<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>US-China war - Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association</title>
	<atom:link href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/tag/us-china-war/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org</link>
	<description>Let No Man Take Your Crown</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Jun 2021 06:11:49 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	

 
	<item>
		<title>The little-known agreement that could lead the U.S. and China to war</title>
		<link>https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/the-little-known-agreement-that-could-lead-the-u-s-and-china-to-war/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-little-known-agreement-that-could-lead-the-u-s-and-china-to-war</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gregory Winger]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Jun 2021 06:06:57 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Far East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Carlos Romulo (Philippines)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cyrus Vance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald H. Rumsfeld]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ferdinand Marcos]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gerald Ford]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Henry Kissinger]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Base Agreement (MBA)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South China Sea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States (US)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-China relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-China war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-Philippines alliance]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/?p=39944</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The definitions in an agreement with the Philippines have long been forgotten but could have huge ramifications. Filipinos march June 12 outside the Chinese Embassy in Makati, Metro Manila, as they mark Independence Day with a protest on continued Chinese &#8230; <a class="kt-excerpt-readmore" href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/the-little-known-agreement-that-could-lead-the-u-s-and-china-to-war/" aria-label="The little-known agreement that could lead the U.S. and China to war">Read More</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/the-little-known-agreement-that-could-lead-the-u-s-and-china-to-war/">The little-known agreement that could lead the U.S. and China to war</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org">Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="font--subhead font-light gray-dark mb-sm null" data-qa="subheadline">The definitions in an agreement with the Philippines have long been forgotten but could have huge ramifications.</p>
<div class="w-100 mw-100 h-auto"><img class="w-100 mw-100 h-auto" sizes="(max-width: 440px) 440px,(max-width: 600px) 691px,(max-width: 768px) 691px,(min-width: 769px) and (max-width: 1023px) 960px,(min-width: 1024px) and (max-width: 1299px) 530px,(min-width: 1300px) and (max-width: 1439px) 691px,(min-width: 1440px) 916px,440px" srcset="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-apps/imrs.php?src=https://arc-anglerfish-washpost-prod-washpost.s3.amazonaws.com/public/PKCDRVWLKII6XBYIMSMR6KWPFA.jpg&amp;w=440 400w,https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-apps/imrs.php?src=https://arc-anglerfish-washpost-prod-washpost.s3.amazonaws.com/public/PKCDRVWLKII6XBYIMSMR6KWPFA.jpg&amp;w=540 540w,https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-apps/imrs.php?src=https://arc-anglerfish-washpost-prod-washpost.s3.amazonaws.com/public/PKCDRVWLKII6XBYIMSMR6KWPFA.jpg&amp;w=691 691w,https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-apps/imrs.php?src=https://arc-anglerfish-washpost-prod-washpost.s3.amazonaws.com/public/PKCDRVWLKII6XBYIMSMR6KWPFA.jpg&amp;w=767 767w,https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-apps/imrs.php?src=https://arc-anglerfish-washpost-prod-washpost.s3.amazonaws.com/public/PKCDRVWLKII6XBYIMSMR6KWPFA.jpg&amp;w=916 916w" alt="Image without a caption" width="600" height="400" /></div>
<p class="font--subhead font-light gray-dark mb-sm null" data-qa="subheadline">Filipinos march June 12 outside the Chinese Embassy in Makati, Metro Manila, as they mark Independence Day with a protest on continued Chinese intrusions in Philippine waters. (Ezra Acayan/Getty Images)</p>
<hr />
<div class="teaser-content">
<section>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">With NATO labeling China a “systemic” threat to the international order and the Pentagon debating the creation of a permanent naval task force in the Pacific, the prospect of war with China has never felt more concrete. Yet if Washington and Beijing ultimately go to war, it might have less to do with today’s great power competition than with how Donald H. Rumsfeld and Cyrus Vance dealt with the American relationship with the Philippines in the wake of the Vietnam War.</p>
</div>
</div>
</section>
</div>
<div class="remainder-content">
