During his visit Tuesday to the Kazakh capital of Nur-Sultan, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared Moscow’s stance on the issue.

“Russia, like the overwhelming majority of other countries, considers Taiwan to be part of the People’s Republic of China,” Lavrov said. “We have proceeded and will proceed from this premise in our foreign policy.”

Only 14 countries today, along with the Vatican, have diplomatic relations with Taipei. Even the U.S. maintains only informal relations with the island nation since recognizing Beijing in 1979, three decades after the Communist victory in a civil war drove nationalists into exile across the Taiwan Strait. The Soviet Union quickly sided with the new fellow Communist power, though Moscow and Beijing would soon develop their own feud that lasted the remainder of the Cold War.

But today, China and Russia are closer than ever, and this year celebrated the 20th anniversary of their 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation that redefined their relationship. These ties have grown especially warm in recent years as both found common ground in countering a mutual rival: the United States.

As the U.S. has turned its sights toward the Asia-Pacific region, especially since former President Donald Trump’s administration, Lavrov and other Russian officials have more readily criticized U.S. coalition-building with Australia, India and Japan under the banner of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Lavrov has recently been voicing his opposition to those efforts.

“The Indo-Pacific concept is aimed at breaking up this system that relied on the need to respect the indivisibility of security,” Lavrov told a defense and foreign policy conference last week, “and has openly proclaimed that its chief objective is containing China.”

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian praised Lavrov’s remarks days later, and on Monday also lauded Russian military expert Ivan Konovalov’s criticism over the behavior of U.S. and partnered navies in the Asia-Pacific region after a U.S. submarine collided with a still-unidentified object in the South China Sea.

During that same press briefing, Zhao shared his position on what he saw as Washington’s unhelpful actions targeting Moscow in Europe, where a new Russia-Germany gas pipeline known as Nord Stream 2 has drawn criticism from U.S. officials concerned about energy independence.

Over the weekend, Lavrov said the U.S. “is not hiding it and is straightforward” about pitting Russia and European powers against one another, and Zhao took the opportunity to support Moscow’s stance on Monday.

“It is well-known that the Nord Stream 2 project shows energy complementarity between Russia and Europe, and would help resolve the European energy crisis,” Zhao said. “The U.S., however, to serve its own geopolitical interests and monopolize the European energy market, spares no effort in disrupting and hobbling relevant projects to undermine the interests of Russia and Europe and their cooperation. This wins no support.”

He then linked the U.S. approach on the pipeline with that which it took in the Asia-Pacific, saying “the U.S. is adept at politicizing issues in all means and would hurt others indiscriminately, including its allies and partners, for its own interests.”

He argued that more nations are beginning to share this perception.

“We believe more countries, with their eyes wide open, will oppose the U.S. hegemonic approach featuring politicization and a sense of supremacy in pursuit of self-interests at the expense of others,” Zhao said.

However, as both Beijing and Moscow’s relations with Washington have deteriorated, each has attempted to stabilize its ties with the top world power.

On Tuesday, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov met with U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland in Moscow, where an attempt by the Russians was said to have been made to roll back tit-for-tat sanctions targeting one another’s diplomatic missions.

“The officials discussed the status and prospects of bilateral relations,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a readout. “They paid special attention to the operation of the diplomatic missions on each other’s territory. Mr. Ryabkov emphasized that the hostile anti-Russian actions will not remain unanswered although Moscow does not seek to further escalate tensions. He suggested removing all restrictions that both sides have introduced in the past few years.”

And Ryabkov warned that continued tensions would only serve to make life more difficult for both parties.

“Ms. Nuland was told that the continuation of Washington’s line toward confrontation on the bilateral agenda and in the context of acute international and regional problems can only result in the further degradation of Russian-US relations,” according to the Russian side. “It is necessary to adopt a realistic approach and build bilateral ties on the principles of equality and mutual consideration of each other’s interests.”

When it comes to China, two notable interactions have occurred over the past month. Last month, Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden spoke via telephone, and last Wednesday Chinese Communist Party Central Foreign Affairs Commission Director Yang Jiechi met virtually with U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan.

