Approval ratings are exceptionally important for South Korean presidents to maintain authority within their own ruling party and delay the almost inevitable arrival of lame-duck status, which leaves them politically paralyzed. But the most important factor determining a president’s popularity is economic performance.

Many South Koreans list Cold War dictator Park Chung-hee as their favorite president because national GDP nearly quadrupled during his reign from 1961 to 1979. Rapid economic development, proudly referred to as the ‘Miracle on the Han River’, served to legitimize Park’s dictatorship despite grave constitutional violations. As long as the economy is booming, most other failures and transgressions are readily forgiven by the South Korean people.

Roh Moo-hyun is remembered as South Korea’s most democratic president — a clear contrast to Park Chung-hee. Although he went to great lengths to dispel an authoritarian legacy and instill democratic values, Roh’s approval rating dropped from 60 to 20 per cent in his first year and never fully recovered.

Some have concluded that this drop was intimately tied to the public’s economic anxiety. President Roh’s failure to stabilize property prices and reduce economic polarization made his support base, and consequently his party, turn their backs on him. Let down by Roh’s failed economic policies, the public elected the conservative candidate Lee Myung-bak — one of South Korea’s most famous entrepreneurs.

A poorly performing economy could also become a serious obstacle for Moon Jae-in. Shortly before Moon’s inauguration, more than 85 per cent of the South Korean population felt that North Korea’s nuclear weapons constituted a major threat. More than 60 per cent answered ‘yes’ when asked whether or not ‘the South Korean government should agree to American military actions against the North’.

But even amid such keen security anxieties, the public still saw economic recovery as the most urgent issue facing President Moon. National security was third on the list after job creation. From his experience in the Roh administration, Moon is well aware of the importance of economic success.

That is not to say that Moon’s North Korea policy is not important. After a decade of intense inter-Korean animosity, the pendulum has swung back towards support for engagement. Most South Koreans expressed fervent support for Moon’s North Korea policy of engagement over pressure. Moon’s strong and consistent message of ‘no war on the Korean Peninsula’ has eased concerns even amid heightened US–China tensions. He has also managed to hold three inter-Korean summits and helped bring about the first US–North Korea summit.

Although Moon’s achievements with North Korea temporarily increased his approval rating, they are unlikely to be enough in the long run. His remarkable 74 per cent support rating after the April 2018 summit with Kim Jong-un quickly dropped to 52 per cent, before rallying again after his visit to Pyongyang in September.

The plunge between April and September was due to public dissatisfaction with Moon’s handling of the country’s economic problems. 2018 has seen economic growth slow, economic polarization worsen and capital investment decline. This sluggishness has allowed the opposition conservative party, eager to redeem itself, to define Moon’s income-led growth principle as a complete disaster.

Moon’s popularity has fallen with his advocate groups, especially those in their 20s and small business owners, after negotiations on raising the minimum wage next year. Small- and medium-sized enterprises — which are already struggling with expensive rents, commissions and franchise fees — regard this decision as an extra burden. This has slowed job creation and threatens the livelihoods of younger generations. The 54 trillion won (over US $47 billion) that the Moon administration has spent on job creation has not succeeded in lowering the unemployment rate, which is the highest since the Asian financial crisis in 1997.

The opposition will, no doubt, use the slumping economy against Moon. They will argue that conciliatory engagement with North Korea will be little more than an economic hand-out. Previous liberal administrations were accused of the same during the so-called Sunshine Policy era of 1998–2008. If the opposition can successfully establish a correlation between Moon’s North Korea policy and the worsening economic situation, this will complicate Moon’s engagement strategy immensely.

If history is anything to go by, Moon’s successful North Korea policy will not be enough to offset public frustrations with a sluggish economy. His dipping approval rating should worry supporters of a more conciliatory North Korea policy as it heralds the coming of Moon’s lame-duck period. If that happens, it is far from certain that opportunistic politicians in his own party will continue to support him. In other words, unless Moon manages to dispel his reputation as weak on the economy, the positive developments we have seen between the two Koreas under his presidency may come to an abrupt end.

Eun Hee Woo is an affiliated researcher at Freie Universität Berlin.