<section>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">Concerned by American inaction and unwillingness to provide emergency military assistance as Saigon fell in 1975, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos undertook a review of his county’s alliance with its former colonial ruler and the continued American military presence in the Philippines. He demanded formal statements clarifying U.S. obligations under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), including how the treaty applied in the pivotal South China Sea. The resulting formulation has underpinned U.S. policy for more than 40 years and leaves the United States committed to a position that could bring it into conflict with China over this crucial waterway.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">The South China Sea emerged as a geopolitical flashpoint in the 1970s <a href="https://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/e-journal/articles/muscolino.pdf">amid a surge</a> in offshore oil exploration by nearby countries including the Philippines. Yet the dispute was also intrinsically shaped by the waning days of the Vietnam War. As South Vietnam floundered, both North Vietnam and the People’s Republic of China jockeyed <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/lessons-from-the-battle-of-the-paracel-islands/">for maritime features</a> to bolster their territorial claims in the disputed sea.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">This scramble had a spillover effect on the U.S.-Philippines alliance. The fall of Saigon had triggered an <a href="https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=10102&amp;dt=2476&amp;dl=1345">existential crisis</a> in Manila. Since gaining independence in 1946, the Philippines had continued to depend upon the United States as the guarantor of its national security.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">Yet Washington’s handling of the Indochina conflict brought the reliability of this arrangement into question. U.S. diplomats in Manila related widespread <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d334">dismay over the “abandonment of Cambodia and Viet-Nam”</a> and calls for the Philippines to end its reliance on Washington. Marcos demanded a <a href="https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=221854&amp;dt=2476&amp;dl=1345">renegotiation of the Military Base Agreement </a>(MBA) governing the U.S. military installations in the Philippines and a clarification of the MDT. The potential loss of or restriction upon the U.S. bases was particularly distressing for Washington. They were among the largest American military bases in the world and remained vital to defending U.S. interests in Asia.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">The South China Sea increasingly became central to these negotiations. North Vietnam’s April 1975 takeover of Southwest Cay in the Spratly Islands spurred Marcos to have a pointed discussion with U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan <a href="https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=19376&amp;dt=2476&amp;dl=1345">over whether and how the MDT applied to these islands</a>.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">This conversation led to a <a href="https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=172445&amp;dt=2476&amp;dl=1345">State Department review</a>, which determined that the MDT would not, in fact, cover an attack by a foreign aggressor on Philippine forces stationed in the Spratly Islands. Yet American diplomats tried to finesse the issue, with Sullivan warning that if this judgment “were ever to come to [the] attention of Filipinos,” it “would confirm their worst fears and suspicions concerning [the] value of U.S. treaty commitments.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">Marcos, however, rejected vague answers. During a visit by Deputy Secretary of State Charles Robinson in August 1976, <a href="https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=51086&amp;dt=2082&amp;dl=1345">he pressed Robinson</a> for a firm statement that the U.S. was committed to protecting those engaged in Philippine oil exploration near Reed Bank, a maritime feature near the Spratly Islands. Dissatisfied by Robinson’s answers, Marcos <a href="https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=51146&amp;dt=2082&amp;dl=1345">formally requested</a> an explicit statement on American MDT obligations in this area.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">Marcos made clear that an unsatisfactory answer would have an impact on the military base negotiations — his ultimate trump card.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">With ambiguity and evasions having failed, Washington needed to craft an answer that would meet Philippine expectations without prematurely committing the United States to a future conflict in the South China Sea. Although Washington regarded Philippine concerns as genuine, it also feared provocative actions by Manila that might embroil the United States in a conflict that it neither sought nor supported at a time when the American public wanted little to do with another conflict in Southeast Asia.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">Rumsfeld, then the defense secretary, came up with a solution. As he explained to President Gerald Ford, the key was tying the U.S. commitment to defend the Philippines to “what the Philippines are doing rather than where in the disputed area they may be doing it.” The United States could promise to protect the Philippines’ “armed forces, public vessels and aircraft” in the South China Sea as long as they weren’t behaving provocatively. This gave the United States some flexibility, while also reassuring Marcos that the United States wouldn’t renege on its commitment because of location.