Tensions appear to have somewhat eased on the surface amid this communication, but core areas of contention exist, with Taiwan identified by both sides as the primary issue.

Under both Trump and Biden, the U.S. has gradually expanded its informal support for Taiwan, including in the security realm. Taipei officials, such as Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, have also increased their ambitions for challenging the “one-China” near-consensus that exists among the international community.

Responding to Wu’s arguments that United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 that passed Taipei’s U.N. seat to Beijing in 1971 does not preclude Taiwan from participating in the U.N, Zhao said during his daily press briefing on Friday “the remarks of some politician in Taiwan are just nonsense.”

“There is only one China in the world, the Taiwan region is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory, and the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China,” Zhao said. “This is a basic fact recognized by the international community. Our position of adhering to the one-China principle will remain unchanged; our attitude of rejecting ‘two Chinas’, ‘one China, one Taiwan’ and ‘Taiwan independence’ is not to be challenged, and our resolve of upholding national sovereignty and territorial integrity is unswerving.”

Zhao also emphasized that Taiwan was a province of China and therefore not qualified from participating independently in international organizations such as the U.N. And he reiterated Beijing’s commitment to reintegrating Taiwan under mainland rule, a pledge Xi has vowed to achieve through diplomacy or force, if neccesary.

“We believe that the just cause of the Chinese government and Chinese people to uphold national sovereignty and territorial integrity, oppose secession and achieve reunification will continue to win understanding and support of the U.N. and its member states,” Zhao said.

That same day, the Chinese military’s official online portal carried a commentary by the official military newspaper, the People’s Liberation Army Daily, underlining the need to achieve reunification.

“The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has firm will, full confidence, and sufficient capabilities to thwart all external interference and separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ and resolutely defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” the commentary read. “If the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces dared to split Taiwan from China in any name and by any means, the People’s Army will resolutely crush it at all costs.”

The commentary also argued for an even more urgent need to focus on this point.

“The officers and soldiers of the entire army must increase their sense of anxiety and responsibility for their missions, focus on fighting, focus on all tasks, and have the ambition to strengthen the army and rejuvenate the army,” the commentary read. “The high level of vigilance ensures that when the party and the people need it, they will come when they are called, they will be able to fight, and they will be victorious.”

Successive U.S. administrations have deliberately avoided making any overt pledges to defend Taiwan in the event of Chinese military action.

Asked about the U.S. planned response to a hypothetical Chinese incursion a day after his online talks with Jang, Sullivan replied, “Let me just say this, we are going to take action now to try to prevent that day from ever coming to pass.”

China and Russia have no formal military alliance, and both sides have said there were no plans to adopt such a framework, even as their defense ties continue to increase. But the two nations have pursued an increasing number of joint exercises, including large-scale drills in August focused on counterterrorism in northwestern China at a time of growing instability as U.S. troops left a two-decade conflict in neighboring Afghanistan, one of a number of regional and international issues on which Beijing and Moscow have stepped up collaboration.

And in yet another display of aligned interests, the two countries released a joint statement on the Biological Weapons Convention, in which “they emphasize that the United States’ and its allies’ overseas military biological activities (over 200 U.S. biological laboratories are deployed outside its national territory, which function in opaque and non-transparent manner) cause serious concerns and questions among the international community over its compliance with the BWC.”

This point has been especially promoted by China since the emergence of U.S. suspicions regarding a potential role played by the Wuhan Virological Institute in the outbreak of COVID-19, a disease first detected in the Chinese city of Wuhan. A U.S. intelligence report commissioned by President Biden came to an inconclusive finding as to whether the pathogen may have appeared naturally or accidentally leaked out of the facility, but the probe has only further damaged U.S.-China relations.

As his first year in office draws to a close, Biden has already met with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a June bilateral summit Geneva, and discussions are underway for a potential virtual talk with Xi, though no official date has yet been confirmed.

