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		<title>How the US military is preparing for a war with China</title>
		<link>https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/how-the-us-military-is-preparing-for-a-war-with-china/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=how-the-us-military-is-preparing-for-a-war-with-china</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[James Stavridis]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Mar 2021 07:27:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Far East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Space Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese People’s Liberation Army]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[East China Sea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Security Council]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South China Sea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. Cyber Command]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States (US)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Air Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-China relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-China war]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/?p=38825</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Juicy targets include artificial islands in the South China Sea. U.S. Marines participate in an amphibious assault exercise in Chonburi, Thailand, in February 2020: the Marines will be sea-based and able to sail into the waters of the South China &#8230; <a class="kt-excerpt-readmore" href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/how-the-us-military-is-preparing-for-a-war-with-china/" aria-label="How the US military is preparing for a war with China">Read More</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/how-the-us-military-is-preparing-for-a-war-with-china/">How the US military is preparing for a war with China</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org">Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Juicy targets include artificial islands in the South China Sea.</p>
<p><img decoding="async" src="https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/https%253A%252F%252Fs3-ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com%252Fpsh-ex-ftnikkei-3937bb4%252Fimages%252F1%252F1%252F6%252F2%252F32832611-3-eng-GB%252FCropped-1614939715A20210305%2520US%2520Marine%2520Cobra%2520Gold%2520small.jpg?width=700&amp;fit=cover&amp;gravity=faces&amp;dpr=2&amp;quality=medium&amp;source=nar-cms" /><br />
U.S. Marines participate in an amphibious assault exercise in Chonburi, Thailand, in February 2020: the Marines will be sea-based and able to sail into the waters of the South China Sea.   © <span class="ezstring-field">Sipa/AP</span></p>
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<p><em>Admiral James Stavridis was 16th Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and 12th Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He spent the bulk of his operational career in the Pacific, and is author of &#8220;2034: A Novel of the Next World War.&#8221;</em></p>
<p>The Atlantic Council&#8217;s publication of <em>The Longer Telegram</em>, which lays out a sweeping blueprint for a U.S. strategy to face China, provides significant clues about a new lay-down of American forces around east Asia.</p>
<p>Whether the new Biden administration fully embraces the paper&#8217;s aggressive stance remains to be seen, but elements are under serious consideration. Certainly, the new team at the National Security Council, led by highly respected Asia hand Kurt Campbell and a deep bench of Asia experts, will be looking at a wide variety of options for the military component of a new overall strategic posture.</p>
<p>One of the key elements in the military component is a series of &#8220;red lines&#8221; to which the U.S. would respond militarily.</p>
<p>These include &#8220;any nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons action by China against the U.S. or its allies or by North Korea; any Chinese military attack against Taiwan or its offshore islands, including an economic blockade or major cyberattack against Taiwanese public infrastructure and institutions; any Chinese attack against Japanese forces in their defense of Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, which China claims as the Diaoyu, and their surrounding exclusive economic zone in the East China Sea; any major Chinese hostile action in the South China Sea to further reclaim and militarize islands, to deploy force against other claimant states, or to prevent full freedom of navigation operations by the U.S. and allied maritime forces; and any Chinese attack against the sovereign territory or military assets of U.S. treaty allies.&#8221;</p>
<p>At U.S. Indo-Pacific headquarters, strategic, operational, and tactical teams are putting together new approaches for deploying American forces. These new options will be sent back to the Pentagon as part of the overall &#8220;posture review&#8221; being undertaken by new Secretary of Defense General Lloyd Austin. What will emerge?</p>