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was supposed to present this revised formula to the Philippine secretary of foreign affairs, Carlos Romulo, on Oct. 6, 1976. Instead, Kissinger swerved. He bluntly explained that the United States was fully prepared to defend “the metropolitan area of the Philippines.” But if Marcos’s government wanted “the Reed Bank and the Spratlys included,” then the United States would “insert a waffling clause” — which would create new problems and blurriness.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">Romulo chose the first option, asserting that the Philippines wanted to exclude “controversial areas,” and only cover the metropolitan territory of the Philippines.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">The result was an official <a href="https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=276614&amp;dt=2082&amp;dl=1345">document</a> reaffirming American obligations to respond to an attack on the Philippines and stating that the United States was “pleased to receive the assurances of the Philippine government that it has no intention of involving the United States in the resolution of disputed territorial claims.” This language avoided potential U.S. involvement in a war over control of the South China Sea. This note seemingly diffused Philippine concerns that the United States would abandon its commitments, but negotiations over the Military Base Agreement collapsed following Ford’s 1976 election loss.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">The new Carter administration resumed talks, and the sides <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v22/d324">reached an agreement</a> in late 1978. However, days before the amended MBA was to be signed, Marcos revived the defense treaty issue, insisting that the Kissinger note from 1976 was now insufficient.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">In response, Vance, now secretary of state, sent Romulo <a href="https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=125719&amp;dt=2776&amp;dl=2169">a diplomatic note</a> outlining America’s interpretation of the MDT. The note bluntly stated that an attack on Philippine forces or public vessels “would not have to occur within the metropolitan territory of the Philippines or island territories” for the treaty to be invoked.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">Vance’s letter reflected the Rumsfeld formulation and established that while the United States did not take a stand on who owns the South China Sea, Philippine forces there were nevertheless protected <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/63168/u-s-philippine-relationship-south-china-sea-uncertain-future-mutual-defense-treaty/">by the MDT</a>. Successive American administrations <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pompeo-promises-intervention-if-philippines-is-attacked-in-south-china-sea-amid-rising-chinese-militarization/2019/02/28/5288768a-3b53-11e9-b10b-f05a22e75865_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_29">reaffirmed</a> this framework and it remains <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/antony-blinken-us-will-defend-philippines-attacks-south-china-sea-1565031">U.S. policy today</a>.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">Moreover, this understanding of the MDT has shaped events in the South China Sea. Notably, in 1999 the Philippines intentionally <a href="https://news.usni.org/2015/07/20/analysis-growing-the-philippines-south-china-sea-outpost">grounded a naval vessel, the BRP Sierra Madre</a>, on Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands to prevent China from seizing the shoals. The Sierra Madre’s<i> </i><a href="https://news.abs-cbn.com/specials/sierra-madre">rusting hulk</a> may not dissuade <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/learning-from-the-battle-of-the-spratly-islands/">aggression</a> from China, but the knowledge that any attempt to forcibly dislodge the Philippine vessel could risk conflict with the United States has proved a potent deterrent. Kissinger probably would have approved of the ploy. As he told Romulo in 1976, “if you seize the territory, it’s always easier to handle.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div data-qa="drop-cap-letter">
<p class="font--body font-copy gray-darkest ma-0 pb-md " data-el="text">The Philippines has not seized more territory, but rather sought to resolve the dispute through <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/philippines-files-new-diplomatic-protests-over-chinese-boats-disputed-waters-2021-04-14/">diplomatic</a> and <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/tribunal-issues-landmark-ruling-south-china-sea-arbitration">legal means</a>. Yet rising <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/03/world/asia/swarms-ships-south-china-sea.html">Chinese assertiveness</a> and <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/philippines-protests-blocking-patrol-ships-china-77457836">harassment of Philippine vessels</a> has kept the South China Sea simmering. Today, with the Philippines <a href="https://amti.csis.org/philippine-south-china-sea-patrols-are-way-up/">increasing its maritime activities</a> in response, the Rumsfeld-Vance framework ensures that the United States cannot remain aloof. Ultimately, if tensions in the South China Sea erupt into violence, the formula adopted in the 1970s means Washington will either have to abandon a longtime ally or embrace a conflict with China that it otherwise may have wished to avoid.</p>