“I don’t have any update at this point,” White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki told reporters Tuesday. “It’s just something that we’re working through and in discussions about at a staff level.”

Source: https://www.newsweek.com/russia-taiwan-part-china-partners-align-around-world-1638170?piano_t=1

The post Russia Says Taiwan is Part of China as Two Powers Further Align Against U.S. first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

SOURCE: мультимедиа.минобороны.рф

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin exchanged views on Afghanistan in a call on August 25. Unlike other G7 states, China and Russia did not call the Taliban to extend the August 31 withdrawal deadline. In fact, Xi Jinping called on the Taliban to form a “coalition” government in Kabul, cut off from terry groups, and keep peaceful ties with the rest of the world. This is in line with Moscow’s policy. Both are satisfied with the Western defeat in Afghanistan but are aware of how important it is to fill in the geopolitical void that emerged after the United States and NATO forces quit the country. Russia and China seek good ties with the Taliban for three reasons. First, to push its top enemy––the United States––out of the country. Second, to prevent the expansion of radical Islam from Afghanistan into Central Asia and Xinjiang. Third, to make money on economic deals in Afghanistan and weapons trade to the Taliban. Beijing and Afghanistan have long had a common stance on Afghanistan. Shortly after the Taliban seized Kabul, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia remained in talks with China while their views were practically identical. Not only does this involve conditional support for the new government in Kabul, but also efforts to show joint decisiveness and send warning signals to the Taliban in the form of military drills near the Afghan border. Russia has already held joint drills with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan while countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) will take part in similar military exercises soon. Noteworthy are Russian-Chinese military drills in August, or a blatant signal for the Taliban that Beijing and Moscow can join forces in the military. It was the first time the two countries drilled large-scale maneuvers, targeting a specific adversary (Islamic fighters) in a designated area (Central Asia). Earlier there were just a few allied troops taking part in joint drills (as the Chinese military participated in the Vostok-2018 war games), but only now these are full-scale joint military exercises. On the one hand, this shows that Moscow and Beijing are afraid of the situation in Afghanistan, but, on the other, this consolidates the China-Russia geopolitical alliance while prompting some Western officials that it is no longer possible to drive a wedge between the two countries.

Source: https://warsawinstitute.org/chinese-russian-axis-afghanistan/

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For many observers, the situation in Belarus has not been developing at the pace they were expecting a week or two ago.

There are still people on the streets who wish to see a free Belarus, but president Alexander Lukashenko has remained in power.

Russian president Vladimir Putin (l) and Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko (Photo: kremlin.ru)

The post Russia is very present in Belarus first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

International power balance is primarily based on claiming ascendancy on the world stage, which in turn is driven by political imperatives, the prime mover in all initiatives towards claiming power. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia assumed the mantle of Soviet power but struggled to prove itself as a world power of consequence. Its gradual rise back to a position of influence has been a long journey, guided by influential thinkers. Since the initiatives that Russia undertook to return to the world stage were based on military actions, there is a prevalent belief that its international dealings were based on a military doctrine that has been attributed to General Valery Gerasimov, the current Russian Chief of General Staff. This belief is a fallacy.

If a nation tends to project power based purely on military actions, it would amount to the military doctrine driving national security policy. The Soviet/Russian tradition does not support this process since the military has never been the driver, but only the implementer in Russia. Russia’s current national security policy is firmly based on a concept, a doctrine, which is gradually being recognized and labeled as the Primakov Doctrine, named after Yevgeny Primakov who became the Russian Foreign Minister in December 1995.

Who was Yevgeny Primakov (1929-2015)

Primakov was born in Kiev in 1929 and initially worked for the Russian broadcasting authority. Subsequently, he was trained by the KGB as an Oriental scholar, becoming multi-lingual, proficient in Arabic and English. During Leonid Brezhnev’s government, he became an expert on the Middle-East and was prominently involved in formulating the Soviet Union’s Middle-East and South Asian policies during the 1970s and 80s. He was a special adviser to Gorbachev and made a last-minute attempt to prevent the 1991 Gulf War, going against the then Soviet policy of cooperation with the United States.