<p>One option is an enhanced role for the U.S. Marine Corps, which traces so much of its pre-9/11 operational history to the Pacific going back to World War II. Under the dynamic intellectual leadership of Marine Corps Commandant Dave Berger, gone are the large troop formations, armored capability, and land-based Marine tactics of the &#8220;forever wars&#8221; in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Instead, in the context of a U.S.-China strategy, the Marines will be resolutely sea-based and able to sail into the waters of the South China Sea, well inside the island chains China relies on for defense. Once inside, they will use armed drones, offensive cyber capabilities, Marine Raiders &#8212; highly capable special forces &#8212; anti-air missiles, and even ship-killer strike weapons to attack Chinese maritime forces, and perhaps even their land bases of operations. The Chinese militarized artificial islands in the South China Sea would be juicy targets, for example. In essence, this will be guerrilla warfare from the sea.</p>
<p><img decoding="async" src="https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/https%253A%252F%252Fs3-ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com%252Fpsh-ex-ftnikkei-3937bb4%252Fimages%252F_aliases%252Farticleimage%252F3%252F1%252F7%252F2%252F32832713-4-eng-GB%252FCropped-1614940372A20210305%2520China%2520airstrip%2520Subi%2520Reef.jpg?source=nar-cms" /><br />
An airstrip and buildings on China&#8217;s man-made Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, pictured in April 2017: juicy targets.   © <span class="ezstring-field">AP</span></p>
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<p>In addition to a new Marine tactical and operational approach, the U.S. Navy will be undertaking more aggressive patrols throughout the waters off China. Some will say this is merely the military equivalent of &#8220;driving doughnut holes in your neighbor&#8217;s lawn.&#8221; But the strategic concept is clever: to gradually include other allied warships in this aggressive freedom of navigation patrols. Doing so internationalizes the pushback on Chinese claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea.</p>
<p>In particular, the Pentagon is hoping to include British, French, and other NATO allies in the effort. Indeed the recent NATO defense ministerial in Brussels involved consultations over the alliance&#8217;s role in facing the rising military capability of China. Over time, the U.S. would like to convince Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam to participate in such deployments. The U.S. overall maritime strategic posture is predicated on creating a global maritime coalition to face the Chinese People&#8217;s Liberation Army&#8217;s highly capable forces.</p>
<p>In addition to the sea service&#8217;s activities, the U.S. Air Force will likely be shifting additional long-range land-attack bombers and fighters to Pacific bases that are widely distributed across Asia, including some very remote sites on smaller islands. These so-called spokes will be supported from larger bases in Guam, Japan, Australia, and South Korea. The concept, dubbed Agile Combat Employment, adds a high degree of mobility to the currently concentrated combat power of both fighter and attack aircraft deployed in the region.</p>
<p>Finally, the U.S. Army will increase both combat power and mobility to deploy units forward in support of the red lines along those advocated in the telegram, including enhanced capability based in South Korea and Japan but easily capable of deploying to smaller islands throughout the region.</p>
<p>Both the Army and Air Force would be on the forward edge of additional training and exercises with the Taiwanese as well. Look for increased emphasis from the new American Space Force to focus intelligence and reconnaissance on the theater, as well as enhanced offensive cyber options from the U.S. Cyber Command, in coordination with the National Security Agency.</p>
<p>Taken together, it seems clear that the U.S. military is stepping up its presence and combat capability in the Western Pacific, and positioning for a conflict with China over the coming decades.</p>
<p><em>The Longer Telegram</em> provides an important clue as to what options the Pentagon and the White House are considering as part of an expected new strategy to face the rise of China. Hopefully, skillful diplomacy and the intertwined economies of the two great powers will preclude the outbreak of war &#8212; but U.S. military planners are busy these days.</p>
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<p>Source: <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/How-the-US-military-is-preparing-for-a-war-with-China" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/How-the-US-military-is-preparing-for-a-war-with-China</a></p>
[<a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/news/disclaimer/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Disclaimer</a>]<p>The post <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/how-the-us-military-is-preparing-for-a-war-with-china/">How the US military is preparing for a war with China</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org">Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<item>
		<title>Russia wants to unplug its internet from the rest of the world. Is that even possible?</title>