</div>
</div>
</section>
</div>
<hr />
<p data-qa="subheadline">Gregory Winger is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati. He is also a fellow with the National Asia Research Program and a participant in the Pacific Forum’s U.S.-Philippines’ Next Generation Leaders Initiative.</p>
<hr />
<p data-qa="subheadline">Source: <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/06/23/little-known-agreement-that-could-lead-us-china-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/06/23/little-known-agreement-that-could-lead-us-china-war/</a></p>
[<a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/news/disclaimer/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Disclaimer</a>]<p>The post <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/the-little-known-agreement-that-could-lead-the-u-s-and-china-to-war/">The little-known agreement that could lead the U.S. and China to war</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org">Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>How the US military is preparing for a war with China</title>
		<link>https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/how-the-us-military-is-preparing-for-a-war-with-china/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=how-the-us-military-is-preparing-for-a-war-with-china</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[James Stavridis]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Mar 2021 07:27:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Far East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Space Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese People’s Liberation Army]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[East China Sea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Security Council]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South China Sea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. Cyber Command]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States (US)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Air Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-China relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-China war]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/?p=38825</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Juicy targets include artificial islands in the South China Sea. U.S. Marines participate in an amphibious assault exercise in Chonburi, Thailand, in February 2020: the Marines will be sea-based and able to sail into the waters of the South China &#8230; <a class="kt-excerpt-readmore" href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/how-the-us-military-is-preparing-for-a-war-with-china/" aria-label="How the US military is preparing for a war with China">Read More</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/how-the-us-military-is-preparing-for-a-war-with-china/">How the US military is preparing for a war with China</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org">Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Juicy targets include artificial islands in the South China Sea.</p>
<p><img decoding="async" src="https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/https%253A%252F%252Fs3-ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com%252Fpsh-ex-ftnikkei-3937bb4%252Fimages%252F1%252F1%252F6%252F2%252F32832611-3-eng-GB%252FCropped-1614939715A20210305%2520US%2520Marine%2520Cobra%2520Gold%2520small.jpg?width=700&amp;fit=cover&amp;gravity=faces&amp;dpr=2&amp;quality=medium&amp;source=nar-cms" /><br />
U.S. Marines participate in an amphibious assault exercise in Chonburi, Thailand, in February 2020: the Marines will be sea-based and able to sail into the waters of the South China Sea.   © <span class="ezstring-field">Sipa/AP</span></p>
<hr />
<p><em>Admiral James Stavridis was 16th Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and 12th Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He spent the bulk of his operational career in the Pacific, and is author of &#8220;2034: A Novel of the Next World War.&#8221;</em></p>
<p>The Atlantic Council&#8217;s publication of <em>The Longer Telegram</em>, which lays out a sweeping blueprint for a U.S. strategy to face China, provides significant clues about a new lay-down of American forces around east Asia.</p>
<p>Whether the new Biden administration fully embraces the paper&#8217;s aggressive stance remains to be seen, but elements are under serious consideration. Certainly, the new team at the National Security Council, led by highly respected Asia hand Kurt Campbell and a deep bench of Asia experts, will be looking at a wide variety of options for the military component of a new overall strategic posture.</p>
<p>One of the key elements in the military component is a series of &#8220;red lines&#8221; to which the U.S. would respond militarily.</p>