In September 1991, Primakov supervised the seamless transition of the KGB to what became known as the Foreign Intelligence Service of the then-emerging Russian Federation, the SVVR. In 1995, he became the Foreign Minister of Russia and then became the Prime Minister during 1998-99. During his years in power, he drove Russian foreign policy imperatives and was lauded by all domestic institutions as a realist who was wedded to Russia’s strategic goals. It was under his aegis that Russia condemned the US-led intervention in Yugoslavia, Operation Allied Force (March-June 1999) and also lodged a symbolic protest against the unilateral action of the US, without UN sanction.

Evolution of the Current Russian Foreign Policy

Prior to Primakov coming to prominence, Russia had sought accommodation with the West. Primakov initiated actions to move on an independent track in its foreign relations, consciously demonstrating to the West that Russia was unwilling to be causally consigned to the proverbial ‘dust heap of history’. Primakov envisaged a Russia-led bloc that would emerge as an alternative to the then-emerging US-led unipolar world and create a truly multi-polar world order. The initial concept was of a trilateral group—Russia, China, and India—that became the foundation and trigger point for the emergence of BRICS.

Primakov’s concept started as a balance to neutralize the immediate threat to Russia, which was the international pressure being brought to bear after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He formulated the doctrine as the connecting bridge between policy objective and the strategy to preempt political backlash to Russian initiatives. This objective was to be achieved by exploiting the enemy’s weakness and upgrading Russian military maneuvers.

Primakov Doctrine – Fundamentals

The doctrine is premised on Russia being able to prevent the world from becoming unipolar, which is another way of stating that the international power and influence of the US has to be diluted. The insistence on developing a multi-polar world went directly against the post-Cold War initiatives of the US to create a unipolar world order with its own assured primacy. Such a multi-polar world was postulated on the strength of Russo-Chinese partnership, with the wider, and informal, view that this coalition would challenge the US-led alliance in the Persian Gulf and the Taiwan Straits. Further, Primakov also wanted to create an exclusive Russian sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

For a little over two decades, based on the Primakov Doctrine, Russian foreign policy has insisted on five fundamental factors or concepts, which has been supported to a limited extent by the slow economic recovery in Russia. The five concepts are:

• Russia is an indispensable actor in global politics, pursuing an independent foreign policy;
• Russia’s foreign policy is surmised within a broad vision of a multipolar world managed by a  group of nations;
• Acceptance of Russia’s primacy in the post-Soviet space and in Eurasia is fundamental to all diplomatic overtures to the nation;
• Russia is fundamentally opposed to any expansion of NATO; and
• Partnership with China forms a cornerstone of Russia’s foreign policy.

With the expansion of NATO into the old Soviet bloc nations, the line of contact is barely two hours from major Russian cities. This strategic repositioning has altered the threat perception in Russia, especially since the earlier ‘buffer-zone’ of the near-abroad between NATO and the Russian heartland has vanished. The current situation has instilled a new sense of vulnerability in Russia’s strategic security thinking.

Russia’s Recent Initiatives

As soon as Russia stabilized its economy and put in place a strong and centralize government, Russia initiated actions to reclaim its perceived international status. It also became prone to taking calculated risks to move forward the nation’s strategic agenda. These initiatives could be seen from the early 2000s, starting with its opposition to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Even though Russia opposed the invasion in principle and voiced it, two factors combined to make it choose to remain in the sidelines and permit Saddam Hussein, its long-term client, to be deposed. First, the Russian economy was still in the process of recovery and its military forces were still to build-up their capabilities after the implosion of the 1990s; and second, the might of the US military machine and the resolve of that nation to go to war, embodied in the President, combined to make Russia accept the inevitable.

However, it took only another five years for President Putin to warn NATO to ‘stay away’ from former Soviet states, a remarkable display of confidence. In 2008, while Georgia was a prime candidate for NATO membership, the Russian military defeated the Georgian Army. This was a calculated risk that Russia took, but by demonstrating its willingness to go to war if required to assert its regional primacy over former Soviet space, Russia unequivocally signaled its return to global politics. In an overarching manner, this was confirmation of Russia coming back into the regional equation in Europe.

