Angela Merkel was assured of a place in the history books as soon as she became Germany’s first female chancellor on Nov. 22, 2005.

Over the next 16 years, she was credited with raising Germany’s profile and influence, working to hold a fractious European Union together, managing a string of crises and being a role model for women.

Now that near-record tenure is ending with her leaving office at age 67 to praise from abroad and enduring popularity at home. Her designated successor, Olaf Scholz, is expected to take office Wednesday.

Merkel, a former scientist who grew up in communist East Germany, is bowing out about a week short of the record for longevity held by her one-time mentor, Helmut Kohl, who reunited Germany during his 1982-1998 tenure.

While Merkel perhaps lacks a spectacular signature achievement, the center-right Christian Democrat came to be viewed as an indispensable crisis manager and defender of Western values in turbulent times.

She served alongside four U.S. presidents, four French presidents, five British prime ministers and eight Italian premiers. Her chancellorship was marked by four major challenges: the global financial crisis, Europe’s debt crisis, the 2015-16 influx of refugees to Europe and the coronavirus pandemic.

The incoming governing coalition under Scholz says it wants to “venture more progress” for Germany after years of stagnation.

But Germans’ overall verdict appears to remain favorable. During the election campaign, from which she largely was absent, Merkel’s popularity ratings outstripped those of her three would-be successors.

Unlike her seven predecessors in postwar Germany, she is leaving office at a time of her choosing.

Additional reporting by The Associated Press.

Source: https://www.newsy.com/stories/german-chancellor-angela-merkel-leaves-office-after-16-years/

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• Angela Merkel has had a profound influence on German politics and could get away with radical changes because she tightly controlled her own party
• However, Merkel’s inability to explain her actions during the 2015 refugee crisis helped fuel the Alternative for Germany party — a radical-right populist party whose only policy plank is hostility to immigrants and minorities.
• Merkel had one last chance to leave behind a coherent union— but with her allies demanding “less Europe,” it is clear that she has failed.

The British politician Enoch Powell famously observed that “all political lives, unless they are cut off in midstream at a happy juncture, end in failure.” German Chancellor Angela Merkel appears to defy this rule.

The present is hardly a happy juncture for her, yet her October 29 announcement that she will step down as leader of her party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), has been lauded by observers as both dignified and elegant.

Whether she can continue as chancellor until 2021, as she has said she would, is de facto not in her hands: Were the Social Democratic Party to leave the ruling coalition before then, prompting elections, she would not run again.

Still, she is perceived as supremely in control, just as she has always seemed in control since heading her first government in 2005 — with the fateful exception of the fall of 2015, when many citizens felt that the German state was no longer in charge of its own borders, as hundreds of thousands of refugees streamed into the country.

‘You know me’

Conventional wisdom has it that her decision to let in refugees might mar her legacy; in reality, historians might well celebrate her for this moment of courage and compassion.

Sebastian Widmann/Getty Images

It is the long-term effects of her reign on German politics and her evident inability to create a lasting architecture for European integration that make a straightforwardly positive assessment of her tenure more doubtful.

Merkel has had an even more profound influence on German politics than the oft-discussed fragmentation of the party system suggests.

As the German political scientist Philip Manow has argued, she was less a chancellor with a strong party behind her than a president, or sometimes even something like a civil servant-in-chief, floating above parties in an era when a succession of crises — starting with the financial crisis — made concentration of power in the executive more legitimate.

SEE ALSO: Germany is taking a step to punish Saudi Arabia that Trump has repeatedly said he won’t go near

Contrary to the cliche that strong political leaders must be charismatic, she often appeared passive or even impersonal. She once suggested to German citizens that they should re-elect her because, “You know me.” In actual fact, most Germans will feel precisely the opposite: They see Merkel as an eminently reliable and highly analytical civil servant, but not as a politician who has ever systematically staked out a vision for the country.

She could govern smoothly, because for most of her time in office, public coffers were full. (Whether Germany’s boom is the result of the harsh labor market and welfare state reforms undertaken by her Social Democratic predecessor Gerhard Schröder remains disputed; what cannot be disputed is Manow’s insight that, unlike previous chancellors, she had to contend much less with the checks and balances built into the German political system, because rising tax revenues made compromises easier.)