		<link>https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/russia-wants-to-unplug-its-internet-from-the-rest-of-the-world-is-that-even-possible/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=russia-wants-to-unplug-its-internet-from-the-rest-of-the-world-is-that-even-possible</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sabra Ayres]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Mar 2019 03:22:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Domain Name System (DNS)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Great Firewall (China)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Human Rights Watch]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Internet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Internet Research Agency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Internet Research Institute]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[State-controlled Internet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. Cyber Command]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Virtual private network (VPN)]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/?p=26372</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting during a visit to the Interior Ministry in Moscow, Russia, on Feb. 28. (Alexei Nikolsky / Associated Press) Russian lawmakers want to tighten the screws on Russia’s internet access by creating an “sovereign” &#8230; <a class="kt-excerpt-readmore" href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/russia-wants-to-unplug-its-internet-from-the-rest-of-the-world-is-that-even-possible/" aria-label="Russia wants to unplug its internet from the rest of the world. Is that even possible?">Read More</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/russia-wants-to-unplug-its-internet-from-the-rest-of-the-world-is-that-even-possible/">Russia wants to unplug its internet from the rest of the world. Is that even possible?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org">Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img decoding="async" src="https://www.latimes.com/resizer/Nrl-Xoq0DrDPs47AEGBv9Kffo1A=/800x0/www.trbimg.com/img-5c7d29c7/turbine/la-1551706563-4exidjicnc-snap-image" alt="Russia wants to unplug its internet from the rest of the world. Is that even possible?" /><br />
Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting during a visit to the Interior Ministry in Moscow, Russia, on Feb. 28. (Alexei Nikolsky / Associated Press)</p>
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<p data-page="1">Russian lawmakers want to tighten the screws on Russia’s internet access by creating an “sovereign” network that the Kremlin could shut off from the greater World Wide Web.</p>
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<p>Proponents of a bill now working its way through the Russian parliament say passing the measure will protect the country’s internet from foreign cyberattacks or other threats.</p>
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<p>But international human rights groups and opponents say the law is an attempt to create a firewall around Russia’s internet and restrict information flow. The law’s introduction has drawn comparisons to <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-bing-20190124-story.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">China’s restrictive Great Firewall</a>.</p>
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<p>Technology experts say beyond the concerns about freedom of information, even if the measure passes, it’s unclear whether Russia would be able to build the technical infrastructure to pull it off.</p>
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<p><strong>What does the law propose?</strong></p>
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<p>The bill proposes routing all Russian internet and data through a central point controlled by the state. To make that happen, Russian internet service providers would have to install specialized equipment to monitor web traffic and block banned content. Theoretically, this would allow the government to cut off the Russian internet, sometimes called Runet, from the rest of the global network.</p>
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<p>The law would grant more powers to Roskomnadzor, the Kremlin’s federal censor, so it could oversee the government-ordered banning of websites and shutdowns.</p>
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<p>The legislation calls also for the creation of a domestic Domain Name System, or DNS, which theoretically would give websites autonomy from the rest of the global net.</p>
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<p><strong>Why does Russia need a ‘sovereign’ internet?</strong></p>
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<p>Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2014 claimed the internet was created as a CIA project. (It was actually created by <a href="https://www.latimes.com/mc-robert-taylor-internet-obit-20170415-story.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">researchers at the U.S. Department of Defense</a>.) It was the first time Putin hinted at the idea of building a purely Russian-run system to counter what the Kremlin sees as the West’s dominance in the cyber world.</p>
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<p>Since then, the U.S. has accused Russia of trying to interfere in the 2016 elections by hacking into the Democratic National Committee computers and <a href="https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-russia-report-20181217-story.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">spreading disinformation</a> online, a claim the Kremlin has vehemently denied.</p>
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<p>Moscow now fears the increasing <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-putin-20190220-story.html">tensions between Russia and the West</a> could extend into cyberspace. Lawmakers backing the sovereign internet bill said it is needed to prepare the country should the U.S. or another foreign, hostile entity launch a cyberattack.</p>
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<p>This is not a purely hypothetical fear. Last month, <a href="https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-russian-trolls-midterms-20190226-story.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">the Washington Post reported </a>that the U.S. Cyber Command hacked into and temporarily disconnected the infamous St. Petersburg internet troll factory around the time of the 2018 U.S. midterm elections. A U.S. grand jury indicted the troll farm, the Internet Research Agency, in 2018 for conducting an influence campaign on behalf of the Kremlin during the 2016 election.</p>
