Smoke billows from targets in Tel Abyad, Syria, during bombardment by Turkish forces. Photograph: Lefteris Pitarakis/AP

By invading northern Syria last week, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan achieved what many thought impossible – uniting all the regional countries and rival powers with a stake in the country in furious opposition to what they see as a reckless, destabilizing move.

A truculent nationalist-populist with dictatorial tendencies, Erdoğan has often cast himself as one man against the world during 16 consecutive years as Turkey’s prime minister and president. Now he really is on his own.

Fighting along the border is limited, so far, but that could quickly change. “Should hostilities intensify, a broader Turkish advance into densely populated areas could entail significant civilian casualties, displace many inhabitants and fuel local insurgency,” the International Crisis Group warned.

Even as the EU, the US, Russia, Iran, and the Arab states voice their differing objections to the invasion (Turkey terms it a “peace operation”), each is simultaneously trying to adjust to it, looking for advantage or leverage as the balance of power in Syria shifts again.

Erdoğan doubtless anticipated Europe’s hostile reaction. His response – a threat to send 3.6 million Syrian refugees westwards – was contemptuous. He knows the EU’s words are not matched by action. Nor is he fazed by calls to suspend Turkey from Nato.

Turkey’s relations with Europe were already at a low ebb because of its abysmal human rights record and thwarted EU membership bid. Now European leaders are paying a high price for past attempts to normalize Erdoğan’s authoritarianism. His latest actions prove he is no democrat, no ally and no friend.

While Europe has scant influence over what happens next, the US has plenty – but seems determined to throw it away. Despite denials, it is clear from the White House statement issued on 6 October that Donald Trump rashly agreed to Erdoğan’s invasion, without consulting his allies, and facilitated it by withdrawing ground forces.

It was a disastrous decision the US is belatedly scrambling to correct. Betraying the Kurds, comrades-in-arms in the fight against Isis, was bad enough. Appearing to abandon Syria to Russia and Iran, America’s rivals and the main backers of Bashar al-Assad’s criminal Damascus regime, was a big strategic own goal, capping eight years of post-Arab spring US policy failures.

It might be thought the Russians would be happy. After all, pushing the US out of Syria (and the wider Middle East) is their long-held aim. Yet Moscow’s reaction to the invasion has been largely negative, as was the case after Turkey intervened in Syria’s Idlib province last year.

When Vladimir Putin sent forces to Syria in 2015, he put his money on Assad to win, but victory has proved elusive, while costs – political and financial – have mounted. Erdoğan’s move further complicates matters by obstructing the peace settlement Russia, Iran (and Turkey) have been pursuing via the so-called Astana process.

That’s why Russia is urging the Kurds, now the US has abandoned them, to agree to a mutual defense pact or some kind of federal arrangement with Assad. And that’s why regime forces and pro-Iran militia are edging towards Kurdish-held areas from the south. Assad sees a chance to recapture lost territory. Erdoğan’s fatuous “safe zone” wheeze has no appeal for him.

Iran is not happy either, but for different reasons. It, too, wants to see the back of the Americans and has no love for the Kurds, a troublesome minority inside Iran. But Turkey’s move threatens Tehran’s hopes of controlling a northern territorial corridor linking it with its Shia allies in Lebanon – what Israel calls a “corridor of terror”.

After struggling to establish a pro-Tehran, Shia-dominated government in post-2003 Baghdad, Iran does not want to face another Sunni uprising across Syria and Iraq.

“The US withdrawal will kindle fears in Iran of a galvanized Sunni insurgency through a renascent Islamic State (Isis),” wrote regional analyst Bilal Baloch.

Worries about an Isis revival, considered more likely thanks to Turkey’s move, are common to all the regional players. Strangely, in this respect at least, the US, Iran and Saudi Arabia, on the brink of war a few weeks ago, now find themselves on the same side.

Arab governments including Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Lebanon, and the UAE, as well as the Saudis, have all condemned Turkey. After initially backing Syria’s rebels, several have pursued a cautious rapprochement with Assad in recent months, based on a shared interest in regional stability and upholding the principle of territorial sovereignty.

Arab leaders also object to Erdoğan’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and his neo-Ottoman ideas about Turkish regional dominance. Like Russia and Iran, they calculate, reluctantly but pragmatically, that the only way to end Syria’s war and contain Isis, is to back Assad. Erdoğan has now got in the way.

The crisis has produced another cautionary lesson: that American alliances cannot be trusted. The Kurds already knew this. They were betrayed in Iraq in 1991 when the US left Saddam Hussein in power at the end of the first Gulf war.