Merkel’s sharp policy turns, on nuclear energy and the draft, for instance — which actually outright contradicted the “you know me” claim — could only have been pulled off by someone who was seen as more of a civil servant-in-chief, someone who simply chose the most seemingly reasonable course of action, quite beyond partisan commitments.

Something like technocracy

In fact, she raided the policies of her competitors, the Social Democrats in particular, thereby systematically demobilizing the party’s voters. At the same time, the decision to abandon nuclear reactors after the Fukushima Daiichi disaster opened the possibility of coalitions with the Green party — thereby increasing the room for strategic maneuver of the CDU.

Merkel could get away with such radical changes partly because she tightly controlled her own party, sidelining potential competitors in a Machiavellian manner. But the other reason was that she convinced many Germans that there was a reasonable center over which she presided, where partisan differences did not matter all that much.

 Christian Hartmann/Reuters

A less polite way of saying this is that Merkel’s default way of governing was something like technocracy. Especially during the euro crisis, she claimed that there was no alternative to her solutions to policy challenges. All who disagreed effectively revealed themselves as irrational — and bad Europeans, as well as, by implication, bad Germans to boot, because the definition of a good German is being enthusiastic about European integration.

As in other countries, technocracy actually paved the way for populism. It is not an accident that the far-right party that was created in response to Merkel’s leadership is called Alternative for Germany (AfD). Populists can (correctly) claim that democracy without choices makes no sense; there is always an alternative, and it is up to voters whether they prefer it or not.

Migrants weren’t the crisis

In retrospect, the initial reaction of many centrist politicians to the AfD, then still mostly led by respected conservative professors and businesspeople, was probably a mistake: All criticism of measures to rescue the common European currency was condemned in highly moralizing terms, which arguably contributed to the radicalization of the AfD.

 Alexandros Avramidis/Reuters

In 2015, the Euroskeptic party still seemed likely to disappear, as many right-wing challengers to the CDU had done in the past. After all, Merkel took a very tough stance on Greece in the summer of that year and thereby satisfied voters who (wrongly) believed that Berlin was giving money to Athens for free.

Yet, soon after, the decision to take in refugees revived — and further radicalized — the AfD, making it what it is today: a radical-right populist party whose only real policy plank is hostility to immigrants and other minorities (and which, alas, is now represented in all German state assemblies, as well as the federal parliament).

It was Merkel’s inability to explain her conduct in 2015 — and the fact that all parties represented in parliament at the time supported her, alongside many in the media — that probably helped to solidify the image on which all populist parties crucially depend: that of an homogeneous elite that is in all likelihood corrupt, but at the very least not acting in the interests of ordinary people.

To this day, many Germans find it hard to understand whether the temporary opening of the borders was a matter of hard-nosed strategy to prevent a collapse of the European Union or humanitarianism. The answer that there was no alternative proved insufficient then and is insufficient today.

Democracy is not just talk, but politics can also never stay silent. Merkel’s pronounced pragmatism — combined with a discourse so noncommittal that it would drive journalists crazy — has contrasted sharply with, for instance, the sometimes sentimental conceptions of Europe put forward by her Christian Democratic predecessors, most notably Helmut Kohl. And Merkel’s aversion to anything like visionary leadership has certainly made it more difficult now to build a proper structure for the EU in the wake of the euro crisis and what is often misleadingly described as the “migrant crisis” — as French President Emmanuel Macron pointed out, migrants weren’t the crisis; it was a crisis of the European political order.

‘Less Europe’

While many Europeans (not least in Brussels) are allergic to talking about the EU as a state in the making, the obvious fact is that at least parts of the union by now have two of the essential attributes of statehood: a common currency and a common border. The challenge after 2015 would have been to make both function properly.

Clearly, Merkel’s attempts to forge a common European approach to refugees became more difficult as an increasing number of politicians, from Hungary’s Viktor Orban to Austria’s Sebastian Kurz and Italy’s Matteo Salvini, discovered that xenophobia could make their political careers.

Still, Merkel had a last chance to leave behind a coherent union when Macron launched his plans for a renewed EU in 2017 and when she was forced into a coalition with the Social Democrats earlier this year.

