intervening period, the party’s use of propaganda and tools of digital authoritarianism to institute crackdowns have demonstrated its ability to engineer political goals from the top down. While foreign observers often view such campaigns as signs of weakness or insecurity, the CCP views them as crucial levers through which to place China on a better path forward.

Internationally, despite deteriorating ties with developed democracies, Chinese perceptions of Beijing’s image remain elevated. This is, in part, the result of China’s decades-long campaign to bolster ties with developing countries through “partnership diplomacy” and programs such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Moreover, Chinese leaders believe U.S. alliances to be “outdated” relics of the Cold War that are “bound to fail” in slowing China’s rise. And during a time of rising protectionism in the United States, Xi continues to advocate for globalization.

In the military field, Chinese leaders maintain they are closing the capability gap with the United States, despite Beijing’s comparably modest defense budget. China now boasts more naval vessels than the United States, a state-of-the-art ballistic missile arsenal, and advanced hypersonic missiles, a capability that the U.S. military currently lacks. Although Washington maintains an advantage in its quantity of aircraft carriers, People’s Liberation Army officials believe Beijing’s asymmetric carrier killer capacity could give it the upper hand in a shooting war off China’s shores. Over the coming decades, Chinese leaders are confident they will achieve a “world-class” military through leapfrog modernization.

In short, despite the many challenges China faces—domestic and international—the CCP believes in the efficacy of its system. There is little evidence to suggest that China views itself as a declining power, making it less likely that Chinese leaders will embark on risky military campaigns to exploit a shrinking window of opportunity.

There exists, conversely, a trove of documents detailing the party’s belief in the ongoing diminution of U.S. power. The common refrain “The East is rising and the West is declining” has become tinged with an air of inevitability. America watchers in China have identified several factors, including rising debt, racial and wealth inequality, and rampant political polarization, that they believe will undermine U.S. stability and imperil Washington’s primacy.

In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, Chinese leaders began recognizing major flaws in the U.S. economic system, so much so that some believed the shock would lead to an immediate U.S. collapse. Although such dire predictions did not pan out, Chinese officials remain skeptical about the U.S. economic model, especially in light of pandemic-induced instability and widening inequality.

In a recent article, one researcher at the Central Party School argued that the United States’ response to the pandemic reflected a “crisis of capitalism” on par with the challenges of the global war on terrorism and the Great Recession. Even the U.S. policy response to COVID-19 was seen to inflate asset bubbles and funnel resources toward speculative investments in companies such as GameStop. In September, the governor of the People’s Bank of China, Yi Gang, took aim at the deficiencies of U.S. monetary policy, arguing that “the long-term deployment of asset purchases could harm market functions, promote fiscal monetization, and damage the reputation of central banks.” Finally, Chinese scholars have taken note of the “hollowing out of the American industrial base.” Some doubt that Washington’s renewed focus on industrial policy will allow advanced manufacturing in the United States to remain competitive with that in China, whose share of global industrial output is nearly double the United States’.

Perhaps more significant than Beijing’s perception of U.S. economic problems, Chinese leaders see the U.S. political system as ill-equipped to provide public goods and ensure long-term social stability. Donald Trump’s presidency confirmed the narrative that liberal democracies are liable to elevate incompetent leaders and exacerbate social divisions. These views did not recede after Joe Biden’s electoral victory, given persistent gridlock in Washington. Following an important government meeting last week, one CCP spokesperson played up the ongoing “problems in Western democracy.” America’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, finally, reinforced the view that the sun is setting on “U.S. hegemony.”

It is quite possible that China’s relative power could peak in the coming decade. Indeed, the recent spate of power outages, loan defaults, and clampdowns on the private sector portend a difficult period to come. Yet Beijing has defied bleak expectations in the past and could do so again. More importantly, forecasts about Chinese militarism, based on assessments of material capabilities, must account for China’s views of itself. The scholar Graham Allison reminds us in Destined for War that “structural realities are not the whole story. Objective conditions have to be perceived by human beings.”

For the time being, the evidence suggests that the CCP is confident in itself and its future and that it views the United States as a declining power facing manifold problems. There is a real possibility that overconfidence, rather than the fear of decline, could fuel Chinese military adventurism in the years ahead. Only time will tell whether time is on China’s side.

Nathaniel Sher is a policy analyst based in Washington, D.C. Twitter: @nathaniel_sher

Sam Bresnick is a writer and editor based in Washington, D.C. Twitter: @SamBresnick

Source: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/21/the-chinese-communist-party-still-thinks-it-owns-the-future/

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As China’s actions, both public and covert, demonstrate, the Communist Party, in its drive for dominance, is committed to disrupting the United States.