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<p>Putin on Feb. 20 threw his weight behind the bill, which is being heard again in the Russian parliament this month.</p>
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<p>“They are sitting over there — this is their invention after all — and they’re listening, watching and reading everything you say, and they’re storing all this information,” Putin told Interfax news agency, when asked why Russia needs the new internet legislation. “In general, the more sovereignty we have, including in the digital sphere, the better.”</p>
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<p><strong>Can Russia’s internet really be cut off from the rest of the world?</strong></p>
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<p>Critics of the bill say that even if it passes — and it looks like it will — Russia will face several obstacles to enforcing the law.</p>
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<p>It took China at least 10 years to build its Great Firewall, as its internet filtering system is known, said Karen Kazaryan, the general director of the Internet Research Institute, an analytical and consulting group in Moscow.</p>
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<p>For Russia to do the same, “it would take a long time, a lot of resources and a lot of human resources, which we don’t have,” Kazaryan said.</p>
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<p>Russia does not currently have the equipment available for telecom companies to filter the internet as required by the bill. That will mean “some entity will have to supply every Russian telecom and internet service provider” with the technology, he said.</p>
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<p>That entity is likely to have a close connection to the Kremlin, he added. The state tends to award lucrative projects to private enterprises whose owners have close links to the Kremlin.</p>
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<p>“Like everything in Russia, it&#8217;s always about a commercial interest, and here it’s pretty obvious,” Kazaryan said.</p>
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<p>Stanislav Shakirov, an internet freedom activist at the nonprofit <a href="https://roskomsvoboda.org/about-us/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Roskomsvoboda</a>, which advocates for unrestricted internet access, told the news outlet Meduza that the other major hurdle to creating a China-like model would be the lack of domestic investment infrastructure for developing enough tech startups in Russia to compete with what’s offered in the West.</p>
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<p>&#8220;Not only are Russian internet users accustomed to having their pick of Western online services, but Russia&#8217;s domestic market isn&#8217;t big enough to sustain competition in isolation, and its unfriendly business climate remains a major hindrance,&#8221; he told Meduza.</p>
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<p><strong>Doesn’t the Kremlin already restrict the Russian internet?</strong></p>
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<p>The Kremlin in effect controls most of Russia’s media, including television and newspapers. Many Russians still get their news from TV.</p>
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<p>Still, a vigorous generation of web-based news portals have kept independent journalism alive in Russia, albeit with a fraction of the audience that Russian state media get. Social media and YouTube have become <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-youtubers-20170611-story.html">convenient mediums</a> for opposition leaders and regular Ivans to express their opinions in Russia.</p>
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<p>A handful of Russian media — including <a href="https://meduza.io/en" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Meduza</a>, in Riga, Latvia — have relocated and rebranded themselves outside the country.</p>
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<p>The Kremlin has already armed itself with weapons to fight this threat.</p>
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<p data-page="2">The government <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/14/world/la-fg-russia-ngo-limits-20120714" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">passed a law in 2012</a> ordering Roskomnadzor to create a blacklist of websites deemed a threat to national security. Putin signed the law after a massive wave of street demonstrations erupted in 2011 and 2012 over what protesters said was a rigged election to put Putin back in power. According to Roskomsvoboda, Russia is blocking 154,000 websites from the blacklist registry.</p>
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<p>Critics of the blacklist law argue that the definition of which sites should be included is unclear and it is frequently used to block political opposition groups and other dissenting voices.</p>
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<p>That last claim is undeniable. Increasingly, Russian authorities have cracked down on dissent, even jailing people for “liking” posts on VKontakte, Russia’s answer to Facebook. In a recent case, Russia convicted a video blogger on hate speech after he posted a video of himself playing Pokemon Go in a church.</p>