<p>These include &#8220;any nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons action by China against the U.S. or its allies or by North Korea; any Chinese military attack against Taiwan or its offshore islands, including an economic blockade or major cyberattack against Taiwanese public infrastructure and institutions; any Chinese attack against Japanese forces in their defense of Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, which China claims as the Diaoyu, and their surrounding exclusive economic zone in the East China Sea; any major Chinese hostile action in the South China Sea to further reclaim and militarize islands, to deploy force against other claimant states, or to prevent full freedom of navigation operations by the U.S. and allied maritime forces; and any Chinese attack against the sovereign territory or military assets of U.S. treaty allies.&#8221;</p>
<p>At U.S. Indo-Pacific headquarters, strategic, operational, and tactical teams are putting together new approaches for deploying American forces. These new options will be sent back to the Pentagon as part of the overall &#8220;posture review&#8221; being undertaken by new Secretary of Defense General Lloyd Austin. What will emerge?</p>
<p>One option is an enhanced role for the U.S. Marine Corps, which traces so much of its pre-9/11 operational history to the Pacific going back to World War II. Under the dynamic intellectual leadership of Marine Corps Commandant Dave Berger, gone are the large troop formations, armored capability, and land-based Marine tactics of the &#8220;forever wars&#8221; in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Instead, in the context of a U.S.-China strategy, the Marines will be resolutely sea-based and able to sail into the waters of the South China Sea, well inside the island chains China relies on for defense. Once inside, they will use armed drones, offensive cyber capabilities, Marine Raiders &#8212; highly capable special forces &#8212; anti-air missiles, and even ship-killer strike weapons to attack Chinese maritime forces, and perhaps even their land bases of operations. The Chinese militarized artificial islands in the South China Sea would be juicy targets, for example. In essence, this will be guerrilla warfare from the sea.</p>
<p><img decoding="async" src="https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/https%253A%252F%252Fs3-ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com%252Fpsh-ex-ftnikkei-3937bb4%252Fimages%252F_aliases%252Farticleimage%252F3%252F1%252F7%252F2%252F32832713-4-eng-GB%252FCropped-1614940372A20210305%2520China%2520airstrip%2520Subi%2520Reef.jpg?source=nar-cms" /><br />
An airstrip and buildings on China&#8217;s man-made Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, pictured in April 2017: juicy targets.   © <span class="ezstring-field">AP</span></p>
<hr />
<p>In addition to a new Marine tactical and operational approach, the U.S. Navy will be undertaking more aggressive patrols throughout the waters off China. Some will say this is merely the military equivalent of &#8220;driving doughnut holes in your neighbor&#8217;s lawn.&#8221; But the strategic concept is clever: to gradually include other allied warships in this aggressive freedom of navigation patrols. Doing so internationalizes the pushback on Chinese claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea.</p>
<p>In particular, the Pentagon is hoping to include British, French, and other NATO allies in the effort. Indeed the recent NATO defense ministerial in Brussels involved consultations over the alliance&#8217;s role in facing the rising military capability of China. Over time, the U.S. would like to convince Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam to participate in such deployments. The U.S. overall maritime strategic posture is predicated on creating a global maritime coalition to face the Chinese People&#8217;s Liberation Army&#8217;s highly capable forces.</p>
<p>In addition to the sea service&#8217;s activities, the U.S. Air Force will likely be shifting additional long-range land-attack bombers and fighters to Pacific bases that are widely distributed across Asia, including some very remote sites on smaller islands. These so-called spokes will be supported from larger bases in Guam, Japan, Australia, and South Korea. The concept, dubbed Agile Combat Employment, adds a high degree of mobility to the currently concentrated combat power of both fighter and attack aircraft deployed in the region.</p>
<p>Finally, the U.S. Army will increase both combat power and mobility to deploy units forward in support of the red lines along those advocated in the telegram, including enhanced capability based in South Korea and Japan but easily capable of deploying to smaller islands throughout the region.</p>
<p>Both the Army and Air Force would be on the forward edge of additional training and exercises with the Taiwanese as well. Look for increased emphasis from the new American Space Force to focus intelligence and reconnaissance on the theater, as well as enhanced offensive cyber options from the U.S. Cyber Command, in coordination with the National Security Agency.</p>
<p>Taken together, it seems clear that the U.S. military is stepping up its presence and combat capability in the Western Pacific, and positioning for a conflict with China over the coming decades.</p>
<p><em>The Longer Telegram</em> provides an important clue as to what options the Pentagon and the White House are considering as part of an expected new strategy to face the rise of China. Hopefully, skillful diplomacy and the intertwined economies of the two great powers will preclude the outbreak of war &#8212; but U.S. military planners are busy these days.</p>
<hr />