Rather than simply muddling through in yet another grand coalition, Merkel and her defeated opponent, Martin Schulz (who had spent most of his political life in the European Parliament), could have provided a real rationale for their cooperation by laying out an ambitious plan to remake the EU — which would have justified the two largest parties working together to maximize backing from German society.

None of this has happened, and it is now unlikely to happen, as Macron is losing momentum and even nominal Merkel allies such as Dutch leader Mark Rutte mechanically demand “less Europe.”

Perhaps one day Germans will blame Merkel for not having used excellent economic conditions to dare to do more. They might also wonder whether the creation of an eminently reasonable, technocratic center was not ultimately detrimental for democracy — and if the fragmentation of the party system, while making political life more complicated, was actually also a way to re-establish a sense of democratic choice.

In any case, they will think of Merkel as embodying a fundamental decency — an especially important contrast with certain other leaders today.

Read the original article on Foreign Policy.

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  Source: https://www.businessinsider.com/angela-merkel-leader-world-failed-2018-11?r=UK&IR=T

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Helmut Kohl was a major historic figure, the Chancellor who united Germany and set the foundations of the European Union as we know it: with the Schengen Area, freedom of movement and joint currency, the euro. However, Kohl had one flaw: he did not choose well his protégés. EURACTIV Croatia reports.

After the unification of Germany, a smart physicist with a doctorate in quantum chemistry caught his eye, the daughter of a pastor, whom he introduced to the closest circle and gave a ministerial position. It was Angela Merkel, whom he called “my girl”. Germans now call her “Mutti” – some out of respect and some ironically.

Merkel has left a mark on German and European politics, but proved fatal for the political career of her mentor – when the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) financing scandal broke out in 2000, she pulled the rug from under Kohl’s feet and took over the CDU.

Soon after introducing Merkel to his circle, Kohl noticed a young man who stirred up the masses in Hungary with his rhetoric. Hungarian-born US billionaire George Soros had already provided him with a scholarship, while Kohl saw him as the mould for future Christian democratic leaders in Eastern Europe

But Viktor Mihály Orbán utterly disappointed him. He refused to adopt the euro, and the majority of EPP MEPs turned their backs on him last week over his authoritarian rule in Hungary. However, Kohl once again made an excellent choice of a person who will define European history, only not in the direction he had hoped.

When Orbán said several months ago that he is the successor of Kohl’s politics, the CDU was appalled – they told him Kohl had connected and strengthened Europe, while Orbán was dividing and weakening it.

He drew his political strength mostly from Hungary, where he was prime minister between 1998 and 2002, but did not fare well. When he returned to power in 2010, he decided not to let go of it without a fight, so regulations were changed and the Constitution amended to bring about an electoral system where he could secure a majority in parliament with relatively low support, granted him control of the media, judiciary and the central bank.

He created a network of people who “owe him” because he provided them with profitable positions or lucrative jobs with the state. Members of his family play key roles in the system, as is the case with every authoritarian system, this is the case in Erdoğan’s Turkey and Putin’s Russia, while Donald Trump would like to see the same in the US.

Orbán is unlikely to become influential on the EU level because Hungary is not that strong.

Salvini and Orbán launch anti-immigration manifesto ahead of EU elections

Hungary’s illiberal Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Italy’s hardline Interior Minister Matteo Salvini launched Tuesday (28 August) an anti-migration manifesto aiming at next year’s European parliament elections, targeting a common enemy.

Profiting from migrant crisis

But he knew how to take advantage of the situation: the refugee crisis in 2015 was just what he needed to stir up Hungarians and become head of the Visegrád Group – four countries that refused to take in migrants and opposed Merkel’s policies – which made him a hero of the growing populist-nationalist movement in the EU.

Aware of the opportunity, he waited for spring this year to win elections in Hungary for the third time and start a new political project: to become the leader, perhaps unofficial, perhaps a “grey eminence”, of a new Europe after the European elections next May, the anti-migrant and illiberal Europe.

This summer, he formulated his plans in three stages, culminating in the seven-minute speech he held in Strasbourg, defending his government from reports that openly warn of a threat of violation of democratic freedoms and rule of law in Orbán’s Hungary.