Here’s What You Need To Remember: China is bellicose, assertive, and hostile – but it is also very smart. The Communist Party, whatever its faults are, has an intelligent plan for China’s domination in the twenty-first century, and U.S. strategic planners should take note.

For over a generation China has been on a long march to assert its dominance on the global stage. As a young foreign affairs officer in Asia and later working in U.S. military intelligence, I came to respect the Chinese’s commitment to achieving their goals. They work hard and make great sacrifices to get ahead, often by any means necessary—not the least of which is commandeering others’ ideas and engineering those to serve their ends.

When I served as Commanding General of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, it became clear that China’s ambitions were becoming more brazen. In recent years, Beijing’s quest for international supremacy has taken an even more aggressive form: “wolf warrior diplomacy,” as senior Chinese officials have begun to call it. As China’s actions, both public and covert, demonstrate, the Communist Party, in its drive for dominance, is committed to disrupting the United States.

The Trump administration has taken bold action to ratchet up controls meant to protect U.S. technologies that are critical to American national security—moves the incoming Biden Administration can expand upon. Recently, the Commerce Department announced that companies will need a license to do work with China’s top semiconductor manufacturer, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC).

The Commerce Department’s notification to SMIC notes that exports to the company “may pose an unacceptable risk of diversion to a military end use in the People’s Republic of China.” In other words, the technology could be siphoned off to the Chinese government—a reminder that no Chinese company is truly independent of the country’s Communist Party’s control. These export restrictions are much needed, but should also be extended to other similarly adversarial companies like Yangtze Memory Technologies Company (YMTC), ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT), and others with similar characteristics.

The announcement follows a clampdown on the Chinese tech giant Huawei and 152 of its affiliates that were added to the Entity List since May 2019. Last month the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security also issued a call for public input to help define “foundational technologies,” which include semiconductors. The advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) specifically notes: “Many of these items, including semiconductor manufacturing equipment…can be tied to indigenous military innovation efforts in China,” among other countries.

Gordon Chang, a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Gatestone Institute, minces no words to describe China’s global semiconductor power-grab: “China is not, as many people will tell you, just a competitor. It is an enemy. China is trying to overthrow the international system, and in that process, it is trying to make you subject to modern-day Chinese emperors.”

The Battle for Technology of the Future

Semiconductors are the bedrock of modern technologies, found in computers, smartphones, as well as sophisticated networks like defense systems. Like a genome, semiconductors can reveal sensitive information about the technologies that use them—which can then expose vulnerabilities and create a backdoor into the U.S. national security apparatus.

As BG John Adams (Retired, U.S. Army), a former military intelligence officer and a prominent voice in the discussion on America’s national security vulnerabilities, explains: “The military needs access to leading-edge semiconductors that our adversaries lack… Most concerning is the continued offshoring of semiconductors production, research and development and intellectual property to potential adversaries such as China… The Defense Department requires semiconductors that are produced per Military Specification—specialized and custom-produced devices specifically for secure computing functions—for which there is no commercial demand.”

China’s presence in the semiconductor market is growing. Beijing is investing heavily to offset intellectual property (IP) restrictions and expand semiconductor production. The notorious “Made in China 2025” plan pledges $120 billion specifically to bolster China’s semiconductor manufacturing industry with the goal of producing 70 percent of all chips needed for local consumption.

The Chinese’s foray into the semiconductor market is dangerous to U.S. interests. Just as it did with LEDs, solar panels and a host of other technologies, China and its government-backed companies seek to flood the market with cheap products predatorily priced to drive out competition. With control of semiconductor the market, China will be able to leverage the technologies that utilize semiconductors—of which there are many—for objectives that clearly risk American national security.

China’s push for semiconductor manufacturing dominance is predicated on its ability to obtain equipment from companies in democratic nations—especially the United States—to expand their homegrown capacity. This is why the aforementioned ANPRM notes that “semiconductor manufacturing equipment…can be tied to indigenous military innovation efforts in China.”

Once China’s semiconductor manufacturers controls capacity, we know they will actively use it for military and intelligence purposes. For example, SOSi—a private technology consultancy—recently released a report explaining how SMIC chips are used in China’s military defense research.

SMIC is not the only adversarial semiconductor manufacturer. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company (YMTC) and ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT) along with Fujian Jinhua, have been referred to as the “three major semiconductor industry national teams of the Made in China 2025 plan.” Like SMIC, all of these companies enjoy overwhelming government advantages and have designs on dramatically expanding their market share within just a few years.