<p>Source: <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/How-the-US-military-is-preparing-for-a-war-with-China" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/How-the-US-military-is-preparing-for-a-war-with-China</a></p>
[<a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/news/disclaimer/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Disclaimer</a>]<p>The post <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/how-the-us-military-is-preparing-for-a-war-with-china/">How the US military is preparing for a war with China</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org">Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>An attack on North Korea could start a US-China war &#8212; Don&#8217;t do it</title>
		<link>https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/attack-north-korea-start-us-china-war-dont/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=attack-north-korea-start-us-china-war-dont</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Douglas Macgregor - Fox News]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 04 Mar 2018 13:27:39 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Far East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Northern Theater Command]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Japan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kim Jong-un]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Moon Jae-in (South Korea)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Korean-U.S. Combined Forces Command]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-China war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping (China)]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/?p=4319</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Following the Winter Olympics, South Korean President Moon Jae-in indicated he was ready to talk to North Korea and engage in diplomacy. And while Vice President Mike Pence – who earlier announced severe sanctions on the North –first signaled a willingness to &#8230; <a class="kt-excerpt-readmore" href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/attack-north-korea-start-us-china-war-dont/" aria-label="An attack on North Korea could start a US-China war &#8212; Don&#8217;t do it">Read More</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/attack-north-korea-start-us-china-war-dont/">An attack on North Korea could start a US-China war — Don’t do it</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org">Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="speakable">Following the Winter Olympics, South Korean President Moon Jae-in <a href="https://apnews.com/e8a92d023ac6477bb5ca402d4ff588d1/Moon-won't-discuss-possible-summit-with-North-Korea's-Kim" target="_blank" rel="noopener">indicated</a> he was ready to talk to North Korea and engage in diplomacy. And while Vice President Mike Pence – who earlier announced severe sanctions on the North –first signaled a willingness to talk, he quickly seemed to change course.</p>
<p class="speakable">President Trump further indicated that he is considering a preventive military strike on the North if the sanctions failed to denuclearize the communist nation. But such a so-called “bloody nose” strike against North Korean missile sites and nuclear facilities stands an excellent chance of becoming a bloody disaster.</p>
<p>China won&#8217;t tolerate an unprovoked attack on North Korea, and President Moon will <a href="http://www.atimes.com/article/north-korean-premier-visit-south-winter-olympics/?utm_source=The+Daily+Report&amp;utm_campaign=43d9a88e1e-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_05&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_1f8bca137f-43d9a88e1e-31544025" target="_blank" rel="noopener">not support the use of South Korean forces</a> as part of a U.S. military strike against North Korea.</p>
<p>South Koreans loathe the regime of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. But very few think that initiating a war on the Korean Peninsula will hasten reunification, let alone lead to lasting peace. In fact, <a href="https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/blog/running-numbers/south-korean-public-opinion-following-north-koreas-third-nuclear-test" target="_blank" rel="noopener">59 percent of South Koreans</a> oppose a pre-emptive strike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities.</p>
<p>Consequently, if President Trump authorizes military action against North Korea, the most probable outcome will be <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/bloody-nose-strike-on-north-korea-will-trigger-all-out-war-warn-analysts" target="_blank" rel="noopener">war with China</a> and the immediate expulsion of U.S. military forces from South Korea. President Moon will have no other choice if he is to avoid conflict with China.</p>
<p>And, contrary to expectations in Washington, Japan will decline to participate in Washington’s “bloody nose” extravaganza in any meaningful way. Tokyo will privately welcome a conflict that removes North Korea from the map, but will not put the Japanese home islands at risk to help Washington in its war with China.</p>
<p>The net result will be embarrassment on a global scale for Washington and the American people. The Trump presidency could well be destroyed.</p>