The first stage was implemented on 16 June, when he spoke at a conference held in honour of Helmut Kohl. “Hungary is aware of its strength, influence and mission. For us, Hungary comes first.” If it sounds familiar, it’s because Trump repeated it so many times.

He then started interpreting the vision of Hungary in Europe. “Hungary’s ambition is to live in a strong Central Europe comprised of countries that cooperate tightly.” He listed Poland as an ally and added that another objective is to entice Western Balkan countries to join the EU, “especially Serbia.” Orbán had been very helpful in Croatia’s EU accession in 2013.

Then he defined modern Hungary: “We are the commanders of a border fortress and we know our duty.” The migrant crisis of 2015 is no longer there, realistically, but the fence on the border with Serbia still is.

The ‘commander of the fortress’ noted: “Can there be a compromise on the migrant debate? No, and there is no need for it.” But, it is clear that people protected by the “fortress” have to pay for it – drawing on EU funds cannot be made dependent on adherence to European values.

The speech climaxed with the sentence “When it comes to EP elections in 2019, it would be very easy, for instance, to create a new group of parties from Central Europe or a pan-European anti-migrant group.” Orbán’s Fidesz is still part of the EPP, where it encounters criticism, but it is clear to all that his 11 MEPs (Austrian ÖVP has five) will be important.

EPP unsure about retaining or expelling Orbán’s party

The European Parliament’s vote to censure Hungary presents the assembly’s dominant centre-right bloc with a dilemma over whether to retain its populist Hungarian allies or expel them months before elections.

Finding new allies

In the meantime, Matteo Salvini took power in Italy in spring. The head of the xenophobic Lega, he is promoting anti-migrant policies and is looking at a large number of MEPs, comparable to the number of MEPs the new head of Democratic Party, Matteo Renzi, brought to socialists in 2014.

With that in mind, Orbán had ideas for the entire EPP: “We have to tackle the difficult task of renewing the EPP and helping it return to Christian democratic roots.”

He addressed the issue on 28 July in Băile Tuşnad, Romania, the location of a summer student camp where he likes to express his political views. That is where he expanded on his idea of a strong Central Europe: “Besides economic strength, Central Europe is a region that has a specific culture. It is different from Western Europe.”

That may mean that Central Europe could go it alone, if the West does not accept these specific characteristics, under Orbán’s leadership. Polish ruling party Law and Justice (PiS) head Jarosław Kaczyński does not have political ambition outside Poland, and others are too weak.

In order for Orbán’s Central Europe to take what he says is its rightful position in the EU, he defined five basic principles: a) defend its Christian culture and reject multiculturalism; b) defend the traditional family model; c) defend strategic sectors of the economy and markets of special importance; d) defend borders and not take in migrants; and e) insist on ‘one nation one vote’ principle when it comes to important issues.

Orbán warned that current Europe is corrupt and lacking direction. This is why it is necessary to establish a new political bloc that will gather all Christian-oriented parties –  Christian democracy must rise as the alternative to liberal democracy.

“This means we have to preserve the way of life that results from Christian civilisation. Our duty is not to defend religious norms, but the form that arises from them. This includes human dignity, family and nation because Christianity is not trying to achieve universality by abolishing the nation, but by preserving it,” Orbán said.

After this explanation was leaked to the public, it was clear that a split may be looming between the EPP and Orbán. But even then, EPP head in Parliament, Manfred Weber, asked Orbán to be conciliatory and modest before MEPs (one of the markings of a good Christian), to avoid the majority voting in favour of activating Article 7 against Hungary.

Orbán did not agree – he already has a plan B. Salvini and Austrian Vice-Chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache, the PiS and perhaps the ANO, the party of Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) headed by Janez Janša, possibly part of dissenters from the CSU in Bavaria (CSU), Marine Le Pen and her National Rally – all in all some 150 seats or more.

Next year may see Orbán and Fidesz outside the EPP, or in a new coalition, but without those from the group who voted against him. Because breaking up the EPP is the simplest way for the new right in Europe to come to power. That is Orbán’s plan.

Source: https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/orbans-manifesto-for-a-new-illiberal-europe/

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