Approval ratings are exceptionally important for South Korean presidents to maintain authority within their own ruling party and delay the almost inevitable arrival of lame-duck status, which leaves them politically paralysed. But the most important factor determining a president’s popularity is economic performance.

Many South Koreans list Cold War dictator Park Chung-hee as their favourite president because national GDP nearly quadrupled during his reign from 1961 to 1979. Rapid economic development, proudly referred to as the ‘Miracle on the Han River’, served to legitimize Park’s dictatorship despite grave constitutional violations. As long as the economy is booming, most other failures and transgressions are readily forgiven by the South Korean people.

Roh Moo-hyun is remembered as South Korea’s most democratic president — a clear contrast to Park Chung-hee. Although he went to great lengths to dispel an authoritarian legacy and instill democratic values, Roh’s approval rating dropped from 60 to 20 per cent in his first year and never fully recovered.

Some have concluded that this drop was intimately tied to the public’s economic anxiety. President Roh’s failure to stabilize property prices and reduce economic polarization made his support base, and consequently his party, turn their backs on him. Let down by Roh’s failed economic policies, the public elected the conservative candidate Lee Myung-bak — one of South Korea’s most famous entrepreneurs.

A poorly performing economy could also become a serious obstacle for Moon Jae-in. Shortly before Moon’s inauguration, more than 85 per cent of the South Korean population felt that North Korea’s nuclear weapons constituted a major threat. More than 60 per cent answered ‘yes’ when asked whether or not ‘the South Korean government should agree to American military actions against the North’.

But even amid such keen security anxieties, the public still saw economic recovery as the most urgent issue facing President Moon. National security was third on the list after job creation. From his experience in the Roh administration, Moon is well aware of the importance of economic success.

That is not to say that Moon’s North Korea policy is not important. After a decade of intense inter-Korean animosity, the pendulum has swung back towards support for engagement. Most South Koreans expressed fervent support for Moon’s North Korea policy of engagement over pressure. Moon’s strong and consistent message of ‘no war on the Korean Peninsula’ has eased concerns even amid heightened US–China tensions. He has also managed to hold three inter-Korean summits and helped bring about the first US–North Korea summit.

Although Moon’s achievements with North Korea temporarily increased his approval rating, they are unlikely to be enough in the long run. His remarkable 74 per cent support rating after the April 2018 summit with Kim Jong-un quickly dropped to 52 per cent, before rallying again after his visit to Pyongyang in September.

The plunge between April and September was due to public dissatisfaction with Moon’s handling of the country’s economic problems. 2018 has seen economic growth slow, economic polarization worsen and capital investment decline. This sluggishness has allowed the opposition conservative party, eager to redeem itself, to define Moon’s income-led growth principle as a complete disaster.

Moon’s popularity has fallen with his advocate groups, especially those in their 20s and small business owners, after negotiations on raising the minimum wage next year. Small- and medium-sized enterprises — which are already struggling with expensive rents, commissions and franchise fees — regard this decision as an extra burden. This has slowed job creation and threatens the livelihoods of younger generations. The 54 trillion won (over US$47 billion) that the Moon administration has spent on job creation has not succeeded in lowering the unemployment rate, which is the highest since the Asian financial crisis in 1997.

The opposition will, no doubt, use the slumping economy against Moon. They will argue that conciliatory engagement with North Korea will be little more than an economic hand-out. Previous liberal administrations were accused of the same during the so-called Sunshine Policy era of 1998–2008. If the opposition can successfully establish a correlation between Moon’s North Korea policy and the worsening economic situation, this will complicate Moon’s engagement strategy immensely.

If history is anything to go by, Moon’s successful North Korea policy will not be enough to offset public frustrations with a sluggish economy. His dipping approval rating should worry supporters of a more conciliatory North Korea policy as it heralds the coming of Moon’s lame-duck period. If that happens, it is far from certain that opportunistic politicians in his own party will continue to support him. In other words, unless Moon manages to dispel his reputation as weak on the economy, the positive developments we have seen between the two Koreas under his presidency may come to an abrupt end.

Eun Hee Woo is an affiliated researcher at Freie Universität Berlin.