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<p>In 2014, Russia passed a controversial data storage law, which requires social media websites to keep their servers — and all their data — in Russia. Some sites have refused, including LinkedIn, which is now blocked in Russia. Telegram, a messaging service popular in Russia and elsewhere, refused to comply with the law and is now technically banned. The program is still accessible through an IP-blocking application such as a virtual private network, or VPN.</p>
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<p>Russia banned the use of VPNs and other software and websites used to circumventing the country’s internet filtering system in June 2017. As is the case for the proposed sovereign internet law, Russia lacks a mechanism for completely enforcing the ban on VPN use.</p>
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<p>Freedom House ranked Russia’s internet as “not free” in its most <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/russia">recent global survey</a>released in late 2018. Although internet access increased among Russia’s 143 million people, internet freedom in the country declined for the sixth year in a row, the watchdog group reported.</p>
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<p>Human Rights Watch has expressed concern about the proposed sovereign internet law.</p>
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<p>“Russia’s regressive internet laws have mostly been rushed, clumsy and chaotic, but that doesn’t reduce their threat to freedom of speech and information,” researcher Yulia Gorbunova wrote in a statement for Human Rights Watch.</p>
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<p>“Russia is definitely beginning to look like one of the worst offenders in the world on internet freedom, but it&#8217;s so sporadic,” Kazaryan of the Internet Research Institute said. “It’s just random prosecutors all around Russia, who block some random sites because, I guess, they need to report to their higher-ups that they are dealing with threats on the internet.”</p>
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<p>Source: <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-internet-20190304-story.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-internet-20190304-story.html</a></p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/russia-wants-to-unplug-its-internet-from-the-rest-of-the-world-is-that-even-possible/">Russia wants to unplug its internet from the rest of the world. Is that even possible?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org">Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>The ‘Global Cybercrime Problem’ Is Actually the ‘Russia Problem’</title>
		<link>https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/the-global-cybercrime-problem-is-actually-the-russia-problem/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-global-cybercrime-problem-is-actually-the-russia-problem</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[John P. Carlin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 16 Dec 2018 07:25:33 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cybercrime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Internet Research Agency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Project Lakhta]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rod Rosenstein]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. Cyber Command]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/?p=8355</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Convincing Putin that further attacks will trigger automatic, severe responses is the best path to deterrence. Paul Abbate, the then–FBI assistant director of the Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch, speaks next to a poster of a suspected Russian hacker &#8230; <a class="kt-excerpt-readmore" href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/the-global-cybercrime-problem-is-actually-the-russia-problem/" aria-label="The ‘Global Cybercrime Problem’ Is Actually the ‘Russia Problem’">Read More</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/the-global-cybercrime-problem-is-actually-the-russia-problem/">The ‘Global Cybercrime Problem’ Is Actually the ‘Russia Problem’</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org">Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Convincing Putin that further attacks will trigger automatic, severe responses is the best path to deterrence.</p>
<p><img decoding="async" src="https://cdn.theatlantic.com/assets/media/img/mt/2018/12/RTX316K3/lead_720_405.jpg?mod=1544898997" alt="Paul Abbate, theâthen FBI assistant director of the Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch, speaks next to a poster of a suspected Russian hacker in 2017." /><br />
<span class="c-lead-media__caption o-credit__caption">Paul Abbate, the then–FBI assistant director of the Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch, speaks next to a poster of a suspected Russian hacker in 2017.</span><span class="o-credit__attribution">YURI GRIPAS / REUTERS</span></p>
<p>A series of explosive Department of Justice filings—outside the special counsel’s probe—makes clear that Russia is a rogue state in cyberspace. Now the United States needs a credible system to take action, and to sanction Russia for its misdeeds.</p>