<p>On the other hand, it’s useful to point out that President Xi Jinping of China has actually cooperated with Washington to push North Korea to the brink of <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1087933.shtml" target="_blank" rel="noopener">economic implosion</a>. Xi has told Kim Jong Un that if he attacks his neighbors or the U.S., Beijing will not assist North Korea in any way.</p>
<p>The importance of Xi’s stance to U.S. military planners cannot be overstated. Military planning is always based on a mix of known capabilities relating to friendly and opposing weapon systems, as well as unknowable aspects of a potential opponent’s behavior. Predictably, in American military planning untested assumptions are often frequently shaped by wishful thinking.</p>
<p>Fortunately for the U.S., President Xi has taken precautions to disabuse Washington of any wishful thinking. If America initiates hostilities against North Korea, China will not sit on the sidelines.</p>
<p>According to South Korean sources, if we attack North Korea the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Northern Theater Command is preparing the <a href="http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/02/05/2018020501359.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Chinese 78th Army Group </a>for intervention on the ground to cope with the potential collapse of the North Korean state.</p>
<p>The Northern Theater Command in Manchuria also includes the 79th Army Group. Together, the two Chinese Army Groups positioned in Manchuria field 855 tanks, 819 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 200 self-propelled guns, rocket artillery, missile defense units, support troops and several hundred attack aircraft – <a href="http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/02/05/2018020501359.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a force of roughly 300,000</a>.</p>
<p>None of these points suggest that America’s nuclear arsenal could not quickly and thoroughly erase the North Korean state from the map. While that’s something that Washington can accomplish, a high-end conventional conflict with China on the Korean Peninsula is a contingency for which the U.S. armed forces are not prepared.</p>
<p>Any use of nuclear weapons to compensate for U.S. conventional military weakness – regardless of yield – would likely trigger a nuclear exchange with China that no sane person wants.</p>
<p>It is time to reconsider the wisdom of military action against North Korea. In their first meeting, President Moon asked President Trump to accelerate the transfer of wartime command of all Korean and U.S. armed forces on the Korean Peninsula to a Korean Army four-star general. President Trump was perplexed.</p>
<p>President Trump’s advisers had not prepared him for the question. For decades, a U.S. Army four-star general has exercised absolute authority over the South Korean-U.S. <a href="http://www.usfk.mil/About/Combined-Forces-Command/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Combined Forces Command</a>, the warfighting headquarters responsible for the defense and, if necessary, the defeat of external aggression against South Korea.</p>
<p>President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/world/asia/south-korea-election-president-moon-jae-in.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Moon</a> is the latest South Korean leader to conclude that without unambiguous South Korean national command authority over the armed forces on its soil, South Korea is not really a sovereign nation. He has a point.</p>
<p>The truth is that Washington is not equipped to “solve the problem” on the Korean Peninsula, largely because the problem is not ours to solve. South Korea is a brilliant success story. Now the United States mission on the Korean Peninsula is complete.</p>
<p>Seoul, not Washington, must now work with Beijing and Tokyo to solve the problem. For Washington, Step One is to signal American support for President Moon’s initiative of an <a href="http://www.atimes.com/article/north-korean-premier-visit-south-winter-olympics/?utm_source=The+Daily+Report&amp;utm_campaign=43d9a88e1e-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_05&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_1f8bca137f-43d9a88e1e-31544025" target="_blank" rel="noopener">inter-Korean dialogue</a>.</p>
<p>Step Two is to turn over command of the Combined Forces Command to a South Korean four-star general as soon as possible. Make it clear that the destiny of the South Korean people rests in their own hands.</p>
<div class="author-bio">
<p>Retired Army Col. Douglas Macgregor is a decorated combat veteran, a Ph.D. and the author of five books; his most recent is <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Margin-Victory-Battles-Changed-Modern/dp/1612519962" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Margin of Victory</a> (Naval Institute Press, 2016).</p>
<hr />
<p>Source: <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/03/04/attack-on-north-korea-could-start-us-china-war-dont-do-it.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/03/04/attack-on-north-korea-could-start-us-china-war-dont-do-it.html</a></p>
[<a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/news/disclaimer/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Disclaimer</a>]
</div><p>The post <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org/attack-north-korea-start-us-china-war-dont/">An attack on North Korea could start a US-China war — Don’t do it</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.garnertedarmstrong.org">Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