Source:  http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/11/27/moons-north-korea-policy-in-danger/

The post Moon’s North Korea policy in danger first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

North Korean village of Gijungdong is seen during a press tour from the Taesungdong freedom village inside the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea in Paju, South Korea, on April 24, 2018.(Photo: Lee Jin-man, AP)

SEOUL — Friday’s summit between North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in will mark the third time the countries’ leaders have met since the Korean War ended in 1953.

The two previous summits were held in 2000 and 2007. In each case, hopes were high for a major breakthrough in relations on the Korean Peninsula.  Each summit was considered a historic success at its time.

The 2000 meeting even earned South Korean President Kim Dae-jung the Nobel Peace Prize. But in both cases the good vibes wouldn’t last long, as North Korea secretly continued to develop its nuclear and missile programs despite agreements to stop.

This time, there is a different cast of characters, and the circumstances — including an unprecedented follow-up meeting of Kim and President Trump in May or June— might produce a more lasting outcome.

The earlier summits remain cautionary tales. In both cases, economic and humanitarian exchanges were given before a detailed framework for denuclearization was in place. Analysts warn Moon not to make the same mistake.

2000 Summit

The first inter-Korean summit was held in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, in June 2000. South Korean President Kim Dae-jung met for three days with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il, father of the North’s current leader.

During the lead-up to the summit, North Korea expanded its diplomatic engagement with the outside world, just as Kim Jong Un has done in recent months. Kim Jong-il met with Chinese leaders in Beijing before of the summit and would later welcome Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pyongyang.

Famine and extreme shortages of goods and fuel in the 1990s plagued North Korea — in part because of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This provided motivation for the North to engage with the international community.

Images of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il shaking hands and clinking champagne glasses filled the airwaves and enthralled many South Korean viewers, as the two leaders signed a broad agreement to work toward peace and reunification. Kim Jong-il called the date of the meeting, June 13, “a day that would be recorded in history.”

More: From nukes to U.S. troops: The 5 key obstacles to peace with North Korea

Kim Dae-jung later declared that ”the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula has disappeared.”

Kim Dae-jung would go on to win the Nobel Peace Prize in November that year for his “sunshine policy” of rapprochement with the North. Economic cooperation followed the meeting, along with rail and road links and the start of a family reunion program.

By the end of 2002, the international community found that North Korea secretly continued its missile and nuclear programs, in violation of a 1994 framework signed with the United States. In 2003, a scandal emerged that Kim Dae-jung’s administration had secretly — and illegally — transferred hundreds of millions of dollars to North Korea to attend the summit.

2007 Summit

In October 2007, Kim Jong-il welcomed South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun to Pyongyang for a three-day summit. Hopes were again high for a peace settlement that would bring a formal end to the Korean War. Roh crossed the North Korean border on foot, saying: “I do hope after my crossing that more people will follow suit. This line will gradually be erased and the wall will fall.”

The meeting came after North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006. Shortly after the test, Pyongyang agreed to continue six-party disarmament talks that included the U.S., Russia, China, Japan and the two Koreas. The six countries reached an agreement to provide North Korea with $400 million in aid in February 2007 in exchange for North Korea shutting down its nuclear reactors and allowing inspectors back into the country.

During the summit, Roh gave Kim Jong-il, a known movie buff, a collection of South Korean films and TV shows, while Kim Jong-il offered his guest four tons of rare mushrooms worth over $2 million.

The summit concluded with North Korea agreeing to end its nuclear plans. Both sides signed a joint declaration calling for a permanent peace deal on the Korean Peninsula. The two countries also agreed to a package of economic projects that included aid to the North, cross-border freight train service and the establishment of a joint fishing zone.

But North Korea again reneged on its promises to end its nuclear program, first banning international inspectors in October 2008. The North then conducted its second nuclear test in May 2009.

In the meantime, South Korea elected conservative Lee Myung-bak as president in 2008, whose hard-line approach chilled relations with Pyongyang. The 2010 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan, a South Korean naval ship that investigators concluded was the result of a North Korean torpedo, helped bring about the formal end of the Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine policy” of peaceful engagement with North Korea.

Source: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/04/24/north-south-korea-summit-holds-promise-peace/545225002/

The post North and South Korea’s summit holds promise for peace. Unfortunately, so did the last two. first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.