<p>Consider what we learned from last month’s criminal charges filed by the Department of Justice against the “chief accountant” for Russia’s so-called troll factory, the online-information influence operations conducted by the Internet Research Agency in St. Petersburg. The indictment showed how Russia, rather than being chastened by Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s detailed February indictment laying out its criminal activities, continued to spread online propaganda about that <em>very </em>indictment, tweeting and posting about Mueller’s charges both positively and negatively—to spread and exacerbate America’s political discord. Defense Secretary James Mattis later <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/01/politics/mattis-russia-election-interference/index.html" data-omni-click="r'article',r'',d,r'intext',r'0',r'None'">told</a> the Reagan National Defense Forum in Simi Valley, California, that Vladimir Putin “tried again to muck around in our elections this last month, and we are seeing a continued effort along those lines.”</p>
<p>In October, a 37-page <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-national-charged-interfering-us-political-system" data-omni-click="r'article',r'',d,r'intext',r'1',r'None'">criminal complaint</a> filed against Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, who is alleged to have participated in “Project Lakhta,” a Russian-oligarch-funded effort to deploy online memes and postings to stoke political controversy, came along with a similar <a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/1915-joint-statement-from-the-odni-doj-fbi-and-dhs-combating-foreign-influence-in-u-s-elections" data-omni-click="r'article',r'',d,r'intext',r'2',r'None'">warning</a>, from the director of national intelligence. Those charges came in the wake of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/us/politics/russia-hacks-doping-poisoning.html" data-omni-click="r'article',r'',d,r'intext',r'3',r'None'">coordinated charges filed this fall</a> by U.K., Dutch, and U.S. officials against Russia and its intelligence officers for a criminal scheme to target anti-doping agencies, officials, and even clean athletes around the world in retaliation for Russia’s doping scandal and in an apparent effort to intimidate those charged with holding Russia to a level playing field. There’s also new <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/us/politics/russia-macedonia-greece.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&amp;smid=nytcore-ipad-share" data-omni-click="r'article',r'',d,r'intext',r'4',r'None'">evidence</a> that Russia has been interfering in other foreign issues, such as a recent referendum in Macedonia aimed at easing that country’s acceptance into Europe.</p>
<p id="injected-recirculation-link-0" class="c-recirculation-link" data-id="injected-recirculation-link"><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/06/the-ragtag-russian-hackers-taking-computers-ransom/486404/" data-omni-click="r'article',r'',d,r'intext',r'5',r'None'">Read: How to run a Russian hacking ring</a></p>
<p>At times, it’s seemed like every week this year has brought fresh news of Putin acting as the skunk at the global internet party. This fall also saw a new <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/russian-hackers-saudi-chemical-plant.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&amp;smid=nytcore-ipad-share" data-omni-click="r'article',r'',d,r'intext',r'6',r'None'">report</a>from the security firm FireEye that concluded that the code used to attack a Saudi petrochemical plant came from a state-owned institute in Moscow.</p>
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<section id="article-section-1" class="l-article__section s-cms-content">Moreover, it’s also become more clear that the “global cybercrime problem” is actually primarily a “Russia problem,” as Putin’s corrupt government and intelligence services give cover and protection to the world’s largest transnational organized crimes, cybercriminals, schemes, and frauds that cost the West’s consumers millions of dollars. Earlier this year, the Justice Department broke up one cybercrime ring based in Russia whose literal motto was “In fraud we trust.” The Justice Department <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/thirty-six-defendants-indicted-alleged-roles-transnational-criminal-organization-responsible" data-omni-click="r'article',r'',d,r'intext',r'7',r'None'">charged</a> 36 individuals, many of whom live in Russia beyond the law’s reach, and outlined a scheme by which they stole more than a half-billion dollars. It’s hardly the only example from this year; last week, the FBI announced that it had dismantled two other cybercrime rings and charged eight people—seven of them Russian—with running a multimillion-dollar ad-fraud scheme. (Three of those charged were able to be caught overseas in friendly countries that respect the rule of law: Malaysia, Bulgaria, and Estonia.)</p>
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<p>Ferreting out cybercriminal and intelligence operations and making them public are two prongs of a three-part strategy to change behavior. In recent years, we’ve gotten really good at the first two parts. In fact, while for years these cases were hidden away inside the government, we now release them routinely. This fall, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-rollout-updated-united-states-attorneys-manual" data-omni-click="r'article',r'',d,r'intext',r'8',r'None'">announced</a> that the Justice Department was changing its approach to election-meddling cases, with the default now to make such cases public as quickly as possible. The change coincided with the criminal complaint against Khusyaynova, detailing that the attacks on our elections are a problem of right now, not just a theoretical issue.</p>