In each of these cases, SMIC, YMTC, and CXMT punctuate the blurred line between China’s private sector and its military-industrial complex. As Gordon Change explains: “Tech transfers to the Chinese pose a threat to Americans because of Beijing’s policy of ‘civil-military fusion.’ This policy means there is no such thing as civilian-only tech cooperation in that country. The technologies that Beijing manages to beg, borrow, and steal are directly pipelined to the People’s Liberation Army.”

The United States can thwart China’s ambitions to gain the upper hand in the modern technology race by stopping these “tech transfers.” Now more than ever, both the old and new Administrations must lean in on export controls to isolate China’s obviously malign intentions.

James “Spider” Marks is a retired Major General of the U.S. Army. This article first appeared last month.

The post The U.S. Must Stop China’s “Wolf Warrior” Diplomacy – Before It’s Too Late first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

Key Point: China only has so much patience, and won’t let the entire peninsula fall into American hands.

North Korea is both a blessing and a curse for China. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is an independent state that is openly hostile to the United States and other regional powers. Pyongyang’s military is a deterrent to attack without posing a direct threat to China. As a result, nearly a thousand miles of China’s borders are occupied by a regime that finances its own defense and will never fall willingly within the U.S. sphere of influence.

The situation is far from perfect. While North Korea has traditionally been a Chinese client state, ties between the two countries have deteriorated in recent years. Pyongyang’s fiery anti-American rhetoric and nuclear weapons program have provoked the United States, making North Korea a major point of contention between Washington and Beijing. The country’s flagrant violation of international norms have tested Beijing’s patience.

There are persistent rumors that Beijing has long prepared to intervene in North Korea, whether in the aftermath of a government collapse or should the country’s leadership make credible threats against China. No one outside of Beijing knows what those preparations might be, but we can outline some scenarios. One thing seems reasonably certain, however: if China goes into North Korea, the presiding regime, whether of Kim Jong-un or someone else, will not survive.

One possible scenario is a military incursion into North Korea in response to regime collapse. An imploding economy, military coup, or Syria-like rebellion could all cause the regime to fold, and it will likely fold quickly. When it does, the national food distribution system will likely fail, causing refugees to flee the country. Given that the border with South Korea is notoriously fortified and the Russian border is relatively far and remote, the least difficult border to cross is into China.

Beijing, obsessed with internal stability, would almost certainly not tolerate millions of refugees crossing into northern China. From a Chinese perspective, it would be far better for those refugees to stay in North Korea. In the event of regime collapse, we could see the three People’s Liberation Army (PLA) armies in the country’s Northern Theater Command move south. One option is to create a buffer zone in North Korea, but that would not solve the problem of political and economic instability. If the PLA does move South, it would likely go all the way to Pyongyang in order to establish a puppet government and reestablish some level of stability.

The most likely scenario is that China launches an all-out invasion to topple the existing regime. Of the sixteen armored, mechanized, infantry and artillery corps that make up the Korea People’s Army (KPA), only two are deployed along the Sino-Korean border. Three more corps are stationed in and around Pyongyang. Nearly 70 percent of the KPA is south of the Pyongyang/Wonsan line, sited to support a cross-border attack against South Korea.

China’s Northern Theater Command ground forces consist of the 78th, 79th, and 80th Armies. These armies are what would be considered corps in the U.S. Army, collectively controlling eighteen combined arms brigades supported by three special operations, three aviation, three artillery, and three engineering brigades. This gives the PLA a powerful force equivalent, at least on paper, to roughly five or six U.S. combat divisions. Supported by the two air attack divisions of the Chinese Air Force assigned to the Northern Command, the three PLA armies could quickly cross the border and march south into the KPA’s strategic rear.

To what extent would the KPA resist an invasion? It depends. If the regime in Pyongyang is still in place, it China could face considerable resistance. A lack of fuel reserves, dictated by China, would likely strand many of the remaining fourteen army corps in place, rendering them unable to resist a Chinese invasion. If the government collapses the KPA could become part of the hungry, leaderless masses—masses with weapons. Ideally, Beijing would cultivate ties with the KPA leadership before a move South and persuade it to not resist and maintain order.

It’s difficult to foretell how well the PLA would do in wartime. The last time the Chinese Army engaged in such large scale combat was the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. Using inferior, outdated tactics, China’s ground forces suffered heavy casualties against their battle-hardened Vietnamese opponents, and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping vowed never to repeat such a costly war. It is unlikely that Beijing would order the attack if it did not have full confidence in the PLA to carry it out without embarrassing failure.