But US unreliability is new for the Saudi regime which, like Israel, ultimately depends on Washington for its security. The more the Saudis realize they cannot count on America, the more likely they are to mend fences with Iran. By some accounts, this is already happening.

How ironic if Trump’s Syrian cop-out – providing a reality check about the limits of American power – led indirectly to peace in the Gulf, an end to the Iran-Saudi proxy war in Yemen, and spiked the guns of US and Israeli hawks who have pushed so hard for war with Tehran.

Source: https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2019/oct/12/turkey-invasion-syria-trump-withdrawal-gulf-rivals-unite

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The Trump administration will send nearly 2,000 troops and advanced military equipment to Saudi Arabia to deter threats from Iran — a move that will increase America’s presence in the Middle East, even as President Donald Trump falsely boasts about ending wars in the region.

The announcement, made by Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Mark Milley on Friday, continues the administration’s campaign both to increase pressure on Tehran and deepen ties with Riyadh. The US has sent an additional 14,000 military members to the Middle East since May, which the 1,800 authorized Friday will add to.

That makes sense, as May was when the US and Iran became locked in a standoff that’s seen the US aggressively increase its stance in the region and consider striking Iran only to call it off at the last minute. It’s also seen Iran bomb oil tankers in strategic waterways and oil fields in Saudi Arabia, which Esper specifically cited as a reason for the increase.

Trump has repeatedly threatened retaliatory strikes and further crushing sanctions if Iran refuses to stop its attacks, though he hopes to sign a deal with the Islamic Republic’s leaders to further constrain its missile program, nuclear ambitions, and support for terrorists.

In the meantime, the Pentagon hopes that sending more fighter jets and air-defense systems to the region will keep Iran at bay.

“We thought it was important to send forces to deter and defend and to send a message to the Iranians: Do not strike another sovereign state. Do not threaten American interests and American forces, or we will respond,” Esper told reporters on Friday. “Do not mistake or restraint for weakness.”

Trump isn’t ending wars in the Middle East

It’s worth being clear about something: Trump is only augmenting America’s presence in the Middle East.

On Wednesday morning, Trump ripped America’s involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts over the past two decades.

Trump is right to note that the US has lost thousands of Americans and spent trillions of dollars fighting these conflicts (though not quite as many trillions as Trump suggests) — not to mention the suffering endured by citizens of these war-torn nations.

But Trump is saying these things to justify his decision on Sunday to move American troops in Syria — a decision that’s drawn bipartisan pushback. It’d be one thing if he were bringing all 1,000 US troops in the country home, but he’s not. Instead, he’s moving just 50 US service members out of northern Syria to get out of the way of a just-started Turkish invasion.

That’s not all. A late September report from US Air Forces Central Command showed that the US launched the most airstrikes in Afghanistan over a single month in roughly a decade. American troops have ramped up airstrikes in Libya targeting ISIS fighters there. And the US continues its shadow war in Somalia to fend off terrorist groups there.

To be fair, there are legitimate reasons to send more troops to Saudi Arabia: The move could help defend the US ally, could make Iran think twice before attacking Saudi Arabia again, and allows the US to respond to a crisis if necessary. But making this decision does nothing to end America’s presence in the Middle East — no matter what Trump says.

IN THIS STORYSTREAM

Iran nuclear deal: Trump withdraws the US from the agreement

• Trump says he’s ending the US role in Middle East wars. He’s sending 1,800 troops to Saudi Arabia.
• Trump escalates Iran tensions by sanctioning Foreign Minister Javad Zarif
  

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  Source: https://www.vox.com/world/2019/10/11/20909932/trump-iran-saudi-arabia-troops-esper

  [Disclaimer]

The post Trump says he’s ending the US role in Middle East wars. He’s sending 1,800 troops to Saudi Arabia first appeared on Garner Ted Armstrong Evangelistic Association.

The Belt and Road International Forum 2017. Photo: The Russian Presidential Press and Information Office

Great expectations are attached to China as a global power. China also has great expectations of itself. The world’s most populous state, however, is expending its energy primarily on securing internal stability, welfare and development, and this focus also determines its foreign policy priorities. The declining will of the United States to take global responsibility has triggered very mixed feelings in Beijing, but the prevailing view is that there is really has no other choice than to step up its global involvement. The Middle East is no exception.