<p id="injected-recirculation-link-1" class="c-recirculation-link" data-id="injected-recirculation-link"><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/01/putins-game/546548/" data-omni-click="r'article',r'',d,r'intext',r'9',r'None'">Read: What Putin really wants</a></p>
<p>As Rosenstein <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/summary-justice-department-policy-disclosure-foreign-influence-operations" data-omni-click="r'article',r'',d,r'intext',r'10',r'None'">said</a> earlier this year, “Exposing schemes to the public is an important way to neutralize them.” Making public such charges helps us be more resilient and more savvy consumers of online content—Russia’s attacks in 2016 succeeded in part because we weren’t expecting them and because people weren’t skeptical enough about consuming information online. Today, of course, we understand all too well that photos, images, and posts online could be the work of foreign trolls and bots.</p>
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<p>While defaulting to public action is a good first step, it is not sufficient. The elusive third part of the strategy is what is most needed: making Russia pay a cost that deters the activity. The United States should move toward automatic retaliatory action, ensuring that in today’s fast-moving information environment a response doesn’t get bogged down in partisan politics or bureaucracy.</p>
<p>It was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/russian-hacking-usa-cyber-command.html" data-omni-click="r'article',r'',d,r'intext',r'11',r'None'">reported</a> just before the November elections that U.S. Cyber Command was privately notifying Russian hackers that it’s on to them—warning them that the United States is watching and that if their actions continue, they’re likely to face personal retaliation, such as U.S. criminal charges or sanctions. While sanctions and criminal charges on operatives make it nearly impossible for targets to travel overseas and participate in global banking or commerce, and limit prospects, we can do more.</p>
<p id="injected-recirculation-link-2" class="c-recirculation-link" data-id="injected-recirculation-link"><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/russia-hacking-trump-mueller/565157/" data-omni-click="r'article',r'',d,r'intext',r'12',r'None'">Read: The coincidence at the heart of the Russian hacking scandal</a></p>
<p>We should consider building more “dead man’s switches” into our counter-foreign-influence work—such as automatic triggers that, when foreign efforts are detected and charged, would put in place new sanctions authority and even boost our own government’s spending on democracy-building efforts that counter Russia’s influence campaigns. Russia might think twice about the value of investing the approximately $30 million allegedly spent on Project Lahkta if doing so would presumptively trigger tough new sanctions as well as a fivefold or tenfold American investment in democracy-building NGOs or institutions such as Voice of America and Radio Free Europe that beam free and independent news in the Russian language.</p>
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<p>Too often, the responses to these incidents get caught up in political debates and bureaucratic stalemates. The dead man’s switch would cut through the inertia by setting up our response in advance—putting Putin on notice that if our intelligence community concludes that a country has targeted our elections, either through online influence operations or direct attacks on the voting systems, that assessment would trigger automatic sanctions against the head of state personally as well as against senior government, intelligence, or foreign-business figures. One credible way to make Putin reassess the cost-benefit analysis of attacking our democracy would be to announce in advance that we’d target his personal wealth for sanctions or that his most powerful oligarch allies would have a harder time vacationing on their super-yachts in the Mediterranean.</p>
<p>After all, the greatest leverage we have is that as much as Putin seeks to undermine the West, his oligarchs, business associates, and even his country’s economy all rely on the West to live their life. If the world responds in concert, we can raise the costs and make it safer for everyone.</p>
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<address id="article-writer-0" class="c-article-writer lazyloaded" data-author-id="18045" data-include="css:https://cdn.theatlantic.com/assets/static/b/frontend/dist/theatlantic/css/components/article-writer.38f8b806e515.css" data-currentinclude="">
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<div class="c-article-writer__bio"><a class="author-link" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/author/john-p-carlin/" data-omni-click="inherit">JOHN P. CARLIN</a> is the author of <em>Dawn of the Code War: America&#8217;s Battle Against Russia, China, and the Rising Global Cyber Threat</em>. He served as the assistant attorney general for national security at the Department of Justice and currently chairs the Aspen Institute’s Cyber &amp; Technology Program.</p>
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<p>Source: <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/how-trump-can-stand-russian-cybercrime/578185" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/how-trump-can-stand-russian-cybercrime/578185</a>/</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/the-global-cybercrime-problem-is-actually-the-russia-problem/">The ‘Global Cybercrime Problem’ Is Actually the ‘Russia Problem’</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org">Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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