The PLA of today, however, is a completely different beast. While the PLA lacks the institutional skill of the battle-tested U.S. Army, it is certainly better than the Korean People’s Army. The army has modernized both its equipment and military doctrine—Xi Jinping’s repeated calls to be “combat ready”, often interpreted as outwardly aggressive, are more likely to be exhortations toward general readiness and against corruption in the ranks. A recent and pervasive emphasis on high speed, mechanized warfare will pay the PLA dividends in a drive on Pyongyang.

The most dangerous aspect of a Chinese invasion of North Korea is if it is launched concurrent with a U.S. and South Korean assault northward from the demilitarized zone. While the U.S. and South Korea would operate with the same objectives in mind, they would likely be very different from China’s. The possibility of fighting breaking out between those armies marching north and those marching south would be very real.

Barring a total collapse of the Pyongyang regime, China is unlikely to invade North Korea any time soon. The economic, political, and military costs outweigh the benefits—at least for now. That having been said, if the calculus changes China maintains the forces, just over the border, to decisively intervene in its smaller neighbor. Whether China, South Korea, or anyone is ready for the outcome is a very good question.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009, he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami. This first appeared years ago.

Source: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/north-korea-afraid-america-should-it-also-fear-chinese-invasion-102917

The post North Korea Is Afraid Of America, But Should It Also Fear A Chinese Invasion? first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

Russia and China are drawing closer together as the two great powers solidifytheir entente to challenge the United States and its liberal hegemony.

Not only do Russian president Vladimir Putin and Chinese president Xi Jinping seem to have established a good personal rapport, the Russian military and the People’s Liberation Army are set to conduct massive wargames such as Vostok-2018 exercises on a regular basis in the future. Russian defense minister Gen. Sergei Shoigu said as much when he hosted his Chinese counterpart Gen. Wei Fenghe during a visit to the Tsugol training ground as a part of Vostok-2018 . “We have agreed to hold such exercises on a regular basis,” Shoigu said in a statement.

Wei, for his part, also stressed the importance of Sino-Russian “cooperation on operational and strategic levels.” The Chinese military and political leadership in Beijing consider such cooperation with the Russians to be particularly important, according to the Russian Defense Ministry statement.

Indeed, both the Russian and Chinese leadership stressed cooperation between the two great powers during Xi’s visit to Vladivostok, Russia, on September 11. “Today was President Xi’s working visit to Russia,” Putin said. “It included talks during which we discussed the most urgent bilateral and international matters, and outlined further plans to promote the comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation between Russia and China.”

Xi, for his part, noted that he had met with his “close friend” Putin three times within the past four months, which demonstrates the “special character” of Sino-Russian relations. “The President and I agree that since the beginning of this year Russian-Chinese relations have been showing dynamic growth, have entered a new era of rapid development and are reaching a higher level,” Xi said. “The parties reaffirmed firm mutual support in the choice of the development path that agrees with the national features of both countries as well as our security and development interests.”

Xi further noted that Russia and China share a common worldview and share the same common interests. Xi also touted the importance of the Sino-Russian entente to global security—at least from the Chinese point of view. “As permanent members of the UN Security Council and leading countries in the developing markets, China and Russia bear enormous responsibility for the maintenance of peace and stability together with the promotion of the development and prosperity all over the world,” Xi said. “We have similar or identical positions on international matters, broad common interests and firm foundations for cooperation. China-Russia cooperation in maintaining equality, justice, peace and stability throughout the entire world is gaining ever more importance against a backdrop of growing instability and unpredictability on a global scale.”

Putin also urged the Russian “regions” to further expand their ties to their Chinese counterparts, which he views as key to the Sino-Russian entente. “We hope that your cooperation strengthens ties between our countries and helps Russia and China step up their relations,” Putin said. “It is our belief that our relations are essential and critical for our countries, as well as for the world in general. These are global, strategic relations that are gaining momentum. Your efforts will be decisive in ensuring this progress.”

While Russia and China have not always been on the best of terms, especially after Sino-Soviet in the 1960s, Moscow and Beijing have found common ground in recent years even if the relationship remains transactional in many ways. Even American experts on Russia are starting to accept the possibility of a genuine Beijing-Moscow entente directed against the United States. “I think a strategic partnership is slowly in the offing, but is encumbered by the two sides’ self-interest and transactional impulses,” as Center for Naval Analyses analyst Michael Kofman told The National Interest earlier this year. “As such, the catalyst will be a third actor, namely the United States, and the extent to which those countries perceive a threat from Washington in common.”

Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for The National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar.

Source: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-and-china-will-now-hold-military-exercises-regular-basis-31157

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