But the Middle East is a challenging region. The list of the world’s most serious wars is dominated by conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Iraq (as well as Afghanistan, which can be seen as part of the so-called “wider Middle East”). Old alliances have come undone. Authoritarian leaders are consolidating their grip. The major social and political tensions that prompted widespread protests in 2011 are by no means resolved.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative – often referred to as the new Silk Road – is President Xi’s grand prestige project. The Belt & Road concept is elastic; it has become something of a catchphrase used to describe large parts of China’s activities overseas. The project’s main ambition is to link China and Europe through massive development of land-based and maritime infrastructure. Roads, railways and pipelines will cross the Middle East. The project is also supposed to contribute to local economic development, but is in danger of becoming a target for rebel groups or of falling victim to rivalries between political actors.

China’s role in the Middle East is already significant, although to not all that visible. Well over half of China’s oil imports come from the region. China has been clever in balancing its interests. For example, the country is a major importer of oil from both Iran and Saudi Arabia, and exports military technology to both countries. In Iraq, China does business both with the regime in Baghdad and with the government of the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan.

According to conventional wisdom, the Chinese are welcomed abroad because they don’t get involved in politics, and because they don’t impose demands about human rights, freedom of expression, or democracy. In recent years, however, we have seen an increasing willingness by China to become involved in political processes, for example in Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan and South Sudan. In the negotiations that led to the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, China made an important contribution though its direct contact with the Iranian leaders. In all these processes, China has kept its ambitions at a moderate level and has maintained a relatively low profile. Even so, this engagement represents an important shift.

The Belt and Road Initiative is already encountering difficulties. As armed conflicts and political instability persist, the question arises whether a more proactive China will succeed in balancing contradictory interests. The conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, for example, is escalating continually, and may put China’s strategy of balancing different interests to the test. Another challenge is that more and more countries are seeing the Chinese approach – with investments funded by large loans – as a recipe for dependency, as we have seen recently in Malaysia and Myanmar.

Traditionally, China’s global engagement has been primarily economic – all about access to raw materials and trade. The new Silk Road can be seen as an extension of this approach. But extensive construction activity, as well as major investments in physical infrastructure, also brings vulnerability. In Beijing, difficult discussions about how Chinese interests can be protected in the world’s most unstable areas, are being forced onto the agenda. The issue is not only to what extent, or how, to react politically. Ultimately, the discussion is also about the use of military means.

Military force may have several areas of application. Firstly, there is the matter of protecting Chinese citizens. The construction projects are heavily dependent on Chinese labour, and can become targets for rebel groups, as we have seen in Pakistan, among other places. Infrastructure projects may also be vulnerable to sabotage, and will require secure access for operation and maintenance. Ultimately, there is also the question to what extent China is becoming more willing to use military force to achieve overarching political objectives outside its national borders, something China has been very restrained about till now.

It can be enlightening to look at trends in the Chinese use of military force. One interesting feature is China’s increasing participation in peacekeeping operations, a very important element in the United Nations’ toolbox, and one for which resources have otherwise become more and more difficult to find. China has also shown interest in boosting other countries’ military capacity by providing training and equipment, not unlike the role Western countries have played in Afghanistan, Iraq and other places. In addition, we see the emergence of private-sector security actors that are being contracted by Chinese companies operating overseas. With this expanded palette, China has a greater range of options.

In Beijing, many people are worried both about the great expectations of what China can achieve, as well as about the risks of increasing China’s presence in the Middle East. There is a debate, but it is by no means clear what direction China will take. The history of US involvement in the region is not encouraging. Perhaps China has greater patience. Perhaps China will have a greater tolerance for uncertainty. But the Chinese do not entertain any illusions that they possess a bundle of instruments that will allow them to perform miracles in a region where many others have tried and failed.

Regardless, the position that China will gradually take up in the Middle East will be very important for development in the region. It will also have significance far beyond the region. The future relationship between the world’s great powers is, in large part, shaped by their actions in the world’s most conflict-ridden region.

Perhaps we will be able to draw further conclusions by keeping track of the situation in Syria in the months to come. In reality, Assad is the military victor, and it is very unlikely that any kind of inclusive peace agreement will be reached in Syria. As a result, Western countries will be very reluctant to get involved, and this will create room for other actors. Syria is strategically important geographically, and the country has significant reserves of oil and gas. At the same time, it is a challenging situation, with many parties and poor prospects for stability in the short term. How will China position itself here?

This text was first published in Norwegian in Bistandsaktuelt 30 October 2018: “Hva vil Kina gjøre med Midtøsten?”

Translation from English: Fidotext

Source: https://blogs.prio.org/2018/11/what-will-china-do-about-the-middle-east/

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