In another sphere, the conflict in Georgia was an eye-opener for Russia—it clearly pointed to the severe gaps that existed in its military capabilities. This realization led to the initiation of far-reaching military reform that resulted in a fundamental change in the thinking from designing the force in preparation for a large-scale, great power conflict to one of a leaner force meant to protect Russia’s immediate sphere of interest. Essentially, the focus of the Russian military became the limits of the Russian periphery, the old Soviet ‘near abroad’. The reforms were instituted with vigor, even though the Russian economy was contracting, and resulted in the visible upgrade of the military’s hard power capabilities.

By 2010, Russian military doctrine had also started to echo the same message—noting the decline in the chances of a large-scale war, assuming the mantle of enforcing the Primakov Doctrine in order to ensure Russian primacy in the post-Soviet space and its area of interest in Eurasia.

Realigning the Military Doctrine

By 2014, Russian military forces were revising their doctrine to align it more seamlessly with the Primakov Doctrine. The revised doctrine reiterated the belief that large-scale war against Russia was highly unlikely and emphasized the deterrent capability resident incapable military forces. While the Russian military is gradually moving away from the concept of large-scale wars, the US Army is consciously stating that soldiers who have been in the army for less than 18 years do not know what a large-scale combat operation would entail. Accordingly, the US Army has initiated the process to reset its training to prepare for the ‘big fight’, indicating that a near-peer, great power competition is back in the reckoning of the future. There is obviously a difference of view between Russian long-term thinking and that of the US Army.

Although discounting the chances of a large-scale war against a near-peer power, Russian military doctrine accepts the emergence of a more dangerous world that will be driven by increased global competition; inter-regional rivalries; and an inherent political instability that will impact economic developments at both the global and regional levels.

The fundamental difference in the military doctrine that was articulated in 2010 and the new iteration in 2014 was that while the earlier version was aligned towards the feasibility of peaceful coexistence, the revised doctrine of 2014 accepted that confrontation with the West could not be avoided in the long term. Accordingly, the military posture and structure started to reflect this inevitability—a confrontation was the new paradigm, which in turn brought acceptance of the role of hard power within the national security calculations. Emerging geographic realities and the fielding of highly evolved advanced precision-guided systems by the Western military forces reinforces Russia’s sense of vulnerability and makes it focus further on the development of matching hard power capabilities.

In the past five years, after the 2014 overhaul of its military doctrine, the Russian military concept of operations has been focused on denying NATO any advantage through embracing hard power capabilities and emphasizing small-scale, hybrid warfare. One of the major objectives has been to deny NATO the advantage of air dominance, the basis on which the Western forces develop their concepts of operations, through the development and fielding of sophisticated air defense systems deployed at vital points and critical areas. Based on these parameters, Russia has moved along a path of taking calculated and deliberate risk-taking; almost taunting the West to react.

The Annexation of Crimea

In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and launched an incursion into eastern Ukraine. The conflict with Georgia in 2008 had brought to light the shortcomings of the Russian military forces. The Crimean episode now demonstrated the effectiveness of the reforms that had been initiated since then and without a doubt emphasized the fact that Russia had now returned to the ranks of major military powers. The immediate aftermath of the Russian action in Ukraine signaled an altered relationship between Russia and the Western world. Even though it had been promised NATO membership in 2008, Ukraine was not a NATO member when Crimea was annexed, and so was not covered by any security guarantee. The Western reaction to the invasion was only statements with no military assistance or intervention.

Russian military actions in Georgia and Ukraine prevented the states within the old Soviet sphere of influence, which Russia now considered its own sphere of influence, from obtaining NATO membership or security guarantees. From the annexation of Crimea onwards, the Primakov Doctrine became the underpinning principle for all Russian politico-strategic initiatives, which were focused on improving Russia’s position as an independent power of global influence.

Russia in the Middle-East

In 2015, Russia intervened militarily in the Syrian Civil War, in support of and at the request of Basher al-Assad’s faltering regime—surprising observers both at home and internationally. This was the first time since the break-up of the Soviet Union that Russia was intervening in a theater, not within its close geographic proximity. Most observers predicted military overreach, high casualties, rapid failure, and retreat; none of which came true. Instead, Russia emerged as the most competent player in the confused Middle-East for the first time after the early 1990s.

The Syrian intervention was a classic example of the Primakov Doctrine in operation. The objectives of the intervention were very clear—prevention of the US-led/sponsored regime change; and questioning and putting an end to unilateral US military interventions. Russian actions confirmed to its military activities of the past decade; enabling a well-crafted campaign while accepting calculated risks and ensuring minimum casualties. The intervention was also ensured that there was no direct confrontation with the US, which was in any case already attempting to scale-down in Syria. Within a few months of the start of the military campaign, it became obvious that Russia had gained far in excess of the limited risk that it had accepted. It had saved a long-term client regime and in the bargain also established itself as a major influence in the Middle-East, using Syria as a springboard to reach out to other countries in the region. By a calculated and limited military intervention, Russia had demonstrated its willingness to employ its military forces to support a client regime, irrespective of its hue and without any overt caveats being placed on the regime. Russia cannot be ignored anymore and has regained its military-strategic influence as an influential power—the Primakov Doctrine had proved its veracity.

In Syria, Russia used a judicious mix of military power projection and diplomacy to gain ascendancy and dominance in an unstable region and has rapidly filled the vacuum that the US left when it hurriedly and rapidly exited the scene. There are many reasons for the Russian success in the Middle-East. First, it learned from US mistakes and realized that ‘sanctions’ would not work against brutal regimes, the corollary being that military interventions must be sufficiently low key while also being decisive. Second, the politico-military strategy has to be backed by diplomacy and the capacity to carryout multi-lateral negotiations. The Astana Process, started in 2017 to discuss the rebuilding of a broken Syria is an example and could be seen as a successful alternative to the US-led Geneva talks that is stagnating. Third, the success of any intervention is dependent on the ability of the nation to bring together all elements of national power in a concerted manner, effectively and decisively. The fourth reason is the old-fashioned concept of loyalty. Russia demonstrated that it was a committed partner to its allies, even when the allied government was autocratic in nature.

Conclusion

In the past decade, it has become obvious that Russia puts national interests above the pursuit of ideology and does not attempt to restructure the region of its interest. Instead, the effort is always to increase stability while adherence to ideology and values is kept on the back burner. This is pragmatism in the new world at its best. Perhaps more importantly, in a region broken-up by ancient and bitter rivalries and fragmented by religious, ideological and geopolitical fault lines, Russia has emerged as the new power broker, an influential and essential partner to any discussion that takes place. Russia is still playing the ‘Great Game’ and achieving better results than ever before.

Within Russia, the Syrian intervention is seen as a great success and therefore an internal debate is shaping up between the older generation leadership and the younger and emerging strategists. The one, ever mindful of the bitter experience of the Soviet Union and therefore risk-averse, and the other more robust and harboring global ambitions for their nation, clamoring for their place in the international sun. While the grey beards seem to be holding sway, for now, the new generation, as is their wont, are impatient and not unduly heedful of history. Sooner, rather than later, Russian ambition will break the restraints of the past and riding on the back of the Primakov Doctrine, it will create global consequences.

First published in Blog sanukay.wordpress.com

Dr. Sanu Kainikara

Dr. Sanu Kainikara is a Canberra-based Military Strategist and a practising Historian. He is an Adjunct Professor at the University of New South Wales and the inaugural Distinguished Fellow at the Institute for Regional Security, Canberra.

Source: https://www.eurasiareview.com/05112019-russias-return-to-the-world-stage-the-primakov-doctrine-analysis/

The post Russia’s Return To The World Stage: The Primakov Doctrine – Analysis first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.